•  225
    How the growth of science ends theory change
    Synthese 180 (2): 139-155. 2011.
    This paper outlines a defense of scientific realism against the pessimistic meta- induction which appeals to the phenomenon of the exponential growth of science. Here, scientific realism is defined as the view that our current successful scientific theories are mostly approximately true, and pessimistic meta- induction is the argument that projects the occurrence of past refutations of successful theories to the present concluding that many or most current successful scientific theories are fals…Read more
  •  195
    Understanding Brute Facts
    Synthese 145 (3): 449-466. 2005.
    Brute facts are facts that have no explanation. If we come to know that a fact is brute, we obviously don’t get an explanation of that fact. Nevertheless, we do make some sort of epistemic gain. In this essay, I give an account of that epistemic gain, and suggest that the idea of brute facts allows us to distinguish between the notion of explanation and the notion of understanding. I also discuss Eric Barnes’ (1994) attack on Friedman’s (1974) version of the uni-fication theory of explanation. Th…Read more
  •  109
    Die Elimination des Wissensbegriffs1
    Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 6 45-56. 2004.
  •  107
    Scientific realism, the position that successful theories are likely to be approximately true, is threatened by the pessimistic induction according to which the history of science is full of suc- cessful, but false theories. I aim to defend scientific realism against the pessimistic induction. My main thesis is that our current best theories each enjoy a very high degree of predictive success, far higher than was enjoyed by any of the refuted theories. I support this thesis by showing that both …Read more
  •  96
    Theory Change and Degrees of Success
    Philosophy of Science 78 (5): 1283-1292. 2011.
    Scientific realism is the position that success of a scientific theory licenses an inference to its approximate truth. The argument from pessimistic meta-induction maintains that this inference is undermined due to the existence of theories from the history of science that were successful, but false. I aim to counter pessimistic meta-induction and defend scientific realism. To do this, I adopt a notion of success that admits of degrees, and show that our current best theories enjoy far higher de…Read more
  •  25
    Introduction: Novel Predictions
    with Ioannis Votsis and Gerhard Schurz
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 43-45. 2014.
  • Book Review (review)
    Erkenntnis 46 (1): 127-131. 1997.