•  4
    De dichter Dèr Mouw en de klassieke oudheid (review)
    Mnemosyne 31 (3): 338-341. 1978.
  •  83
    Second-Order Arithmetic Sans Sets
    Philosophia Mathematica 21 (3): 339-350. 2013.
    This paper examines the ontological commitments of the second-order language of arithmetic and argues that they do not extend beyond the first-order language. Then, building on an argument by George Boolos, we develop a Tarski-style definition of a truth predicate for the second-order language of arithmetic that does not involve the assignment of sets to second-order variables but rather uses the same class of assignments standardly used in a definition for the first-order language
  •  95
    The liar, context and logical form
    Journal of Logic, Language and Information 13 (3): 267-286. 2004.
    This essay attempts to give substance to the claim that the liar''sparadox shows the truth predicate to be context sensitive. The aim ismodest: to provide an account of the truth predicate''s contextsensitivity (1) that derives from a more general understanding ofcontext sensitivity, (2) that does not depend upon a hierarchy ofpredicates and (3) that is able to address the liar''s paradox. Theconsequences of achieving this goal are not modest, though. Perhapssurprisingly, for reasons that will b…Read more
  •  57
    Why the liar does not matter
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3): 323-341. 2003.
    This paper develops a classical model for our ordinary use of the truth predicate (1) that is able to address the liar's paradox and (2) that satisfies a very strong version of deflationism. Since the model is a classical in the sense that it has no truth value gaps, the model is able to address Tarski's indictment of our ordinary use of the predicate as inconsistent. Moreover, since it is able to address the liar's paradox, it responds to arguments against deflationism based upon that paradox a…Read more