Lukas Bielik

The paper focuses on the problem of identification of laws of nature and their demarcation from other kinds of regularities. The problem is approached from the viewpoint of several metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological criteria. Firstly, several dominant approaches to the problem are introduced. Secondly, the logical and semantic explicatory framework – Transparent Intensional Logic – is presented for the sake of clarification of logical forms of sentences that are supposed to express the laws of nature. Finally, a complementary strategy to the demarcation problem is proposed, including reconsideration of relevant metaphysical, epistemological, logical and methodological requirements and principles behind the former conceptions

The so-called „Covering Law Model“ of explanation proposed by C. Hempel and R. Oppenheim was claimed to have been applied as an explanatory model in natural sciences as well as in humanities. Several objections were raised against this explanatory model during the second half of 20th century. This article considers the proposed criteria of adequacy of scientific explanation and, in particular, the possibilities and limitations connected with the idea of its applicability in the process of logical reconstruction of historical explanations. In the final part of the paper I introduce some remarks concerning the „methodological“ relation of dependence between the explanandum and the explanans which could also illuminate the proper role of this explanatory model in history

The paper deals with some logical, semantic and methodological aspects of defining and definitions. First of all, basic features of the background semantic theory are specified. Next, three different kinds of definitions are distinguished: codifying definitions, objectual analytic definitions and meaning analytic definitions. It is shown that the relationships between the definiendum and the definiens in a given definition differ with respect to these different kinds of definition. Furthermore, it is argued that definitions and defining are intrinsically connected with so called conceptual systems. Finally, definitions are distinguished from explications

The paper deals with the New Riddle of Induction set forth by N. Goodman in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. The problem is introduced through the definition of grue-predicate. The relation between the grue-hypothesis and empirical evidence is examined. Goodman’s underlying thesis about the neutrality of empirical evidence is undermined. The intelligibility of the idea that disjunctive properties such as Grue can be observed and seen is questioned. A solution of Goodman’s riddle is outlined by means of the definition of the identity of empirical properties and further deve- loped through postulating of the necessary condition of induction executability which prohibits the inference from “Some a, b, c, d emeralds are green” to the hypothesis “All emeralds are grue”