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76In a series of recent publications Jerry Fodor has attacked what many believe is the core of Darwinian theory of evolution – the theory of natural selection. Not surprisingly, Fodor’s attack has provoked a strong negative reaction. Fodor’s critics have insisted both that his main argument is unsound and that his central claim that the theory of natural selection “can’t explain the distribution of phenotypic traits in biological populations” is untenable. I can generally agree with the first part…Read more
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35The Principle Based Explanations Are Not Extinct in Cognitive Science: The Case of the Basic Level EffectsPhilosophia Scientiae 18 203-214. 2014.On observe une nouvelle tendance dans la philosophie des sciences cognitives, manifeste dans les écrits de Betchel et al. qui met en avant l’importance des explications mécanistes au détriment du rôle explicatif des principes. Cet article est un plaidoyer pour rétablir l’équilibre. Il met l’accent sur l’effort d’explication des effets du niveau de base, l’une des plus importantes découvertes empiriques dans l’histoire de la recherche en catégorisation. L’analyse de trois différentes périodes de …Read more
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32The Uses of Truth: Is There Room for Reconciliation of Factivist and Non-Factivist Accounts of Scientific Understanding?International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (3): 211-221. 2022.One of the most lively debates on scientific understanding is standardly presented as a controversy between the so-called factivists, who argue that understanding implies truth, and the non-factivists whose position is that truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. A closer look at the debate, however, reveals that the borderline between factivism and non-factivism is not as clear-cut as it looks at first glance. Some of those who claim to be quasi-factivists come suspiciously…Read more
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27VII. Sparse and dense categories: what they tell us about natural kindsIn Vesselin Petrov (ed.), Ontological Landscapes: Recent Thought on Conceptual Interfaces Between Science and Philosophy, De Gruyter. pp. 157-168. 2011.
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25‘Understanding it makes it normal’: is it a reasoning fallacy or not?Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3): 524-527. 2013.
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24On Some Non-trivial Implications of the View that Good Explanations Increase Our Understanding of Explained PhenomenaBalkan Journal of Philosophy 9 (1): 45-52. 2017.The central argument in this paper is the following: if we agree that one of the aims of explanation is to provide or increase understanding, and if we assess understanding on the basis of the inferences one can draw from the knowledge of the phenomenon which is understood, then the value of an explanation, i.e. its capacity to provide or increase understanding of the explained phenomenon, should be assessed on the basis of the extra-inferences which this explanation allows for. The extra-infere…Read more
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15The Principle Based Explanations Are Not Extinct in Cognitive Science: The Case of the Basic Level EffectsPhilosophia Scientiae 18 203-214. 2014.On observe une nouvelle tendance dans la philosophie des sciences cognitives, manifeste dans les écrits de Betchel et al. qui met en avant l’importance des explications mécanistes au détriment du rôle explicatif des principes. Cet article est un plaidoyer pour rétablir l’équilibre. Il met l’accent sur l’effort d’explication des effets du niveau de base, l’une des plus importantes découvertes empiriques dans l’histoire de la recherche en catégorisation. L’analyse de trois différentes périodes de …Read more
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7Philosophy of Science A-Z by Stathis Psillos (review)Balkan Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 159-162. 2009.
Lilia Gurova
New Bulgarian University
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New Bulgarian UniversityProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
General Philosophy of Science |