•  1
    Theory Theory (Simulation Theory, Theory of Mind)
    In M. Binder, N. Hirokawa, U. Windhorst & H. Hirsch (eds.), Encyclopedia of Neuroscience. pp. 4064-4067. 2008.
  • This chapter focuses on Davidson’s discussion regarding the phenomenon of self-knowledge and its puzzling features, and how he has placed it in a central place within his philosophy. This chapter begins by providing an overview of the concept of “psychological self-knowledge,” which is considered unlike any other form of knowledge. In contrast to our knowledge of the rest of the world or our knowledge of others’ mental states, we usually know the contents of our current mental states without rec…Read more
  • Postscript: Human Uniqueness in a Comparative Perspective
    In Louise Röska-Hardy & Eva M. Neumann-Held (eds.), Learning from Animals? Examining the Nature of Human Uniqueness, Psychology Press. pp. 209-210. 2008.
  •  1
    ‘I’ and the First Person Perspective
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 32 119-124. 1998.
    Do the special features of 'I' have epistemological and metaphysical implications? Many philosophers have thought so. Here I investigate the relation between the first person singular pronoun 'I' and the first person perspective, construed as the perspective of consciousness. First, I discuss the semantics of 'I' as a lexeme of a natural language. The fact that semantic reference and speaker reference always coincide in the case of 'I' is shown to have important consequences: it explains the 're…Read more
  •  4
    Self-Ascription and Simulation Theory
    ProtoSociology 14 115-144. 2000.
    This paper examines the two leading simulation approaches to mental selfascription, Alvin Goldman’s introspectionist account and Robert Gordon’s nonintrospectionist, “ascent routine” account, with a view to determining their adequacy as accounts of our ordinary self-ascriptions of mental states.I begin by reviewing the features of everyday mental state ascriptions and argue that an adequate account of mental state attribution must be able to account for the salient features of those mental attri…Read more
  •  8
    Sprechen, Sprache und Handeln
    ProtoSociology 1 72-86. 1991.
    The idea that saying it are doings is a platitude among speech act theorists.In the following I argue that the assimilations of the speakers intentions, belieft and desires to the linguistic meaning of expression types in J.R. Searles influential speech act theory precludes or explaining saying truely as doings, iE. speciftcly as linguistic actions.An adequate explanation of speech acts must treat linguistic meaning of expression type and the speakers intentions, beliefs and desires as seperate,…Read more
  • Die « Bedeutung » in natürlichen Sprachen
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 179 (1): 118-118. 1989.
  • Die „Bedeutung” in natürlichen Sprachen
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (3): 574-574. 1990.
  •  4
    Reframing the Issues
    ProtoSociology 21 194-211. 2005.
    In his philosophy Donald Davidson developed original proposals, suggested innovative applications and moved philosophical debate forward by reframing key issues in analytic philosophy. In doing so, he attempted to bring about a profound transformation of the problems of modern philosophy by reframing philosophical issues. It is argued that essays in the collection, Donald Davidson, edited by Kirk Ludwig, show that the profound consequences of Davidson’s way of reframing issues about meaning, age…Read more
  •  6
    Denken, Handeln und Erklärung durch Gründe: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 43 (2): 259-270. 1995.
  •  7
    „Gehirne im Dialog “?
    In Tobias Müller & Thomas M. Schmidt (eds.), Ich Denke, Also Bin Ich Ich?: Das Selbst Zwischen Neurobiologie, Philosophie Und Religion, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. pp. 14--113. 2011.
  •  5
    Language Acts and Action
    ProtoSociology 10 67-85. 1997.
    Speech act theorists agree unanimously that language or speech acts are a species of intentional action. I argue that J.R. Searle’s influential speech act theory actually precludes our explaining sayings truly as doings, i.e. as linguistic actions, because it assimilates speakers’ beliefs, desires and intentions to the linguistic meaning of expression types. An adequate explanation of speech acts as intentional performances must treat the meanings of expression types and speakers’ beliefs, desir…Read more