Magali Bessone

ABSTRACT This article argues that Frantz Fanon’s critique of the epistemology of the colonial situation is a complex, pluralized, epistemology of ignorance, where ignorance takes three main forms. Fanon first produces a critique of colonial ideology, in which ignorance is the product of the colonizers’ false justificatory ideology. Fanon unveils how Europeans, through human sciences such as “ethnopsychiatry” and “ethnophilosophy,” deliberately produce ignorance and devaluation of colonized subjects and colonized knowledge for purposes of domination. Second, ignorance is the unintentional result of the partial, situated, standpoint of embodied knowers. Fanon does not intend to substitute a “black truth” to white ideology. He rather insists that while truth is unattainable under colonial conditions, the affective perspective of the oppressed/colonized is a necessary constitutive part of any objective account of the world. Third, by analyzing the “Conducts of confession in North Africa,” characterized by deliberate denial, lies, and opacity as resistance mechanisms, Fanon insists that no objective knowledge is possible in a colonial situation because of the total separation, and impossible epistemic collaboration, of dominant and dominated knowers. An anticolonial politics has to focus on producing the conditions of possibility of knowledge.

L’article se propose dans un premier temps de comparer les arguments d’Elizabeth Anderson sur l’intégration comme impératif de justice et ceux d’Iris Marion Young qui critiquent l’idéal d’intégration et lui préfèrent un idéal d’inclusion comme « solidarité différenciée ». Il procède dans un second temps à un test des arguments promouvant ou critiquant l’intégration en les (dé)plaçant dans un contexte français, où le concept relève d’un champ sémantique et d’une sociohistoire très différents de ceux du contexte nord-américain. L’article proposera, dans ce contexte, une défense qualifiée du concept d’intégration, conçu non comme un « impératif » ni un « idéal » mais plutôt comme un « effet essentiellement secondaire » de la déségrégation raciale.

L’article se propose de prendre au sérieux la notion de « critique » pour évaluer dans quelles mesures, selon quelles caractérisations, sous quelles conditions et avec quelles limites, la philosophie critique de la race (PCR), qui désigne la théorie critique de la race spécifiquement dans le champ philosophique, constitue un savoir critique. La première section présentera la manière dont la PCR se définit par différence avec la philosophie de la race non critique, en termes de canon philosophique, de méthodes privilégiées et d’analyse des concepts centraux du champ : cela permettra de dégager, négativement, la fonction attribuée à la critique, méthodologiquement et théoriquement. La deuxième section dégagera trois sens possibles pour la pensée critique de la race selon les trois influences théoriques majeures du champ : la généalogie foucaldienne, la théorie critique et la phénoménologie critique. Enfin une dernière section, conclusive, se penchera plus précisément sur trois objectifs diversement défendus par les trois écoles critiques dans leur rapport à la vérité, au sujet de connaissance et à l’action.

This paper focuses on demands for reparations for colonial slavery and their public reception in France. It argues that this bottom-up, context-sensitive approach to theorising reparations enables us to formulate a critical republican theory of international racial justice. It contrasts the critical republican perspective on reparations with a nation-state centred approach in which reparations activists are accused of threatening the French republic’s sense of homogeneity and unity, thus undermining the national narrative on the French identity. It also rejects the liberal egalitarian perspective, which itself rejects reparations in favour of focusing on present disadvantages. In so doing, this paper illustrates how the notion of non-domination offers a superior way of conceptualising global racial injustices compared to more traditional distributive outlooks.

The paper aims to apply the epistemologies of ignorance framework to racial issues outside the Anglo-American world, the region where it is has been developed and which has been its almost exclusive focus. Centering on the French context, which is often considered as a unique or particularly acute example of the tension between a republican intellectual tradition of colorblindness, and a lived reality of racial discrimination, the paper identifies two renewed and opposed anti-racist positions in France: a publicly dominant, republican colorblind race-eliminativist position on the one hand, and a critical approach on the other hand. The latter puts the emphasis on the significance of racial concepts as decisive epistemic tools, used to identify specific racial inequalities that tend to remain invisible, even taboo, in the dominant French public discourse. This paper analyzes French republican colorblind race-eliminativism as a distinctive form of epistemology of ignorance that enacts epistemic injustice, and argues that critical anti-racism is a form of epistemology of resistance, aiming at epistemically empowering racialized agents.

ABSTRACTThe incorrect conceptualization and evaluation of reparations for colonial slave trade and slavery within the legal, as opposed to the political, domain, produces an interpretation of the demands in France that views them as morally absurd and politically deleterious. I’ll use Iris Marion Young’s distinction between a liability model and a social connection model of responsibility to suggest that the moral claim according to which we can be held responsible today for redressing the structural injustices inherited from slave trade and slavery is not irrational, nor motivated by a political will to divide the body politic between blamed perpetrators and innocent victims. I’ll first analyze the difficulties posed by the liability model by focusing on a specific legal case, MIR and CMDP vs. French state. Then I’ll argue that using a political model of responsibility solves conceptual and normative issues and allows us to understand why, and to what extent, we are responsible for redressing the structural racial injustice that endures in French society.

