•  87
    No Identity Without an Entity
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1): 279-305. 2015.
    Peter Geach's puzzle of intentional identity is to explain how the claim ‘Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow’ is compatible with there being no such witch. I clarify the puzzle and reduce it to the familiar problem of negative existentials. That problem is a paradox of representations that seem to include denials of commitment , to carry commitment to what they deny commitment to, and to be true. The best proposed solutions can be understood …Read more
  •  76
    Real Representation of Fictional Objects
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (1): 13-24. 2014.
    ABSTRACTAssuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented—appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct fo…Read more
  •  21
    Reply to Sartorelli on Pretense and Representing Fictional Objects
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2): 193-196. 2015.
    I defend and clarify my arguments in "Real Representation of Fictional Objects" in response to criticisms from Joseph Sartorelli. In particular, I clarify why Kripke's notion of "levels of language" and a pragmatic principle suggested by van Inwagen do not support the view that works of fiction generate fictional objects but do not represent them.