•  164
    Bunge y la validez de la adición
    In German Guerrero-Pino (ed.), Ciencia, Realismo y materialismo, Universidad Del Valle. pp. 191-202. 2022.
    En The paradox of Addition and its dissolution (1969), Mario Bunge presenta algunos argumentos para mostrar que la Regla de Adición puede ocasionar paradojas o problemas semánticos. Posteriormente, Margáin (1972) y Robles (1976) mostraron que las afirmaciones de Bunge son insostenibles, al menos desde el punto de vista de la lógica clásica. Aunque estamos de acuerdo con las críticas de Margáin y Robles, no estamos de acuerdo en el diagnóstico del origen del problema y tampoco con la manera en la…Read more
  •  114
    Bunge y la validez de la adición
    In German Guerrero-Pino (ed.), Ciencia, Realismo y materialismo, Universidad Del Valle. pp. 191-202. 2022.
    En The paradox of Addition and its dissolution (1969), Mario Bunge presenta algunos argumentos para mostrar que la Regla de Adición puede ocasionar paradojas o problemas semánticos. Posteriormente, Margáin (1972) y Robles (1976) mostraron que las afirmaciones de Bunge son insostenibles, al menos desde el punto de vista de la lógica clásica. Aunque estamos de acuerdo con las críticas de Margáin y Robles, no estamos de acuerdo en el diagnóstico del origen del problema y tampoco con la manera en la…Read more
  •  105
    Models of Possibilism and Trivialism
    Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (2): 175-205. 2012.
    In this paper I probe the idea that neither possibilism nor trivialism could be ruled out on a purely logical basis. I use the apparatus of relational structures used in the semantics for modal logics to engineer some models of possibilism and trivialism and I discuss a philosophical stance about logic, truth values and the meaning of connectives underlying such analysis
  •  90
    On the Plenitude of Truth. A Defense of Trivialism (review)
    with Claudia Olmedo-García
    Disputatio 5 (35): 93-98. 2010.
    Estrada-Gonzalez-Olmedo-Garcia_On-the-plenitude-of-truth.-A-defense-of-trivialism-by-Paul-Kabay2
  •  65
    Weakened semantics and the traditional square of opposition
    Logica Universalis 2 (1): 155-165. 2008.
    .  In this paper we present a proposal that (i) could validate more relations in the square than those allowed by classical logic (ii) without a modification of canonical notation neither of current symbolization of categorical statements though (iii) with a different but reliable semantics.
  •  55
    Connexive Negation
    Studia Logica (Special Issue: Frontiers of Conn): 1-29. 2023.
    Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, n…Read more
  •  49
    According to logical non-necessitarianism, every inference may fail in some situation. In his defense of logical monism, Graham Priest has put forward an argument against non-necessitarianism based on the meaning of connectives. According to him, as long as the meanings of connectives are fixed, some inferences have to hold in all situations. Hence, in order to accept the non-necessitarianist thesis one would have to dispose arbitrarily of those meanings. I want to show here that non-necessitari…Read more
  •  46
    The Divinity of Rāma in the Rāmāyaṇaof Vālmīki
    Journal of Indian Philosophy 34 (3): 203-220. 2005.
  •  45
    Alberic of Paris put forward an argument, ‘the most embarrassing of all twelfth-century arguments’ according to Christopher Martin, which shows that the connexive principles contradict some other logical principles that have become deeply entrenched in our most widely accepted logical theories. Building upon some of Everett Nelson’s ideas, we will show that the steps in Alberic of Paris’ argument that should be rejected are precisely the ones that presuppose the validity of schemas that are nowa…Read more
  •  43
    Empty validity all the way up: an easy road (Proceedings) (edited book, 12th ed.)
    Lomonosov Moscow State University. 2022.
    There is a tension between the definition of empty logic as a logic with no valid arguments and no valid meta-arguments, on the one hand, and the way in which we have usually interpreted the validity of meta-arguments, on the other. Here we argue that one way to eliminate the tension is understanding the “If. . . then. . . ” in a meta-argument, at least in the case of an empty logic, as a transplication (aka the de Finetti conditional) instead of an extensional or material conditional.
