Luan Corrêa da Silva

RESUMO O presente artigo tem por objetivo caracterizar a “metafísica prática ” em Schopenhauer. Segundo essa caracterização, a metafísica prática corresponde ao correlato prático da “metafísica teórica” e, desse modo, ao correlato empírico do discurso filosófico. Para Schopenhauer, isto equivale a afirmar a possibilidade de comprovação, via experiencia, da tese metafísica fundante de “O mundo como vontade e como representação”, a saber, da identidade metafísica da vontade subjacente aoplano da multiplicidade aparente. Por funcionar como uma espécie de prova empírica desta tese metafísica, a metafísica prática é também Experimentalmetaphysik, isto é, “metafísica experimental”. ABSTRACT This article aims to characterize the “practicalmetaphysics” in Schopenhauer. According to this characterization, the practical metaphysics corresponds to the practical correlate of the “theoretical metaphysics” and thus to the empirical correlate of the philosophical discourse. For Schopenhauer, this is equivalent to affirm the possibility of proving, via experience, the metaphysical founding thesis of “The World as Will and Representation”, namely, the metaphysical identity of the will underlying the plane of apparent multiplicity. Due to the fact that itfunctions as a kind of empirical proof of this metaphysical thesis, the practical metaphysics is also Experimentalmetaphysik, that is, “experimental metaphysics”.

Resumo: Arthur Schopenhauer possui uma concepção acerca da natureza do conceito que atravessa o seu pensamento, desde o início de sua produção filosófica. Inicialmente abordado a partir de sua acepção racional abstrata, em O mundo como vontade e como representação, o conceito adquire traços mais profundos em função do sentimento. O conceito “não-conceito” sentimento determinará os rumos da filosofia de Schopenhauer, ao evidenciar os limites da linguagem. A linguagem filosófica, por consequência, exprime um paradoxo, pois pretende expressar em linguagem abstrata um conteúdo concreto cuja natureza não pode ser por ela determinado. Por ser um construto conceitual abstrato, a linguagem filosófica possui um estatuto ontológico secundário e, portanto, incompleto, em relação ao conteúdo da realidade concreta. Este artigo pretende mostrar que os sentimentos são, nesse sentido, o meio não conceitual que esclarece a própria natureza dos conceitos e, por consequência, a via não-filosófica que paradoxalmente melhor expressa o conteúdo da filosofia. No registro do sentimento, Schopenhauer reconhece na linguagem musical o âmbito de justificação adequado da linguagem filosófica.: Arthur Schopenhauer has a notion about the nature of the concept that runs through his thinking since the beginning of his philosophical production. Initially approached from its abstract rational meaning, in The world as will and representation, the concept acquires deeper traces from sentiment. The “non-concept” concept of sentiment will determine the direction of Schopenhauer”s philosophy by highlighting the limits of language. The philosophical language, therefore, expresses a paradox, since it intends to manifest, in abstract language, a concrete content, whose nature cannot be determined by it. As an abstract conceptual construct, philosophical language has a secondary and, thus, incomplete ontological status in relation to the content of concrete reality. Sentiments are the non-conceptual medium that clarifies the nature of concepts itself, and, consequently, the non-philosophical way that paradoxically best expresses the content of philosophy. In the recording of sentiment, Schopenhauer recognizes in musical language the proper justification scope of philosophical language.

This article aims to establish the basis for understanding "sympathy" in Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy. In an undeveloped passage, Schopenhauer defines the concept of sympathy as the empirical irruption of the metaphysical identity of the will through the physical plurality of its appearances, which shows a connection completely different from that known we through the principle of reason. In characterizing sympathy, Schopenhauer seems to indicate both a conception of sympathy from the moral feeling, and a cosmological-metaphysical conception of this concept. Following the clue left by the philosopher of the will, these conceptions seem to find an adequate clarification in the thoughts of Hume and Plotinus. Both develop, in their own way, two conceptions of sympathy, which aid and enrich Schopenhauer's approach. While from Hume the conception of the communication of feelings and affections is extracted, Plotinus develops a conception of the sympathy from the primordial unit of the cosmos. In the face of the two positions, which exert mutual and indirect influence on Schopenhauer, a connection between ethics and metaphysics, between the stricto sensu morality of the individual and the lato sensu morality of the cosmos, becomes possible.