•  1
    This monographic issue contains a long article bringing together the Lullius Lectures delivered by Professor Sandra Mitchell during the Xth Conference of the Society of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science in Spain, that took place in Salamanca (16-19 November, 2021). The publication of her Lectures is complemented by six original articles that address and examine different aspects of Sandra Mitchell’s contributions to the philosophy of science. In this introduction to the monograph, th…Read more
  •  5
    Mundos Posibles
    Praxis Filosófica 29 155-164. 2011.
  • Disposiciones Traicioneras
    Praxis Filosófica 35 239-255. 2013.
    David LewisFinkish Dispositions (1999)
  •  4
    Las Paradojas Del Viaje En El Tiempo
    Praxis Filosófica 27 269-283. 2011.
  •  62
    Facts of identity
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 2022.
    In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell held the view that facts in the world are formally structured complexes, the structure of which matches the logical structure of correspondent propositions. Russell also seems to have denied that there are facts of identity and of diversity. This paper argues that Identity and Diversity can be understood as purely formal structures in Russellian facts. It considers Russell’s possible reasons for denying the existence of facts of identity and diversity…Read more
  •  270
    Transference, or identity theories of causation?
    Theoria 19 (1): 31-47. 2004.
    Transference theorists propose to explain causation in terms of the transference of a physical element. I argue, in two steps, that this is not possible. First, I show that available accounts of ‘transference’ ultimately convey that transference -and, consequently, causation- is the (non-relational) identity over time of the transferred element (a universal, a trope, or even an absolute substance). But, second, I try to defend, it is conceptually impossible that causation is (non-relational) ide…Read more
  •  184
    Transference, or identity theories of causation?
    Theoria 19 (1): 31-47. 2010.
    I argue that transference is, ultimately, identity over time, and that identity over time can't possibly be causation. Transference, then, fails as an analysis of causation.
  •  204
    Singular Causation without Dispositions
    Theoria 26 (1): 35-50. 2011.
    Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations.
  •  105
    The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper is to a…Read more
  • Los tropos son naturalezas individuales
    Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 33 (1): 97-116. 2008.
    En este artículo pretendo la clarificación conceptual de la idea de propiedad individual. En concreto, defiendo que las propiedades individuales no son compuestos, aunque son naturalezas individuales complejas. Por un lado, no poseen un parte "individuante" que dé cuenta de sus condiciones de individualización: las propiedades individuales tienen su propia identidad numérica primitiva. Por otro lado, no poseen un parte "común," "universalizante" que dé cuenta de su naturaleza: las propiedades in…Read more
  • ¿metafísica Analítica?
    Límite 14 87-107. 2006.
    Quiero mostrar en este artículo que no hay una metafísica analítica, lo que no significa que no se haga metafísica desde un punto de vista analítico, i.e., desde el análisis conceptual. Para ello, intento ofrecer un muestrario, inevitablemente escaso, de ideas y posiciones metafísicas diferentes que discuten los llamados filósofos analíticos. Mi tesis es que el interés por la ciencia, la lógica y el lenguaje, siempre desde el intento de racionalidad y objetividad en el método de conocimiento, es…Read more
  •  3
    La filosofía de Kripke
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (3): 123-129. 2006.
  •  1
    La crítica de Pedro Abelardo a otros nominalismos
    Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 12 179-190. 2005.
    Al escribir este articulo intento recuperar, para la discusión más contemporánea sobre los universales, al menos una parte de las ideas del lógico y filósofo medieval Pedro Abelardo. En particular, hay ciertas formas de nominalismo, léase, el mentalismo, el nominalismo de conjuntos, y el nominalismo de semejanza(s), que han reaparecido con fuerza nueva en metafísica analítica contemporánea. Abelardo, como nominalista que fue, no sólo argumentó contra tesis de corte realista;, sino que también ev…Read more
  •  4
    Acciones causales temporalmente invertidas
    Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 37 (80): 51-74. 2002.
  •  10
    La reducción de la causalidad a contrafácticos al estilo Lewis
    Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 34 (74): 7-34. 1999.
  •  292
    Necessity in singular causation
    Philosophia 29 (1-4): 149-172. 2002.
    I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as tropes, causation is founded on the nature…Read more
  •  1333
    It was an empirical discovery that Phosphorus is Hesperus. According to Kripke, this was also the discovery of a necessary fact. Now, given Kripke’s theory of direct reference one could wonder what kind of discovery this is. For we already knew Phosphorus/Hesperus, and we also knew that any entity is, necessarily, identical to itself. So what is it that was discovered? I want to show that there is more to this widely known case than what usual readings, and critics, reveal; and I want to show th…Read more
  •  114
    On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo
    Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2): 147-164. 2012.
    This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories…Read more
  •  388
    The Role of Intuition in Metaphysics
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3): 79-99. 2015.
    In this paper I consider the possibility of a kind of a priori cognition that serves the purposes of metaphysics, given that metaphysics involves the search for modal knowledge. Necessary or, better, modal knowledge is a priori; so metaphysical knowledge is likewise a priori. Here I argue that intuition is the route to modal knowledge in metaphysics, and I insist that conceivability or knowledge of conceptual truths does not lead towards the modal realm of metaphysics.
  •  28
    RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine l'argumentation de Sullivan en faveur du principe que toute chose a une cause. On soutient que les critiques de Smith et d'Allen ne lui rendent pas justice et que Sullivan est justifié de maintenir que nous n'avons pas de bonnes raisons de nier la vérité de ce principe. Sa défense finale, cependant, qui semble basée sur une approche thomiste, échoue. Être contingent et être causé sont séparables. Il semble au bout du compte que nous n'ayons pas non plus de bonnes rais…Read more
  •  212
    Identidad Personal Y Responsabilidad
    Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 31 (2): 1-24. 2011.
    Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de corte narrativo, más qu…Read more
  •  570
    Tropes for Causation
    Metaphysica 10 (2): 157-174. 2009.
    Tropes, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata
  •  232
    On Necessary but External Relations
    Review of Contemporary Philosophy 12 93-101. 2013.
    I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of identity—into…Read more