•  299
    Introspective humility
    with Tim Bayne
    Philosophical Issues 20 (1): 1-22. 2010.
    Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by com…Read more
  •  190
    This chapter discusses the main types of so-called ’subjective measures of consciousness’ used in current-day science of consciousness. After explaining the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of an ever-present response bias, I discuss the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked-out notion of subjective access. In turn, this makes t…Read more
  •  112
    Moderate scepticism about introspection
    Philosophical Studies 165 (3): 1187-1194. 2013.
  •  83
    Calibrating Introspection
    Philosophical Issues 25 (1): 300-321. 2015.
  •  56
    Disagreement about cognitive phenomenology
    In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 268. 2011.
  •  43
    Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology
    In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 381. 2012.
  •  33
    Using first-person data about consciousness
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1): 165-179. 2011.
    In Describing Inner Experience, Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel explore the proper limits of scepticism about consciousness and the prospect of a scientific investigation of consciousness. Their debate with each other focuses on the question about whether we can trust people's reports about their inner experiences and on Hurlburt's introspective method, DES. I point out that their discussion leaves unclear the crucial question of the aims and objectives of DES. This makes it difficult genuinely to ass…Read more
  •  25
    Review of William Robinson, Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (9). 2005.
  •  16
    Expecting phenomenology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 526-527. 2007.
    Block's argument against correlationism depends in part on a view about what subjects in certain experiments can be aware of phenomenally. Block's main source of evidence for this view is introspection. I argue that introspection should not be trusted in this respect. This weakens Block's argument and undermines correlationism at the same time