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Louis Doulas

University of California, Irvine
  •  Home
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 More details
  • University of California, Irvine
    Department of Philosophy
    Doctoral student
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Irvine, California, United States of America
0000-0002-6810-8347
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
20th Century Analytic Philosophy
G. E. Moore
Philosophical Methods
Metaphysics
19th Century Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
General Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Mathematics
4 more
  • All publications (4)
  •  984
    Against philosophical proofs against common sense
    with Evan Welchance
    Analysis 81 (2). 2021.
    Many philosophers think that common sense knowledge survives sophisticated philosophical proofs against it. Recently, however, Bryan Frances (forthcoming) has advanced a philosophical proof that he thinks common sense can’t survive. Exploiting philosophical paradoxes like the Sorites, Frances attempts to show how common sense leads to paradox and therefore that common sense methodology is unstable. In this paper, we show how Frances’s proof fails and then present Frances with a dilemma.
    MetaphysicsG. E. MooreParadoxesPhilosophical ProgressPhilosophical Methods
  •  683
    A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics
    Philosophical Studies 178 (2): 493-513. 2021.
    Some metaphysicians believe that existence debates are easily resolved by trivial inferences from Moorean premises. This paper considers how the introduction of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that command Moorean certainty—complicates this picture. In particular, it shows how such facts, when combined with certain plausible metaontological principles, generate a puzzle that commits the proponents of this method to a contradiction.
    Ontological CommitmentExistenceMetaontology, MiscOntology, MiscMethodology in Metaphysics
  •  194
    What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on
    with Annalisa Coliva
    Synthese 200 (3): 1-14. 2022.
    Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another wa…Read more
    Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both to skeptical and anti-skeptical intuitions concerning the possibility and scope of philosophical knowledge. The main advantage of our account is that it’s able to recover some philosophical knowledge while also being compatible with philosophical skepticism.
    Skepticism, MiscEpistemology of Philosophy, MiscEpistemology of DisagreementMetaphilosophical Skepti…Read more
    Skepticism, MiscEpistemology of Philosophy, MiscEpistemology of DisagreementMetaphilosophical SkepticismLudwig Wittgenstein
  •  143
    Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement
    with Annalisa Coliva
    In Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Richard Rowland (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge. forthcoming.
    This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theo…Read more
    This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theoretic account.
    Metaphilosophical SkepticismEpistemology of DisagreementLudwig WittgensteinPhilosophical ProgressEpi…Read more
    Metaphilosophical SkepticismEpistemology of DisagreementLudwig WittgensteinPhilosophical ProgressEpistemology of Philosophy, MiscSkepticism
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