Luca Forgione

Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense, or empirical apperception, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. As we will see, the doctrine of apperception is not to be confused with an introspective psychological approach: in reality, it is a formal model for the thinking activity itself which explains the most central concepts regarding subjecthood.

In this issue of Studies in Transcendental Philosophy five scholars enquire about the theoretical aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy related to the notions of subject, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge. Andrew Brook examines Kant’s views on transcendental apperception at the end of the Critical Period, focusing on Opus Postumum which contains some of Kant’s most important reflections on the subjective dimension. As is known, the self-conscious act designated by the proposition ‘I think’ is an act of spontaneity, and this spontaneity is the reason that the subject calls itself an intelligence. In his article Addison Ellis examines the theoretical and practical dimension of spontaneity, calling into question the distinction between a merely ‘relative’ spontaneity and one that is ‘absolute’. Luca Forgione points to two forms of self-consciousness introduced by Kant: inner sense, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira’s article presents a systematic and a historical approach, linking the contemporary debate on transcendental argument to Kant’s philosophy. It addresses both Stroud’s objection and Strawson’s perspective on transcendental argument and introduces a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation as successful truth-directed transcendental argument. In contrast to the contemporary movement of transhumanism and its claims that creatures like us can exist independently of our bodies, Robert Hanna develops a generalist perspective on the subjective dimension, according to which all rational human creature are synthetic a priori necessarily, essentially embodied Kantian selves. I would like to thank the authors for participating in this issue and for helping to make it really special.

In recent years, nonconceptual content theories have seen Kant as a reference point for his notion of intuition (§§ 1-3). This work aims to dismiss the possibility that intuition is provided with an autonomous function of de re knowledge. To this end, it will explore certain epistemological points that emerge from Garroni’s reading of the Third Critique in the conviction that they provide a suitable context to verify the presence of autonomous, epistemically nonconceptual content in the transcendental system (§§ 4-5). It is here, in fact, that Kant discusses those cases where intuition is given without bringing into play the conceptual component. As Garroni posits, in this frame of reference, such content cannot subsist without the interplay between aesthetic and conceptual dimensions (§§ 6-7). Long before the development of the debate on Kantian nonconceptualism, and during the period in which the Kantian debate on the epistemic considerations contained in the Third Critique was developing deeply for the first time, Garroni had already identified a theoretical position on these issues, which can be labelled aesthetic conceptualism, thanks to his fundamentally epistemological reading of the Third Critique.

The of aim of this paper is to enquire about some theoretical aspects of Kant’s philosophy that are connected to the representation ‘I’ and the question of self-identification in self-consciousness. The subjective capacity to represent itself through the representation ‘I’ will be articulated on the basis of the structure the so-called de se or I-thoughts developed by Perry and Recanati. In this regard, a contrast between Longuenesse’s view and my approach on self-identification and the different uses of I as subject will be considered.

Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded in a sensory form of self-awareness and transcendental apperception. The aim of this paper is to show that a sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness, which contains a pre-reflective self-consciousness as its first level, is provided by the notion of transcendental apperception. The necessity for a pre-reflective self-consciousness has been pointed out in phenomenological literature. According to this account, every self-ascription of any property implies a more fundamental form of self-consciousness, i.e., a kind of immediate familiarity with oneself. This pre-reflective self-consciousness is a non-relational and non-identificational form of self-consciousness and concerns an immediate acquaintance of the subject with itself. In the specific terms of transcendentalism every thought contains an implicit reference to a first-personal “givenness” or a sense of “mineness” that articulates a non-relational and non-identificational form of a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness.

Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, apparently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the specific terms of Transcendentalism.

The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory?

Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thou-ghts which can be described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. Self-consciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analyse a few considerations about Descartes and Hume’s approaches to self-consciousness, as both philosophers introduce a first-personal method of accessing the subjective dimension through an introspective account. Descartes’s view on self-consciousness seems incapable of conceiving and recognizing herself as herself, while Hume’s seems to lack those features assigned to the consciousness of self-as-subject

This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation ‘I think’ that the subject’s capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant’s theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: 1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation ‘I’; 2) an epistemic problem regarding the type of knowledge relative to the thinking subject produced by the representation ‘I think’; and 3) a strictly metaphysical problem regarding the features assigned to the thinking subject’s nature. The author connects the relevant scholarly literature on Kant with contemporary debates on the huge philosophical field of self-knowledge. He develops a formal reading according to which the unity of self-consciousness does not presuppose the identity of a real subject, but a formal identity based on the representation ‘I think’.

The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same philosophical concerns and focus on the same type of reference involved in the “I", obviously via different philosophical paths and antipodal metaphysical assumptions.

Recentemente Cellucci (2008) ha argomentato che la riflessione filosofica, per essere feconda, deve essere tra le altre cose un’indagine sul mondo che mira in primo luogo alla conoscenza. In questa indagine la filosofia è contigua alla scienza, entrambe non devono avere alcuna restrizione nei loro campi di applicazione, entrambe utilizzano sostanzialmente gli stessi metodi. Inoltre, e in ciò si misurerebbe il maggior valore della filosofia, questa batte vie ancora inesplorate dando origine, eventualmente, a nuove scienze.La scienza cognitiva, lo sfondo teorico adottato in queste pagine per affrontare la dimensione comunicativa, è un approccio interdisciplinare che mette insieme diversi campi di ricerca per analizzare la mente e i processi cognitivi, ed è nata da antiche intuizioni filosofiche, sostanzialmente dall'incontro di diverse tradizioni filosofiche con alcuni sviluppi della logica e dell’informatica. È dunque il prodotto di una riflessione filosofica feconda. Nel cap. 1 sono stati presentati i principali modelli della comunicazione del Novecento, e sono stati da ultimo toccati alcuni contributi classici che si situano nel solco degli studi della scienza cognitiva. In questo capitolo si illustreranno gli elementi che compongono questo specifico approccio, e si cercherà di isolare alcune questioni di fondo che attualmente animano il dibattito sul rapporto tra mente, linguaggio e comunicazione.

