Manuel García

Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of Moore-paradoxical cases to be meaningful. In this paper we reflect on the consequences of this view for the acquisition of beliefs, and argue that, as in the moral case, excessive concentration on a thirdpersonal understanding of thought undermines the very idea of being directed to the world and of being capable to fully own our own beliefs. We suggest that maybe too much attention to epistemic virtues or tojustification is misdirected and could produce beliefs that are themself not first-personal enough.

In the core chapters 4–6, Iacona (2018) argues against the “Uniqueness Thesis” (UT), stating that “there is a unique notion of logical form that fulfils both the logical role and the semantic role” (39), where the former “concerns the formal explanation of logical properties and logical relations, such as validity or contradiction” (37), and the latter “concerns the formulation of a compositional theory of meaning” (ibid.). He argues for this on the basis of relations of coreference among referential expressions, names and indexicals. From what I take to be a fundamental agreement on most relevant issues, here I will nonetheless press him to clarify the notions of intrinsicness and the logical and semantic role of logical form on which he relies.

We intuitively make a distinction between _lying_ and _misleading_. On the explanation of this phenomenon favored here—the _adverbial_ account—the distinction tracks whether the content and its truth-committing force are literally conveyed. On an alternative _commitment_ account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one believes to be false; one merely misleads when one presents it without full assertoric commitment, by merely hinting or otherwise implying it. Now, as predicted by the well-supported assumption that we can also assert with pictures, the lying/misleading distinction appears to intuitively show up there too. Here I’ll explain how the debate confronting the two accounts plays out both in general and in that case, aiming to provide support for the adverbial account.

This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they form

Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice’s conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and others. This paper confronts and rejects three considerations that have been made: arguments based on the distinction between lying and misleading; arguments based on the ordinary concept of assertion; and arguments based on the testimonial knowledge that assertions provide

The essential role of creativity has been highlighted in several human knowledge areas. Regarding the neural underpinnings of creativity, there is evidence about the role of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) on divergent thinking (DT) and convergent thinking (CT). Transcranial stimulation studies suggest that the left DLPFC is associated with both DT and CT, whereas left IFG is more related to DT. However, none of the previous studies have targeted both hubs simultaneously and compared transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and random noise stimulation (tRNS). Additionally, given the relationship between cognitive flexibility and creativity, we included it in order to check if the improvement in creativity may be mediated by cognitive flexibility. In this double-blind, between-subjects study, 66 healthy participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups (N = 22) that received a transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), transcranial random noise stimulation (tRNS), or sham for 20 min. The tDCS group received 1.5 mA with the anode over the left DLPFC and cathode over the left IFG. Locations in tRNS group were the same and they received 1.5 mA of high frequency tRNS (100–500 Hz). Divergent thinking was assessed before (baseline) and during stimulation with unusual uses (UU) and picture completion (PC) subtests from Torrance Creative thinking Test, whereas convergent thinking was evaluated with the remote association test (RAT). Stroop test was included to assess cognitive flexibility. ANCOVA results of performance under stimulation (controlling for baseline performance) showed that there were significant differences in PC (F = 3.35, p = 0.042, np2 = 0.10) but not in UU (F = 0.61, p = 0.546) and RAT (F = 2.65, p = 0.079) scores. Post-hoc analyses showed that tRNS group had significantly higher scores compared to sham (p = 0.004) in PC. More specifically, tRNS showed higher performance in fluency (p = 0.012) and originality (p = 0.021) dimensions of PC compared to sham. Regarding cognitive flexibility, we did not find any significant effect of any of the stimulation groups (F = 0.34, p = 0.711). Therefore, no further mediation analyses were performed. Finally, the group that received tDCS reported more adverse effects than sham group (F = 3.46, p = 0.035). Altogether, these results suggest that tRNS may have some advantages over tDCS in DT.

In this paper we reject the nature–culture dichotomy by means of the idea of affordance or possibility for action, which has important implications for landscape theory. Our hypothesis is that, just as the idea of affordance can serve to overcome the subjective–objective dichotomy, the ideas of landscape and ecological niche, properly defined, would allow us to also transcend the nature–culture dichotomy. First, we introduce an overview of landscape theory, emphasizing processual landscape theory as the most suitable approach for satisfying both cultural and naturalist approaches. After that, we introduce the idea of affordance and we analyze a tension between sociocultural and transcultural affordances (affordances that depend on cultural conventions and affordances that depend on lawful information and bodily aspects of agents). This tension has various implications for landscape theory and ecological niches. Our proposal is that sociocultural and transcultural aspects of affordances could be systematically accommodated if we apply niche construction theory (the theory that explains the process by which organisms modify their selective environments) as a methodological framework for explaining the emergence of ecological niches. This approach will lead us to an integrative account of landscapes as the products of the interaction between human and environmental elements, making it a clear example of a concept that transcends the nature–culture dichotomy.

In recent work, Walton has abandoned his very influential account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples allegedly showing that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. In this paper, both in support and further elaboration of a constitutive-norms speech-act variation on Walton’s account that I have defended previously, I critically discuss his objections. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, I provide additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis-à- institutional accounts like Walton’s, and Gricean speech-act proposals.

The paper distinguishes between two conceptions of kinds defined by constitutive rules, the one suggested by Searle, and the one invoked by Williamson to define assertion. Against recent arguments to the contrary by Maitra, Johnson and others, it argues for the superiority of the latter in the first place as an account of games. On this basis, the paper argues that the alleged disanalogies between real games and language games suggested in the literature in fact don’t exist. The paper relies on Rawls’s distinction between types of practices and institutions defined by constitutive rules, and those among them that are actually in force, and hence are truly normative; it defends along Rawlsian lines that a plurality of norms apply to actual instances of rule-constituted practices, and uses this Rawlsian line to block the examples that Maitra, Johnson and others provide to sustain their case.