  •  35
    La diferencia entre lógicas y el cambio de significado de las conectivas: un enfoque categorista
    with Ivonne Victoria Pallares Vega
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2): 133-154. 2011.
    En este artículo tratamos de hacer plausible la hipótesis de que las conectivas de diferentes lógicas no necesariamente difieren en significado. Utilizando el tratamiento categorista de las conectivas, argumentaremos contra la tesis quineana de que la diferencia de lógicas implica diferencia de significado entre sus conectivas, y ubicamos el cambio de tema en la diferencia de objetos más bien que en una tal diferencia de significado. Finalmente, intentamos mostrar que ese tratamiento categorista…Read more
  •  34
    An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic
    Cambridge University Press. 2019.
    Philosophy of logic is a fundamental part of philosophical study, and one which is increasingly recognized as being immensely important in relation to many issues in metaphysics, metametaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. This textbook provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to topics including the objectivity of logical inference rules and its relevance in discussions of epistemological relativism, the revived interest in logical pluralism…Read more
  •  34
    Variable Sharing in Connexive Logic
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6): 1377-1388. 2021.
    However broad or vague the notion of connexivity may be, it seems to be similar to the notion of relevance even when relevance and connexive logics have been shown to be incompatible to one another. Relevance logics can be examined by suggesting syntactic relevance principles and inspecting if the theorems of a logic abide to them. In this paper we want to suggest that a similar strategy can be employed with connexive logics. To do so, we will suggest some properties that seem to be hinted at in…Read more
  •  27
    An Easy Road to Multi-contra-classicality
    Erkenntnis 88 (6): 2591-2608. 2023.
    A contra-classical logic is a logic that, over the same language as that of classical logic, validates arguments that are not classically valid. In this paper I investigate whether there is a single, non-trivial logic that exhibits many features of already known contra-classical logics. I show that Mortensen’s three-valued connexive logic _M3V_ is one such logic and, furthermore, that following the example in building _M3V_, that is, putting a suitable conditional on top of the \(\{\sim, \wedge,…Read more
  •  25
    In this paper we discuss whether the relation between formulas in the relating model can be directly introduced into the language of relating logic, and present some stances on that problem. Other questions in the vicinity, such as what kind of functor would be the incorporated relation, or whether the direct incorporation of the relation into the language of relating logic is really needed, will also be addressed.
  •  25
    Knot is not that nasty
    Synthese 198 (S22): 5533-5554. 2019.
    In this paper, we evaluate Button’s claim that knot is a nasty connective. Knot’s nastiness is due to the fact that, when one extends the set \ with knot, the connective provides counterexamples to a number of classically valid operational rules in a sequent calculus proof system. We show that just as going non-transitive diminishes tonk’s nastiness, knot’s nastiness can also be reduced by dropping Reflexivity, a different structural rule. Since doing so restores all other rules in the system as…Read more
  •  24
    Beyond Toleration? Inconsistency and Pluralism in the Empirical Sciences
    with María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz
    Humana Mente 10 (32). 2017.
    Nowadays there is a growing tendency in the philosophy of science to think that some phenomena cannot be exhaustively explained, or even described, by a single theory or a particular approach. Thus, we are occasionally required to use various approaches in order to give account of the phenomenon we are analyzing. And sometimes, we can appreciate this as an invitation to be pluralist in certain respects about our understanding of a particular aspect in science. During the last decade applications…Read more
  •  23
    Revisiting Reichenbach’s logic
    with Fernando Cano-Jorge
    Synthese 199 (5-6): 11821-11845. 2021.
    In this paper we show that, when analyzed with contemporary tools in logic—such as Dunn-style semantics, Reichenbach’s three-valued logic exhibits many interesting features, and even new responses to some of the old objections to it can be attempted. Also, we establish some connections between Reichenbach’s three-valued logic and some contra-classical logics.
  •  21
    La dimensión política de la deconstrucción
    Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 54 45-59. 2011.
    En las páginas que siguen, vamos a realizar una lectura política del pensamiento de Derrida, dirigiendo nuestra atención, primero, a la deconstrucción de la escritura para centrarnos en el significado político de la différance , segundo, a la institución filosófica como vehículo de elaboración y transmisión del saber y, tercero, a lo que el pensador francés ha reunido bajo el rótulo figuras de lo imposible , con especial atención a la hospitalidad, la responsabilidad y la justicia
  •  20
    Everything is True
    Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2): 64-76. 2018.
