University of Maastricht

My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept an intermediate view
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept an intermediate view
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible