•  1137
    Not One, Not Two: Toward an Ontology of Pregnancy
    Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4): 1-23. 2017.
    Basic understandings of subjectivity are derived from the principles of masculine embodiment such as temporal stability and singularity. But pregnancy challenges such understandings because it represents a sort of splitting of the body. In the pregnant situation, a subject may experience herself as both herself and an other, as well as neither herself nor an other. This is logically untenable—an impossibility. If our discourse depends on singular, fixed referents, then what paradigms of identity…Read more
  •  14
    Hello, We're Philosophy in the Wild
    Philosophy in the Wild Collection. 2023.
    This article introduces the Philosophy in the Wild collection. Philosophy in the Wild asks how ways of doing philosophy impact the kinds of philosophy being done and the kinds of philosophical engagement that are possible. We think that taking philosophy outside of its usual fluorescent, wired context would open up new ways of theorizing our relation to the world, as well as create new ways of engaging with philosophy. Thus Philosophy in the Wild hosts outdoor and technology-free conferences and…Read more
  •  10
    Cogito, Ergo Sumus? The Pregnancy Problem in Descartes's Philosophy
    Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 13 (2). 2023.
    Given Descartes’ metaphysical and natural-philosophic commitments, it is very difficult to theorize the pregnant human being as a human being under his system. Specifically, given (1) Descartes’ account of generation, (2) his commitment to mechanistic explanations where bodies are concerned, (3) his reliance on a subtle individuating principle for human (and animal) bodies, and (4) his metaphysics of human beings, which include minds, bodies, and mind-body unions, there is no available human sub…Read more
  • Émilie du Châtelet’s Mathematical Fictionalism
    In New Voices on Women in the History of Philosophy, Springer. forthcoming.
    Émilie Du Châtelet was a fictionalist about mathematics. Mathematical fictionalism (henceforth, fictionalism) is the view that, strictly speaking, mathematical entities such as numbers, functions, and sets, are fictions that are useful for human purposes, but are not themselves real in an ontological sense. I first explain fictionalism. Then I illustrate Du Châtelet’s position with regard to mathematical entities and give textual evidence of her fictionalism from Institutions de Physique. I offe…Read more