Questo libro indaga la natura dell’autocoscienza, ossia la capacità tutta umana di essere consapevoli della propria sfera mentale. E si colloca nell’alveo della riflessione strettamente filosofica, privilegiando sia un approccio filosofico-linguistico e mentalista sia una ricostruzione del pensiero di alcuni tra i protagonisti della modernità e del dibattito contemporaneo. In particolare, vengono affrontate le caratteristiche specifiche della capacità dell’uomo di rappresentare linguisticamente e mentalmente il proprio io, esaminando gli aspetti problematici dell’argomento: se si parte dal cosiddetto modello riflessivo e si considera l’autocoscienza come una scissione del soggetto che prende a oggetto del suo pensiero se stesso, emergono svariate questioni e difficoltà epistemiche e metafisiche, evidenziate in modo sorprendentemente simile da diverse tradizioni filosofiche: da Descartes a Husserl, da Kant a Wittgenstein, passando tra gli altri per Strawson, Henrich, Castañeda, Shoemaker, Evans e Frank. In questo quadro viene difesa la cosiddetta tesi dell’ubiquità, che afferma una sorta di pervasività della dimensione soggettiva in ogni esperienza cosciente.

As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects of Kan’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting with textual evidence even from the logical corpus, in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant’s adherence to this view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind Kant appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference.

Presupponendo l’influenza di alcune tesi dell’idealismo di Kant su alcune tesi di Wittgenstein non solo attraverso la lettura di Schopenhauer, questo contributo prova a ripercorrere alcune contiguità e differenze tra il dispositivo autoreferenziale dell’appercezione trascendentale e certi aspetti emersi dal dibattito contemporaneo sul carattere irriducibile dell’autoascrizione dei pensieri che contengono un riferimento in prima persona, i cosiddetti I-thoughts, dibattito ispirato da Wittgenstein e dalla sua analisi filosofico-linguistica della grammatica del termine “Io”.

In the last few years, various Kantian commentators have drawn attention on a number of features in the self-reference device of transcendental apperception having emerged from the contemporary debate on the irreducibility of self-ascription of thoughts in the first person. Known as I-thoughts, these have suggested a connection between some aspects of Kant’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I. This paper would like to review some of such correspondences (§§ 1-3), avoiding any mechanical association between Kant and an elusive reading of the I think, e.g. as suggested mutatis mutandis by McDowell and Kitcher (§§ 4-7).

Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least two diametrically opposed attitudes: the first – exemplified in the works by Hacker, Becker, Sturma and McDowell – considers the features of the I think according to Wittgenstein’s approach to the I as subject while the second, exemplified by Kitcher and Carl, criticizes the various commentators who turn to Wittgenstein in order to interpret Kant’s I think. The hypothesis that I will attempt at articulating in this paper starts off not only from the transcendental apperception form, but also from the characterizations of empirical apperception. It may be assumed that Kant’s reflection on the problem of self-identification lies right here, truly prefiguring some features of Wittgenstein’s uses of I, albeit from different metaphysical assumptions and philosophical horizons.

The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: (1) in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; (2) in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It proves helpful to interpret the “transcendental subject” in formal terms as a concept that, mutatis mutandis, has the same function of the concept of the “transcendental object.”

Approfondendo lo schema dell’immaginazione, introdotto da Kant nella Critica della Ragione Pura per risolvere l’applicazione tra concetti e intuizioni, diversi commentatori hanno individuato alcuni legami con l’impostazione di Wittgenstein, soprattutto con le nozioni di immagine del Tractatus logico-philosophicus e di regola delle Ricerche filosofiche. Partendo da una prospettiva filosofico-linguistica, in particolare dalla questione della denominazione, questo saggio prova a ripercorrere alcuni punti critici che emergono dal tale confronto (§ 1),affrontando sia le difficoltà epistemiche interne alla riflessione kantiana sia gli aspetti che caratterizzano il suo paradigma procedurale (§ 2e § 3), per individuare un accostamento plausibile all’impresa filosofica di Wittgenstein (§ 4 e § 5).

Henrich (1966) has contributed to the revival of philosophical debates on subjectivity and its irreducibility, starting from Fichte’s notion of "insight", and focusing his attention on the reflective model of self-consciousness. Subsequent studies have followed the same line from different perspectives, emphasizing the basic role of pre-reflective self-consciousness as the condition of possibility of conscious experience. The so-called ubiquity thesis has been developed through analysis of indexical thinking.

È un'introduzione alla semiotica del cinema, divisa in tre parti che affrontano alcune specifiche dimensioni teoriche. La prima parte si sofferma sulla nascita del dibattito in semiotica del cinema, dalla metà degli anni '60 fino agli anni '70, per approfondire le nozioni di segno, codice, testo. La seconda parte affronta in chiave narratologica gli studi filmici: la questione è stabilire le caratteristiche che definiscono la nozione di narratività e la possibilità di assegnare al testo filmico lo statuto narrativo emerso dagli studi strettamente legati all'analisi testuale di natura scritturale. Infine, la terza parte si sofferma sulla dimensione pragmatica, in particolare approfondisce il dispositivo dell'enunciazione e sempre in chiave comparata prova a cogliere contiguità e differenze tra l'ambito scritturale e quello filmico.