Lisa Kretz

In this paper I explore some of the ramifications that thinking ecologically has on thinking about the human self, identity, and ethics. Inspired and informed by the work of the late Val Plumwood, I recommend new directions for Plumwood’s application of ecological continuity to human self-concept. I applaud Plumwood’s recognition of continuity as a key theoretical concept. Her work on revising selfhood in ways both 1) consistent with various insights of ecology, and 2) informed by oppression theory, is innovative and a crucial theoretical move. Building on the work of Plumwood, I argue that an ecological self-concept should reflect dimensions of “open continuity” with the environment. Open continuity literally requires opening one’s self-concept in ways that require revising many presumptions of where one’s self leaves off and the other begins. The familiar notion of a clearly bound human self cannot serve as the hub of moral action and theory if it is to reflect key ecological insights. Attending to ecological selfhood reshapes human self-concept and the moral terrain.

This article gives a broad sense of existing debate about Global Citizenship Education to help situate and contextualize a novel case study. Scholars for Syria originated at a small university in southern Indiana. This grassroots response to the turmoil in Syria bridges the gap between a seemingly distant crisis and a midwestern city in the United States. The unique pedagogical and curricular dimensions of the case study work as a helpful framing device for facilitating exploration of debates about the shape of GCE, as well as providing new ways in which to imagine GCE curriculum, pedagogy, and embedding ethics into wider university initiatives.

I focus on North America, a locale with nations financially well-situated to avoid the worst of climate change harms for the longest duration through financial buttressing (at least for a subset of the population). Environmental action is often taken when one is affected negatively in direct and concrete ways. It is therefore unfortunate that populations with the most fiscal and political power have the greatest ability to avoid the sorts of environmental harm that pragmatically necessitate an immediate and comprehensive response. Within North America I focus my analysis on the population whose job it is to advance moral theory, namely practicing ethicists. I also focus on their students—those intellectually ..

For much of human history knowledge was communicated orally. Moral understandings were shared, developed and contextualized from generation to generation. Current moral theorists have argued that storied accounts may better serve to motivate ethical action and engage emotionally than standalone arguments. Over the years I found myself developing a story – which I spoke aloud to students in my introductory classes when we are starting work on non-human animal ethics, altering it and layering on elements year after year. Below is a written version.

Karen Warren’s work has helped to transform the landscape of environmental philosophy, contributing theoretical grounding for Western ecofeminism and opening the range of theoretical perspectives one can adopt when doing Western environmental ethics. Although her work is laudable, there are substantive worries about how potential subjects of oppression are characterized in her later work. Warren’s work and relevant secondary literature can be used as a foil to illuminate inadequate justification for the failure to include all living entities as potential subjects of the harm of oppression. The failure to provide conceptual room to include all entities that can rightfully be the potential subjects of oppression limits our understanding of oppression and the multiple ways in which it functions. Additionally, failure to attend to all potential subjects of oppression limits practical opportunities for anti-oppressive solidarity in political action. If oppression is correctly described as the harm of particular group members by others, and the class of living entities can be subjected to harm, then nonhuman living entities can potentially be subjects of oppression. The aim here is to provide conceptual support for the possibility that nonhuman life can be oppressed.

Peter Carruthers argues in favour of the position that the pains of non-human animals are nonconscious ones, and from this that non-human animals are due no moral consideration.1 I outline Carruthers’ argument in Section II, and call attention to significant overlap between Carruthers’ standpoint regarding non-human animals and Rene Descartes’ position. In Section III I specify various ways Carruthers’ premises are undefended. I argue that we are either forced to take seriously an absurd notion of pain experience that fails to be adequately defended, or we are forced to accept an underlying problematic ideology Carruthers shares with Descartes that begs the question of non-human animal consciousness. In Section IV I conclude by arguing from both a common sense and moral perspective that Carruthers’ analysis is fundamentally flawed

This paper is situated at the intersection of ethics, pedagogy, and bias. Various challenges for pedagogy that are posed by explicit and implicit bias are discussed. Potential solutions to such challenges are then explored. These include practices such as enhanced thought experiments, interviews, research projects, in-depth role-playing, action projects, and appropriately morally deferential experiential service-learning. Moral imagination can be beneficially stretched through adopting differing moral lenses and engaging and encouraging multiple empathizing; art and literary narrative provide helpful tools to this end. Also recommended is critical scrutiny focused on personal biases (including teacher bias) and developing curriculum focused on moral literacy. Such moves of necessity span from individual to public action given the environmental components of the operations of bias. Shaping ourselves through intentional environment construction and avoidance of undesirable environments is therefore identified as a valuable technique. Finally, the potential contribution of loving-kindness meditation is addressed. Although we may be unable at present to eradicate problematic forms of bias, there are multiple methods available to begin to ameliorate the harms associated with those forms of bias.

In Environmental Skill: Motivation, Knowledge, and the Possibility of a Non-Romantic Environmental Ethics, Mark Coeckelbergh presents an expansive approach to rethinking the ontological, epistemic, and ethical relationships humans have with the environment. It is a book with a wide historical scope rooted in the Western tradition, and it seeks to address the gap between humans’ ecological ideals and environmental practices.The text begins with an exploration of the psychological conditions for environmental change. Coeckelbergh seeks to bridge the gap between what we believe we should do and what we actually do. In other words, he is seeking to provide a solution to the theory-action gap. The theory-action gap with...

ABSTRACT. Ecological philosophy requires a significant orientation to the role of hope in both theory and practice. I trace the limited presence of hope in ecological philosophy, and outline reasons why environmental hopelessness is a threat. I articulate and problematize recent environmental publications on the topic of hope, the most important worry being that current literature fails to provide the necessary psychological grounding for hopeful action. I turn to the psychology of hope to provide direction for conceptualizing hope and actualizing hoped for states of affairs. If positive moral action is the goal, hope is a vital concept for underwriting ecological philosophy and a practice requiring considerably more attention.

Teaching ethics at the university level in the Western tradition tends to focus on teaching ethical theories, or—in the case of applied ethics—applying theories. Success in ethics courses is occasioned by the ability to articulate, and in some cases apply, ethical theories. Ratiocination about ethics is the focus. I contend that in so far as one of the goals of ethical education is becoming more ethical, current pedagogical models leave much to be desired. This paper makes a case for teaching being ethical. I recommend developing the skill sets required for enacting ethical behavior. Problems with historical methods of testing ethical development are assessed, and methods for testing ethical behavior are considered. I explore fertile sites for research and practice regarding the intersection of moral education and moral behavior. In particular I focus on the role of emotion, active learning techniques, moral exemplars, and addressing the relevance of self-concept.

‘This class is so [insert expletive] depressing.’ I overheard a student communicating this to a friend upon exiting one of my ethics courses and I wondered how my classes could generate a sense of empowerment rather than depression, a sense of hope rather than despair. Drawing from David Hume's and Martin Hoffman's work on the psychology of empathy and sympathy, I contend that dominant Western philosophical pedagogy is inadequate for facilitating morally empowered students. Moreover, I stipulate that an adequate analysis of the role emotion should play in pedagogy requires tending to the politics of emotional expression and how oppression functions. I argue that ethical educators have a moral responsibility to facilitate not only critical moral thinking but critical moral agency. Part of ethical education should involve the provision of tools for effective citizen engagement, and reasoning alone is insufficient for this goal. The role of emotion in ethical decision-making and action remains devalued and u..