My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes If it is in the original Kantian sense, where I understand it to be similar to a Wittgensteinian 'hinge proposition', then I "Accept: yes." Otherwise, I'll stick to my original response.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept an intermediate view
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Logic: classical and non-classical Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept both
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Agnostic/undecided
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Agnostic/undecided
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: non-physicalism I take "physical" to mean "amenable to observation/perception". Since the mind is not amenable to observation, then I regard it as non-physical. However, I do not consider myself a dualist. I think the mind has a purely physical analog in the brain's processes.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Reject one, undecided between others Reject virtue ethics.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: disjunctivism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Reject one, undecided between others
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: communitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept an intermediate view
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept both A-theory = experience/perception of temporal becoming. B-theory = theories/models of time.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept more than one
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Reject one, undecided between others Reject metaphysically possible.