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71Immersive Experience and Virtual RealityPhilosophy and Technology 37 (1): 1-24. 2024.Much of the excitement about virtual reality and its potential for things like entertainment, art, education, and activism is its ability to generate experiences that are powerfully immersive. However, discussions of VR tend to invoke the notion of immersive experience without subjecting it to closer scrutiny; and discussions often take it for granted that immersive experience is a single unified phenomenon. Against this, we argue that there are four distinct types or aspects of immersive experi…Read more
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57Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2019.Philosophers have always recognized the value of reason, but the process of reasoning itself has only recently begun to emerge as a philosophical topic in its own right. Is reasoning a distinctive kind of mental process? If so, what is its nature? How does reasoning differ from merely freely associating thoughts? What is the relationship between reasoning about what to believe and reasoning about how to act? Is reasoning itself something you do, or something that happens to you? And what is the …Read more
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7On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing, and ConceivingIn Amy Kind & Peter Kun (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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96Knowledge First?, by McGlynn, Aidan: Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. xiii + 227, £60 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4): 826-829. 2016.
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76Intuitions as inferential judgmentsPhilosophical Issues 28 (1): 7-29. 2018.According to philosophical orthodoxy, intuitions are perception‐like in that they provide us with non‐inferential justification. In this paper, I present four arguments to show that orthodoxy is mistaken: Intuitions, as used in thought experiments, are inferential judgments, that is the results of inferential transitions that are inferentially justified (if justified at all). The discussion will shed light on the nature of intuition but also on the nature of inference.
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448Understanding and philosophical methodologyPhilosophical Studies 161 (2): 185-205. 2012.According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson’s arguments against Conceptual…Read more
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208Justification by ImaginationIn Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory, Oxford University Press. pp. 209-226. 2018.
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91Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2019.This new volume addresses the central questions which surround the process of reasoning. This emerging topic of analytic philosophy intersects with numerous other areas of philosophy, such as epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and metaethics, and also psychological work on reasoning.
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225Reasoning as a source of justificationPhilosophical Studies 164 (1): 113-126. 2013.In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities
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751Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic ProgressSynthese 190 (15): 3053-3074. 2013.This essay concerns the question of how we make genuine epistemic progress through conceptual analysis. Our way into this issue will be through consideration of the paradox of analysis. The paradox challenges us to explain how a given statement can make a substantive contribution to our knowledge, even while it purports merely to make explicit what one’s grasp of the concept under scrutiny consists in. The paradox is often treated primarily as a semantic puzzle. However, in “Sect. 1” I argue tha…Read more
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70Introduction to the special issue “The roles of experience in a priori knowledge”Synthese 192 (9): 2695-2699. 2015.
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126Perceptual Fundamentalism and a priori bootstrappingPhilosophical Studies 173 (8): 2087-2103. 2016.According to Perceptual Fundamentalism we can have justified perceptual beliefs solely in virtue of having perceptual experiences with corresponding contents. Recently, it has been argued that Perceptual Fundamentalism entails that it is possible to gain an a priori justified belief that perception is reliable by engaging in a suppositional reasoning process of a priori bootstrapping. But I will show that Perceptual Fundamentalists are not committed to a priori bootstrapping being a rational rea…Read more
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