•  987
    The openness of illusions
    Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 25-44. 2011.
    Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporar…Read more
  •  431
    A book of tremendous influence when it first appeared, A Mind of One's Own reminded readers that the tradition of Western philosophy-- in particular, the ideals of reason and objectivity-- has come down to us from white males, nearly all of whom are demonstrably sexist, even misogynist. In this second edition, the original authors continue to ask, What are the implications of this fact for contemporary feminists working within this tradition? The second edition pursues this question about the va…Read more
  •  323
    Feeling fine about the mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2): 381-87. 1997.
    The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects
  •  257
    Atheism, Naturalism, and Morality
    In Raymond Arragon & Michael Peterson (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edition, John Wiley & Sons. pp. 66-78. 2020.
    It is a commonly held view that the existence of moral value somehow depends upon the existence of God. Some proponents of this view take the very strong position that atheism entails that there is no moral value; but most take the weaker position that atheism cannot explain what moral value is, or how it could have come into being. Call the first position Incompatibility, and the second position Inadequacy. In this paper, I will focus on the arguments for Inadequacy. There are two main ar…Read more
  •  244
    Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force
    Philosophical Review 98 (April): 153-87. 1989.
    Concern about two problems runs through the work of davidson: the problem of accounting for the "explanatory force" of rational explanations, and the problem posed for materialism by the apparent anomalousness of psychological events. davidson believes that his view of mental causation, imbedded in his theory of "anomalous monism," can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. however, it is argued in this paper that davidson's program contains a fundamental inconsistency; that his metaphy…Read more
  •  178
    Atheists are frequently demonized as arrogant intellectuals, antagonistic to religion, devoid of moral sentiments, advocates of an "anything goes" lifestyle. Now, in this revealing volume, nineteen leading philosophers open a window on the inner life of atheism, shattering these common stereotypes as they reveal how they came to turn away from religious belief. These highly engaging personal essays capture the marvelous diversity to be found among atheists, providing a portrait that will surpris…Read more
  •  176
    Making room for the mental
    Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2): 37-44. 1999.
  •  144
    I argue for a deflationary answer to the question, “What is it to be a woman?” Prior attempts by feminist theorists to provide a metaphysical account of what all and only women have in common have all failed for the same reason: there is nothing women have in common beyond being women. Although the social kinds man and woman are primitive, their existence can be explained. I say that human sex difference is the material ground of systems of gender; gender systems serve to enable male control of …Read more
  •  133
    : Feminism is an antiauthoritarian movement that has sought to unmask many traditional "authorities" as ungrounded. Given this, it might seem as if feminists are required to abandon the concept of authority altogether. But, we argue, the exercise of authority enables us to coordinate our efforts to achieve larger social goods and, hence, should be preserved. Instead, what is needed and what we provide for here is a way to distinguish legitimate authority from objectionable authoritarianism
  •  132
    Situating Feminist Epistemology
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 31-40. 2000.
    I understand feminist epistemology to be epistemology put at the service of feminist politics. That is, a feminist epistemology is dedicated to answering the many questions about knowledge that arise in the course of feminist efforts to understand and transform patriarchal structures, questions such as: Why have so many intellectual traditions denigrated the cognitive capacities of women? Are there gender differences in epistemic capacities or strategies, and what would be the implications for e…Read more
  •  127
    Meaning and semantic knowledge: Louise M. Antony
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1). 1997.
  •  120
    Naturalized Epistemology, Morality, and the Real World
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement): 103-137. 2000.
  •  109
    Equal Rights for Swamp‐persons
    Mind and Language 11 (1): 70-75. 1996.
  •  103
    Fodor and LePore's reconstruction of the semantic holism debate in terms of "atomism" and "anatomism" is inadequate: it fails to highlight the important issue of how intentional contents are individuated, and excludes or obscures several possible positions on the metaphysics of content. One such position, "weak sociabilism" is important because it addresses concerns of Fodor and LePore's molecularist critics about conditions for possession of concepts, without abandoning atomism about content in…Read more
  •  84
    Mental Causation (review)
    Philosophical Review 105 (4): 564. 1996.
    The old problem about mental causation arises out of dualism: if minds are not physical, how can they interact causally with bodies? The new problem about mental causation arises, ironically, out of materialism: if everything that happens, including intentional action, has a wholly physical cause, what room is left for distinctively mental causes? This is the problem to which the essays in Heil and Mele’s extremely useful volume are devoted. Although mental causation enthusiasts will recognize m…Read more
  •  81
    Empty heads?
    Mind and Language 16 (2): 193-214. 2001.