Lisa Broussois

We challenge effective altruism (EA) on the basis that it should be more inclusive regarding the demands of altruism. EA should consider carefully agents’ intentions and the role those intentions can play in agents’ moral lives. Although we argue that good intentions play an instrumental role and can lead to better results, by adopting a Hutchesonian perspective, we show that intentions should, first and foremost, be considered for their intrinsic value. We examine offsetting and geoengineering, two so-called solutions to climate change supported by EA, to highlight the limitations of a narrow understanding of altruism.

This article investigates new convergences between animal ethics and environmental ethics by focusing on the effects as well as the causes of climate change. Its main objective is to show how a non-anthropocentric approach to climate ethics can increase the potential of collaboration between animal ethics theorists and environmental ethics theorists. It develops an approach that explains how animal ethics, environmental ethics and climate ethics can converge at the theoretical level on the common problem of livestock farming. Then it explains how, from a practical point of view, the vegetarian and vegan diet as well as the vegan lifestyle can be a solution to this common problem. Finally, it replies to major objections in order to develop arguments in favour of a duty not to consume animal products.

This article investigates new convergences between animal ethics and environmental ethics by focusing on the effects as well as the causes of climate change. Its main objective is to show how a non-anthropocentric approach to climate ethics can increase the potential of collaboration between animal ethics theorists and environmental ethics theorists. It develops an approach that explains how animal ethics, environmental ethics and climate ethics can converge at the theoretical level on the common problem of livestock farming. Then it explains how, from a practical point of view, the vegetarian and vegan diet as well as the vegan lifestyle can be a solution to this common problem. Finally, it replies to major objections in order to develop arguments in favour of a duty not to consume animal products.

O que é “a outra perspectiva nas obras da natureza”, de que fala Hutcheson? De que forma a beleza provê acesso a ela? O presente artigo discute o lugar dessa “outra perspectiva” na teoria estética de Francis Hutcheson. Trata-se de compreender por que o desígnio (design) surge do belo através de uma reflexão sobre a beleza em sua Investigação sobre a origem de nossas ideias da beleza e da virtude, de 1725. Buscaremos determinar se essa teoria estética estaria subordinada aos argumentos do desígnio ou se, em Hutcheson, esse campo de pesquisa filosófica já goza de alguma autonomia.

This paper looks at two figures in the modern, European, eighteenth-century debate on luxury. It claims to better understand the differences between Francis Hutcheson and Bernard Mandeville by exploring how Hutcheson treated the topic of luxury as a distinction between two desires, thus differing from Mandeville's concept of luxury, and a concept of temperance based on moral sense. It explores why Hutcheson believed that luxury was a moral, social and political issue and particularly why he considered Mandeville the embodiment of a threat that went beyond simple considerations of the content of The Fable of the Bees to touch on reflections on the equilibrium of a social and political system. It aims to show how the psychological and the moral dimension were connected to Hutcheson's political theory and how luxury was one of the key points of this connection.

Le présent article a pour objectif de mettre en évidence un aspect de l’influence de Francis Hutcheson sur la troisième partie du Traité de la Nature Humaine de David Hume, consacrée à la morale : Hume écrit, en effet, que l’être humain est doté d’un sens moral. Cependant, la distinction qu’il opère entre la philosophie de l’anatomiste et celle du peintre, dans cette œuvre, montre qu’il se refuse à suivre totalement l’exemple de Hutcheson. Hume compte bien, au contraire, approfondir et compléter une philosophie morale qu’il trouve encore superficielle chez son contemporain et même si cela implique de devoir toucher et réinterpréter les concepts clés de ce dernier. Pourtant, à y regarder de près, la notion de sympathie contribue, d’un certain point de vue, à rapprocher les deux philosophies. Le sens moral de Hume, dans le Traité, ne serait-il pas bien plus qu’une simple expression vide de contenu, comme on l’a trop souvent supposé ? Et que serait-il alors ?