•  4
    First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind
    Philosophical Quarterly 43 (171): 272-273. 1993.
  • Beings and Doings
    . forthcoming.
  • 'Action and immunity to error through misidentification'
    In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to error through misidentification, Cambridge University Press. pp. 124-143. 2012.
    In this paper I want to examine a claim made about the kind of immunity through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM) that attaches to action self-ascriptions. In particular, I want to consider whether we have reason to think a stronger kind of immunity attaches to action self-ascriptions, than attaches to self-ascriptions of bodily movement. I assume we have an awareness of our actions – agent’s awareness – and that agent’s awareness is not a form of perceptual bodily awareness. …Read more
  •  2
    Mental actions and the no-content problem
    In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  2
    Ordinary self-consciousness
    In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-122. 2011.
  •  117
    Ambulo Ergo Sum
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 57-75. 2015.
    It is an extraordinary thing that Descartes' famous Cogito argument is still being puzzled over; this paper is another fragment in an untiring tradition of puzzlement. The paper will argue that, if I were to ask the question the Cogito could provide for a positive answer. In particular, my aim in this is to argue, in opposition to recent discussion by John Campbell, that there is a way of construing conscious thinking on which the Cogito can be seen to provide a non-question begging argument for…Read more
  •  22
    Getting Out of Your Head: Addiction and the Motive of Self‐Escape
    with Daniel Morgan
    Mind and Language 31 (3): 314-334. 2016.
    This article explores and defends the claim that addictive desires—for alcohol in particular—are partly explained by the motive of self-escape. We consider how this claim sits with the neurophysiological explanation of the strength of addictive desires in terms of the effect addictive substances have on the dopamine system. We argue that nothing in the neuroscientific framework rules out pluralism about the causes of addictive desire.
  •  77
    ‘Obsessive Thoughts and Inner Voices’
    Philosophical Issues 23 (1): 93-108. 2013.
    My concern is this paper is to consider the nature of obsessive thoughts with the aim of getting a clearer idea about the extent to which they are rightly identified as passive or as active. The nature of obsessive thoughts is of independent interest, but my concern with the question is also rooted in a general concern to map the extent of mental activity, and to defend the importance and centrality of a view of self-knowledge that appeals to agency. I hold that much of our mental lives is activ…Read more
  •  276
    Imagination and the motivational view of belief
    Analysis 65 (1): 55-62. 2005.
  •  55
    XII—The Problem of Self-Identification
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1): 235-252. 1995.
  •  57
    Actions as Prime
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80 265-285. 2017.
    In this paper I am going to argue that we should take actions to be prime. This will involve clarifying what it means to claim that actions are prime. I will consider Williamson's construal of actions as prime in a way that parallels his treatment of knowledge. I will argue that we need to be careful about treating our actions in the way suggested because of an internal relation between the success condition of an action and the action itself; a parallel relation does not hold for most cases of …Read more
  •  12
    Self-Knowing Agents
    Analysis 69 (1): 187-188. 2009.
    How is it that we think and refer in the first-person way? For most philosophers in the analytic tradition, the problem is essentially this: how two apparently conflicting kinds of properties can be reconciled and united as properties of the same entity. What is special about the first person has to be reconciled with what is ordinary about it. The range of responses reduces to four basic options. The orthodox view is optimistic: there really is a way of reconciling these apparently contradictor…Read more
  •  129
    Anscombe and the self-reference rule
    Analysis 54 (4): 277-281. 1994.
    This paper argues that Anscombe's arguments against appealing to the self-reference rule that 'I" refers to its producer are ineffective.
  •  6
    Solipsism and Self‐Reference
    European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 175-194. 1996.
  •  8
    Moran on Agency and Self‐Knowledge
    European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3): 375-390. 2003.
  •  4
    Mind 125 (497): 1-3. 2016.
  •  120
    On knowing one's own actions
    In Johannes Roessler & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness, Clarendon Press. 2003.
    Book description: * Seventeen brand-new essays by leading philosophers and psychologists * Genuinely interdisciplinary work, at the forefront of both fields * Includes a valuable introduction, uniting common threads Leading philosophers and psychologists join forces to investigate a set of problems to do with agency and self-awareness, in seventeen specially written essays. In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awar…Read more
  •  92
    Self-Knowing Agents
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.