Luciano Garofalo

El debate acerca de la naturaleza de la percepción o aísthēsis en Aristóteles puede rastrearse ya en las obras de los comentadores antiguos. Desde hace un par de siglos, dos interpretaciones rivales se han posicionado como variantes extremas que nos aportan una concepción «literalista», o, por el contrario, «espiritualista», del fenómeno en cuestión. Sin embargo, ambas posturas coinciden en reducir la percepción a un asunto meramente «dado»: bien sea puramente fisiológico, o bien, únicamente intencional. Como consecuencia de ello, el dominio conceptual resultaría separado de lo perceptual, algo que, según la célebre expresión de McDowell, representaría un punto de vista encantado por el «Mito de lo Dado». En este artículo defenderé una visión moderada del problema a través de una consideración sobre lo que podría denominarse el «espacio lógico» de la percepción, poniendo de relieve el papel conjunto y sintético de la diánoia en el discernimiento propio que implica todo proceso sensoperceptivo del alma específica del hombre. Si mi interpretación es correcta, difícilmente podría decirse que Aristóteles incurre en este tipo de mitología.

The aim of the present paper is provide an overview of Husserl’s thoughts about meaning, such as they are exposed in his Logical Investigations. Specifically, our interpretation is framed in the context of the First one, in which the author performs a complex analysis about the types of acts involved in the utterance of all expressions. However, unlike some other theories of indirect reference, what is peculiar to the Husserl’s conception is that implies a different relation to objects, namely, the intentionality. This one, as an intrinsic character of some mental states, is the axis on which turns the notion of meaning, and enables that their appropriate correlates be obtained. Therefore is not a relational phenomenon, strictly speaking, what which is paradoxical.

The purpose of this article is offer a wide view of the Aristotle’s thoughts about the logical concept of truth. In sight of this, we analyze different writings in the Aristotelian corpus where we find an explicit consideration about this subject-matter, namely: in Metaphysics, De Interpretatione and the treatise De Anima. We believe that the formulation contained in Metaphysics, IV, 7, 1011b25, well-known as the famous Aristotelian «dictum», is not, truly, the most accomplished. Elsewhere he presents another characterization thereof whose specificity is to be delimited only to declaratives sentences. Which is why, first of all, we explain what requirements must be fulfilled by these to be considered as truth bearers. Subsequently, we expose the various definitions of truth throughout his work. In our opinion, the Aristotelian concept of truth can be seen as a particular account of the correspondence theory.