John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of inferences. This commitment is prone to sceptical attacks and waters down McDowell’s holism. We propose to retain McDowell’s partial re-enchantment of nature—without appealing to McDowell’s Kantian conception of experience—, and argue that it is sufficient to avoid the oscillation and to make sense of the objectivity of thought.

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in the light of claims of “thought insertion” in schizophrenic patients. The paper aims to defend a Shoemaker-like line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. Methodologically, the paper argues that to properly address these issues the all-inclusive term “thought” should be avoided, and specific types of thoughts countenanced.

Manuel García Carpintero defends a form of antirealism for the explicit talk and thought both about fictional entities and scientific models: a version of StephenYablo’s figuralist brand of factionalism. He argues that, in contrast with pretense-theoretic fictionalist proposals, on his view, utterances in those discourses are straightforward assertions with straightforward truth-conditions, involving a particular kind of metaphors or figurative manner. But given that the relevant metaphors are all but “dead”, this might suggest that the view is after all realist, committed to referents of some sort for singular terms in the relevant discourses. He revisits these issues from the perspective of the more recent work on them and applies his view to recent debates in semantics on the role and adequacy of supervaluationist models of indeterminacy.

Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed as a knowledge-possessor. By adopting a perspective based on Robert Brandom's normative expressivism, we respond to this objection by arguing that there is a close connection, conceptual and constitutive rather than merely causal, between the primary and the secondary epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, such that testimonial injustice always involves both kinds of epistemic harm. We do so by exploring the logic and functioning of belief and knowledge ascriptions in order to highlight three ways in which the secondary epistemic harm caused by testimonial injustice crystallizes: it undermines the epistemic agency of the victim, the epistemic friction necessary for knowledge, and the possibility of occupying particular epistemic nodes.

Propuesta de un nuevo y complementario enfoque —el traductológico— para el estudio de los romanceamientos granadinos considerados en cuanto que testimonios únicos para la historia de la traducción del árabe al español y la historia del arabismo en España. Dicho enfoque se lleva aquí a la práctica ilustrado con dos romanceamientos inéditos llevados a cabo en 1517 por Bemardino Xarafí, escribano público y romanceador de la ciudad de Granada y su Reino. La edición de los mismos se acompaña de un amplio estudio traductológico, una panorámica general sobre los Xarafí y otros romanceadores granadinos del primer tercio del XVI y un análisis descriptivo comparado con otros romanceamientos del siglo XVI y con los procedimientos de traducción actualmente aceptados en la traducción jurada del árabe al español.

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’—first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se—have a distinctive character that traditional views of contents cannot characterize. Drawing on Anscombe, Annalisa Coliva has argued that a feature she calls Real Guarantee marks apart de se thoughts—as opposed to others including Immunity to Error through Misidentification that have been proposed for that role. I'll argue that, while her work points to a truly distinguishing feature of the de se, we need an account of the notion other than hers and Echeverri's recent development of it. I'll offer an alternative, drawing on Léa Salje's work. Finally, I'll briefly outline how, thus understood, the Real Guarantee feature could be adequately explained by theories of de se thoughts like the one I favour, even if it is an open option to just explain it away.

Atrial fibrillation is the most common cardiac arrhythmia in clinical practice. It often starts with asymptomatic and short episodes, which are difficult to detect without the assistance of automatic monitoring tools. The vast majority of methods proposed for this purpose are based on quantifying the irregular ventricular response during the arrhythmia. However, although AF totally alters the atrial activity reflected on the electrocardiogram, replacing stable P-waves by chaotic and time-variant fibrillatory waves, this information has still not been explored for automated screening of AF. Hence, a pioneering AF detector based on quantifying the variability over time of the AA morphological pattern is here proposed. Results from two public reference databases have proven that the proposed method outperforms current state-of-the-art algorithms, reporting accuracy higher than 90%. A less false positive rate in the presence of other arrhythmias different from AF was also noticed. Finally, the combination of this algorithm with the classical analysis of RR series variability also yielded a promising trade-off between AF accuracy and detection delay. Indeed, this combination provided similar accuracy than RR-based methods, but with a significantly shorter delay of 10 beats.

The author maintains in this article that it is possible an approach between the positivistic legal theory, the one that follows the model of the analytical theory developed by Hart, and those others that apply a socio-legal method. Against what some defenders of both perspectives advocate, who view each others with some disdain, the author asserts the need to integrate legal theory with social sciences in the field of juridical ideas. This supposes opening spaces to develop a socio-legal theory of law that lives equally from categories of conceptual analysis and of sociological research. The author rests specially, in order to defend this position, on authors like Roger Coterrell, Denis Galligan, Nicola Lacey and, above all, Brian Tamanaha and William Twinning, whose arguments are here object of special consideration

José Luis Moreno argumenta contra lo que considera una variedad de formas de fetichismo político. Lo que tienen en común es depositar una confianza excesiva o monolítica en algún mecanismo democrático en particular. Compartimos su motivación y en esta nota crítica intentamos llevar sus argumentos más lejos preguntándonos si diferentes tipos de conocimiento políticamente relevante pueden distinguirse, si en algunos contextos es necesario dejar las decisiones en manos de expertos y si la propuesta de Moreno cae en un nuevo tipo de fetichismo con respecto al sorteo como mecanismo capaz de eliminar injusticias sociales profundas.

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of _immunity to error through misidentification_ (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, _episodic_ memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans disputed it. In the past two decades research on memory has produced very significant results, which have changed the philosophical landscape. As part of it, several new arguments have been made for and against the IEM of personal memories. The paper aims to defend the Shoemaker line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions.