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    Hume’s Conception of Proper Reflection
    Hume Studies 38 (2): 129-155. 2012.
    The concept of reflection plays an equivocal role in the Treatise. It is identified as both the key to the formation of more accurate beliefs and the means to the destruction of belief altogether. I attempt to resolve this apparent paradox by showing that there are two distinct kinds of reflection in Book 1: legitimate, or “proper,” reflection and illegitimate reflection. Despite evidence to the contrary—including Hume’s own claim that he cannot establish that excessive reflections (one variant …Read more
  •  14
    In What Sense are Errors in Philosophy ‘Only Ridiculous’?
    Journal of Scottish Philosophy 12 (2): 213-229. 2014.
    In one of the closing paragraphs of Treatise Book 1, Hume provocatively concludes: ‘Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous’ . Unlike the first clause, the meaning of the second clause is far from obvious. I claim that errors in philosophy are ‘only ridiculous’ for Hume in the sense that – unlike errors in religion – they fail to disturb us psychologically or in practical life. The interesting question, however, is why they fail to disturb us…Read more
  •  12
    The Method in Hume's "Madness"
    Hume Studies 41 (1): 3-32. 2015.
    Hume’s response to his very personal encounter with skepticism is well known: “I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any farther”.1 As many commentators have noted, this “response” to skepticism is deeply unsatisfying. For example, Brian Ribeiro writes, “Having dinner …Read more