•  1297
    Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2): 1021-1038. 2017.
    The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key…Read more
  •  933
    Como Ser um Naturalista Filosófico Responsável?
    Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião 4 (1): 9-25. 2017.
    Um alinhamento responsável à alguma versão do naturalismo filosófico requer a articulação explicita e cuidadosa de um argumento em sua defesa. Em quatro passos, o texto que segue abaixo expande e examina a validade de um argumento que é frequentemente rascunhado em favor do naturalismo. Como veremos, contudo, a versão do naturalismo que esse argumento nos permite é um pouco diferente dos naturalismos filosóficos mais populares.
  •  813
    Clifford, William Kingdom
    In Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion, Wiley-blackwell. forthcoming.
    W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.
  •  606
    Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2): 319-333. 2019.
    Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...
  •  597
    Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2): 174-185. 2018.
    Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries …Read more
  •  556
    Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values
    Philosophical Studies 174 (2): 485-506. 2017.
    Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinct…Read more
  •  547
    Rossian totalism about intrinsic value
    Philosophical Studies 173 (8): 2069-2086. 2016.
    This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that is based …Read more
  •  458
    Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can
    Philosophical Studies 175 (10): 2567-2582. 2018.
    Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue that anyone who antecedently accepts or re…Read more
  •  436
    Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2): 389-394. 2015.
    Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.
  •  192
    Quatro Desafios Céticos ao Saber
    In Antonio José Pêcego (ed.), Direito e Filosofia: Em Busca do Saber. forthcoming.
    O ceticismo é por vezes descartado como uma doutrina absurda e merecedora do seu lugar distante na antiguidade. Nada poderia ser menos correto. O ceticismo continua extremamente relevante para o pensamento filosófico e científico de hoje, servindo como um lembrete de que a sabedoria não é barata nem segura. Nesse texto, o meu objetivo principal é reproduzir o raciocínio das discussões clássicas sobre o ceticismo, mas de uma maneira coloquial e contemporânea. Após seguir as linhas de pensamento d…Read more
  •  168
    Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity
    In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. forthcoming.
    What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been…Read more
  •  157
    Agency and Reasons in Epistemology
    Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 2016.
    Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative epistemology: are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy of belief and disbelief? Locke's influential answer was evidentialist: we have an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of obligations, the connection between …Read more
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  •  2
    Externalism About Knowledge (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Externalism about knowledge is thriving in contemporary epistemology. Yet there is no collection devoted exclusively to it. Consequently, externalism about knowledge is too often caricatured as merely reliabilism, too often confused with externalism about justification, and hardly ever considered as a distinct family of related but importantly different views. This collection addresses all of these issues by bringing new essays from leading externalist epistemologists working on seven different …Read more
  •  1
    The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification has been of undisputed theoretical importance in a wide range of contemporary epistemological debates. Yet there are a host of intimately related issues that have rarely been discussed in connection with this distinction. For instance, the distinction not only applies to an individual’s beliefs, but also to group beliefs and to various other attitudes that both groups and individuals can take: credence, commitment, suspension, fait…Read more
  • Lynne Baker was a trenchant critic of reductionist and physicalist conceptions of the universe, as well as the foremost defender of the constitution view of human persons. Baker was a staunch defender of a kind of practical realism, or what she sometimes called a metaphysics of everyday life. And it was this general “common sense” philosophical outlook that underwrote her non-reductionist, constitution view of reality. Whereas most of her contemporaries were given to metaphysical reductionism an…Read more