University of Otago
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2017
Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  529
    Making Things Up (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274): 200-202. 2019.
    Making Things Up. By Bennett Karen.
  •  486
    Mereological universalists and nihilists disagree on the conditions for composition. In this paper, we show how this debate is a function of one’s chosen semantics for plural quantifiers. Debating mereologists have failed to appreciate this point because of the complexity of the debate and extraneous theoretical commitments. We eliminate this by framing the debate between universalists and nihilists in a formal model where these two theses about composition are contradictory. The examination of …Read more
  •  284
    Philosophers disagree whether composition as identity entails mereological universalism. Bricker :264–294, 2016) has recently considered an argument which concludes that composition as identity supports universalism. The key step in this argument is the thesis that any objects are identical to some object, which Bricker justifies with the principle of the universality of identity. I will spell out this principle in more detail and argue that it has an unexpected consequence. If the universality …Read more
  •  142
    Composition and Identities
    Dissertation, University of Otago. 2017.
    Composition as Identity is the view that an object is identical to its parts taken collectively. I elaborate and defend a theory based on this idea: composition is a kind of identity. Since this claim is best presented within a plural logic, I develop a formal system of plural logic. The principles of this system differ from the standard views on plural logic because one of my central claims is that identity is a relation which comes in a variety of forms and only one of them obeys substitution …Read more
  •  47
    Starting with Wittgenstein. By Chon Tejedor (review)
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 149-151. 2014.