Ludwig Jaskolla

The combination problem is still one of the hardest problems for a panexperientialist ontology. Prominently, among others, Philip Goff wrote two papers in 2009 arguing that panexperientialists cannot get around the combination problem. We will argue that Goff 's attack is only relevant if parsimony is the only methodological principle for evaluating and comparing ontologies. Our second approach will sketch a version of panexperientialism for which the combination problem does not arise at all. Panexperiential holism is the theory that the universe as a whole is one big experiential matter of fact. What we normally believe to be independent centres of conscious subjectivity are merely long-lived structural features of this big experience. The notion of 'personal identity' entailed by panexperiential holism is essentially vague and may lead us into something like Derek Parfit's relation R . Therefore, persons are not merely series of experiences, but exemplify the common denominator of these experiences. In this sense, a person is what has experiences, or the subject of experiences. We will argue that this concept fits nicely into some frameworks of personal identity put forth by Peter Simons and Godehard Brüntrup

Recent debates in philosophy of mind seemingly have resulted in an impasse. Reductive physicalism cannot account for the phenomenal mind, and nonreductive physicalism cannot safeguard a causal role for the mental as mental. Dualism was formerly considered to be the only viable alternative, but in addition to exacerbating the problem of mental causation, it is hard to square with a naturalist evolutionary framework. By 1979, Thomas Nagel argued that if reductionism and dualism fail, and a non-reductionist form of strong emergence cannot be made intelligible, then panpsychism-the thesis that mental being is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the universe-might be a viable alternative. But it was not until David Chalmers' The Conscious Mind in 1996 that debates on panpsychism entered the philosophical mainstream. Since then the field has been growing rapidly, and some leading philosophers of mind as well as scientist have argued in favor of panpsychism. This book features contemporary arguments for panpsychism as a genuine alternative in analytic philosophy of mind in the 21st century. Different varieties of panpsychism are represented and systematically related to each other in the volume's 16 essays, which feature not only proponents of panpsychism but also prominent critics from both the physicalist and non-physicalist camps.

Sometimes the thesis has been put forth that the languages of 3- Dimensionalism and 4-Dimensionalism are completey translatable into each other without any loss of meaning. Prominently, this thesis has recently been defended by Jonathan Lowe and Storrs McCall. A global inter-translatability would show that there is no deeper systematic or even ontological difference between these philosophical positions despite that both are using a different vocabulary to describe the same features of reality. In this paper, I want to argue that the thesis of 3D-4D-Equivalence covers some interesting aspects of the discussion between 3-Dimensionalists and 4-Dimensionalists, but is not able to grasp fully the ontological intuitions of both positions. At the end of the day, it seems necessary to refute the thesis that 3-Dimensionalism and 4-Dimensionalism are eqivalent in the sense that both are completely translatable into each other.

Panpsychism has become a highly attractive position in the philosophy of mind. On panpsychism, both the physical and the mental are inseparable and fundamental features of reality. Panentheism has also become immensely popular in the philosophy of religion. Panentheism strives for a higher reconciliation of an atheistic pantheism, on which the universe itself is causa sui, and the ontological dualism of necessarily existing, eternal creator and contingent, finite creation. Historically and systematically, panpsychism and panentheism often went together as essential parts of an all-embracing metaphysical theory of Being. The present collection of essays analyses the relation between panpsychism and panentheism and provides critical reflections on the significance of panpsychistic and panentheistic thinking for recent debates in philosophy and theology.

This book explores persistence, taking human beings as an example case. It investigates how concrete particulars stay the same during their temporal carriers while changing significantly. Themes of relativity, structural realism, 4-dimensional ontologies and different strains of panpsychism are amongst those addressed in this work. Beginning with an exploration of the puzzle of persistence, early chapters look at philosophers’ perspectives and models of persistence. Competitors in the debate are introduced, from classical 3-dimensionalism to two flavors of 4-dimensionalism, namely worm theory and stage theory. The second part of the book explores the various challenges to 4-dimensionalism and develops a positive taxonomy of those questions that the reasonable proponent of 4-dimensionlism needs to answer. In the third part of the book readers may explore an ontology at the interface of analytic metaphysics and philosophy of mind, called Real Fourdimensionalism, or more specifically: Physicalistic Stage-Panexperientialism. This is a version of panexperiential stage theory and its alleged model of persistence-as-deciding answers the questions of the taxonomy. This book makes a substantial contribution to debates concerning the status, extent and viability of both stage theoretic models of persistence as well as non-reductive, naturalistic models of persistence. It will be of interest to graduates and scholars involved in analytic metaphysics, as well as the philosophy of mind, especially those specializing in questions of persistence and the ontology of the mind.

In this paper, I argue that the self-abasement account of humility is misguided and present Thomas Aquinas’s approach as a more adequate alternative. Starting out from the recent debate, I delineate and criticize three strategies to model humility. Contrasting these strategies, I argue that humility is best understood as a form of realistic self-insight. Following Aquinas’s ‘secunda secundae,’ I finally discuss why the proposed account is fragmentary, and should be supplemented by the concept of magnanimity.

Alfred North Whitehead bietet in seiner philosophischen Kosmologie einen Deutungsrahmen, mit dem Wirklichkeit primär von ihrer Prozesshaftigkeit begriffen werden kann. Eine solche prozesshafte Konzeption der Wirklichkeit hat folgerichtig auch Auswirkungen darauf, wie Religion und damit zusammenhängend das Gott-Welt-Verhältnis gedacht wird. Der Band möchte einen Beitrag zu einer systematischen Rekonstruktion von Whiteheads Religionstheorie und -philosophie leisten und zugleich zeigen, wie ihr Potential für die aktuelle Debatte fruchtbar gemacht werden kann.

Sometimes the thesis has been put forth that the languages of 3- Dimensionalism and 4-Dimensionalism are completey translatable into each other without any loss of meaning. Prominently, this thesis has recently been defended by Jonathan Lowe and Storrs McCall. A global inter-translatability would show that there is no deeper systematic or even ontological difference between these philosophical positions despite that both are using a different vocabulary to describe the same features of reality. In this paper, I want to argue that the thesis of 3D-4D-Equivalence covers some interesting aspects of the discussion between 3-Dimensionalists and 4-Dimensionalists, but is not able to grasp fully the ontological intuitions of both positions. At the end of the day, it seems necessary to refute the thesis that 3-Dimensionalism and 4-Dimensionalism are eqivalent in the sense that both are completely translatable into each other.

Sometimes the thesis has been put forth that the languages of 3- Dimensionalism and 4-Dimensionalism are completey translatable into each other without any loss of meaning. Prominently, this thesis has recently been defended by Jonathan Lowe and Storrs McCall. A global inter-translatability would show that there is no deeper systematic or even ontological dierence between these philosophical positions despite that both are using a dierent vocabulary to describe the same features of reality. In this paper, I want to argue that the thesis of 3D-4D-Equivalence covers some interesting aspects of the discussion between 3-Dimensionalists and 4-Dimensionalists, but is not able to grasp fully the ontological intuitions of both positions. At the end of the day, it seems necessary to refute the thesis that 3-Dimensionalism and 4-Dimensionalism are eqivalent in the sense that both are completely translatable into each other.