This paper focuses on demands for reparations for colonial slavery and their public reception in France. It argues that this bottom-up, context-sensitive approach to theorising reparations enables us to formulate a critical republican theory of international racial justice. It contrasts the critical republican perspective on reparations with a nation-state centred approach in which reparations activists are accused of threatening the French republic’s sense of homogeneity and unity, thus undermining the national narrative on the French identity. It also rejects the liberal egalitarian perspective, which itself rejects reparations in favour of focusing on present disadvantages. In so doing, this paper illustrates how the notion of non-domination offers a superior way of conceptualising global racial injustices compared to more traditional distributive outlooks.

When groups feature in political philosophy, it is usually in one of three contexts: the redressing of past or current injustices suffered by ethnic or cultural minorities; the nature and scope of group rights; and questions around how institutions are supposed to treat a certain specific identity/cultural/ethnic group. What is missing from these debates is a comprehensive analysis of groups as both agents and objects of social policies. While this has been subject to much scrutiny by sociologists and social psychologists, it has received less attention from a normative and philosophical point of view. This volume asks: what problems are posed to political philosophy by a collection of individuals who act or are treated in a collective way? Focusing not only on ways in which institutions should treat groups, but also on the normative implications of considering groups as possible social agents, when acting either in vertical relations with the state or in horizontal relations with other groups (or individuals), this book explores these issues from both theoretical and practical perspectives, combining questions about the nature of groups, and their social and political impacts, with the particular, pressing considerations to which such groups give rise.

Le vocabulaire de l’hospitalité est massivement employé dans la « philosophie publique » française républicaine pour penser les questions d’immigration, au point qu’on a pu considérer qu’il s’est constitué en « nouveau paradigme » au cours des années 1990. Or si le phénomène de l’immigration est distinctement sociopolitique, le concept d’hospitalité relève plutôt d’une théorie éthique et son statut dans les discours est celui d’une métaphore. L’hypothèse explorée dans l’article est que son usage est un symptôme de la conversion, systématiquement accomplie par le républicanisme, des principes politiques de justice en obligations éthiques lorsqu’il est question de migrations. L’article suggère qu’il importe de « déséthiciser » les questions de migrations afin de les traiter politiquement : cela doit nous conduire à abandonner la métaphore de l’hospitalité pour traiter les conditions de la citoyenneté

One of the most perplexing paradoxes of toleration concerns the ‘tolerant racist’. According to most current definitions of toleration, a person is considered tolerant if, and only if, 1) he refrains from interfering with something 2) he deeply disapproves of, 3) in spite of having the power to interfere. Hence, a racist who refrains from discriminating against members of races he considers inferior despite having the power to do so, should be considered a tolerant person. Moreover, a person can apparently become more tolerant by increasing the range or degree of his racist disapproval, just as long as he continues not to act against the objectionable object. This paper examines this strongly counterintuitive implication of the standard concept of toleration, by considering in full the meaning and nature of racism(s) and focusing on the power component of toleration. It explores both an exclusive solution and an accommodating solution to the paradox. The first part of the paper shows that none of the standard agent-oriented views of racism — doxastic, dispositional or volitional — adequately supports either solution. The second part of the paper turns to another, structural account of racism and toleration. It suggests that taking into account an institutional interpretation of toleration as non-domination and adopting a more socio-political perspective on racism provides an accommodating solution to the paradox

The article will argue that, despite Will Kymlicka’s claims to the contrary, the concept of ‘multicultural toleration’ implicitly entails an essentialist concept of groups, which amounts to holding a negative ‘permission’, power-loaded conception of toleration and not a positive liberal ‘respect’ conception. This seems contradictory to the general goal of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism. This article will then argue that multicultural toleration is not a satisfactory concept, neither from a conceptual point of view (it is incoherent) nor from a practical point of view (it disregards important aspects of political life). Nonetheless, multiculturalism poses the question of toleration at the correct level of group relations. This article will try to sustain the double requirement of, on one hand, trying to place toleration in a collective frame and, on the other, refusing the essentialist concept of groups used by multiculturalism. The way out of this difficulty can be found in a critical ‘non-domination’ conception of toleration

English summary: The concept of race has historically been employed to justify multiple forms of injustice: exploitation, oppression, even annihilation of entire human populations. In order to fight racism, it may seem logical to want to permanently eliminate the concept that forms its basis. This volume, however, argues against elimination and instead aims to reduce racial inequality by requiring an analytical and critical use of the concept of race. Socially constructed racial categories today are hidden in many legal and administrative policies. To not name them would be to not reveal their discriminatory effects. French text.French description: Le concept de race--et ses déclinaisons catégorielles--a été historiquement enrôlé pour justifier de multiples formes d'injustice : discrimination, exploitation, oppression, voire annihilation de groupes entiers de l'humanité. Pour lutter contre le racisme, il a donc pu sembler cohérent de vouloir définitivement disqualifier le concept qui en constituerait le fondement. Ce livre défend pourtant la thèse adverse : entreprendre de réduire les inégalités raciales exige un usage analytique et critique du concept de race. Socialement construites, les catégories raciales sont aujourd'hui à l'oeuvre, de manière plus ou moins masquée, dans de nombreuses pratiques administratives, juridiques et politiques. Ne pas les nommer, c'est s'interdire d'en débusquer les effets discriminatoires. Une philosophie politique soucieuse de penser l'injustice sociale sous toutes ses formes, mettant sa compétence propre de clarification conceptuelle au service d'un engagement politique, se doit d'affonter la question raciale