    I defend the idea that there are universal fictions, and that the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner way of generating them – namely, with a story including deliberately and explicitly the proposition Everything is true – is still the best one. I reconstruct Wildman and Folde’s Finean criticisms to universal fictions a la Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner based on the idea that the universal quantifier in such fictions may not target the intended range of quantification, that is, all propositions. I show that Wildma…Read more
  •  19
    Complement-Topoi and Dual Intuitionistic Logic
    Australasian Journal of Logic 9 26-44. 2010.
    Mortensen studies dual intuitionistic logic by dualizing topos internal logic, but he did not study a sequent calculus. In this paper I present a sequent calculus for complement-topos logic, which throws some light on the problem of giving a dualization for LJ.
  •  18
    PreámbuloEl sentimiento contiene una sabiduría que la razón desconoce. Esta intuición es de los filósofos, los poetas, los artistas, los cantores como Violeta en "Volver a los 17". Nació Violeta a quien está dedicado el libro Sabiduría Chamánica del Sentimiento, y con ella los colores que ella y nosotros nos corresponde siempre redescubrir.En la portada de libro de Peter Wild, los colores aparecen distorsionados, quizás acá ya esté el primer indicio de encuentro con esta sabiduría del sentimi..
  •  18
    On the Plenitude of Truth. A Defense of Trivialism (review)
    with Claudia Olmedo-García
  •  18
    Ending the Mahābhārata: Making a Lasting Impression (review)
    International Journal of Hindu Studies 15 (1): 101-110. 2011.
  •  17
    Hegel of the gaps? Truth, falsity and conjunction in Hegelian contradictions
    Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1): 1-13. 2024.
    I offer here a critical assessment of Beall and Ficara’s most recent take on Hegelian contradictions. By interpreting differently some key passages of Hegel’s work, I favor, unlike them, a no-gaps approach which leads to a different logic.
  •  17
    When Curry met Abel
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 28 (6): 1233-1242. 2020.
    Based on his Inclosure Schema and the Principle of Uniform Solution (PUS), Priest has argued that Curry’s paradox belongs to a different family of paradoxes than the Liar. Pleitz (2015, The Logica Yearbook 2014, pp. 233–248) argued that Curry’s paradox shares the same structure as the other paradoxes and proposed a scheme of which the Inclosure Schema is a particular case and he criticizes Priest’s position by pointing out that applying the PUS implies the use of a paraconsistent logic that does…Read more
  •  17
    Sí hay negación lógica
    Critica 52 (155): 55-72. 2020.
    En este artículo discutimos la tesis de Jc Beall según la cual no hay negación lógica. Evaluamos la solidez del argumento con el que defiende su tesis y presentamos dos razones para rechazar una de sus premisas: que la negación tiene que ser excluyente o exhaustiva. La primera razón involucra una presentación alternativa de las reglas de la negación en sistemas de secuentes diferentes al que Beall presupone. La segunda razón establece que la negación no tiene que ser excluyente o exhaustiva.
  •  17
    An Alternative Definition of Quantifiers on Four-Valued Łukasiewicz Algebras
    with M. B. Lattanzi and A. G. Petrovich
    Logica Universalis 11 (4): 439-463. 2017.
    An alternative notion of an existential quantifier on four-valued Łukasiewicz algebras is introduced. The class of four-valued Łukasiewicz algebras endowed with this existential quantifier determines a variety which is denoted by \. It is shown that the alternative existential quantifier is interdefinable with the standard existential quantifier on a four-valued Łukasiewicz algebra. Some connections between the new existential quantifier and the existential quantifiers defined on bounded distrib…Read more
  •  16
    Beall has given more or less convincing arguments to the effect that neither classical logic, nor K3, nor LP, nor S3 can play the role he expects from logic: to be the basement theory for all true theories, including true theology. However, he has not considered all the pertinent competitors, and he has not given any reassurance that he has not gone too low in the hierarchy of logics to find his desired “universal closure of all true theories”. In this paper, I put forward those additional argum…Read more