•  42
    Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?)
    Philosophical Explorations 21 (3): 333-349. 2018.
    Matthew Boyle [. “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 : 223–241. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x] has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find…Read more
  •  31
    Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2): 230-252. 2019.
    ABSTRACTA widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the…Read more
  •  74
    Two notions of intentional action? Solving a puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3): 578-602. 2018.
    The account of intentional action Anscombe provides in her Intention has had a huge influence on the development of contemporary action theory. But what is intentional action, according to Anscombe? She seems to give two different answers, saying first that they are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second that they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. Anscombe gives no explicit account of how these two characterizations conv…Read more
  •  74
    An epistemology for practical knowledge
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2): 159-177. 2018.
    Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s acc…Read more