Manuel Rebuschi

Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence, but the reformulation does not extend to non-factive attitudes like belief. There, formulae with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, called ‘de objecto’: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified property – in each world the same individual, which or who need not exist actually. The philosophical benefits of our analysis of propositional attitudes include a refined account of the behaviour of proper names as well as of indefinite and definite descriptions in attitude reports. Some remarks about perception and about the hallucination argument are also presented

Can epistemic logic state anything interesting about the epistemology of mathematics? That's one of Jaakko Hintikka’s claims. Hintikka was not only the founder of modal epistemic logic (1962), since he also worked on the foundations of mathematics (1996). Using what he calls "second generation" epistemic logic (2003), i.e. independence-friendly (IF) epistemic logic, Hintikka revisits the epistemology of mathematics, and in particular the debate between classical and intuitionistic mathematics (2001). The aim of the talk is to show that Hintikka is right regarding IF epistemic logic, for such a logic enables us to account for interesting features of mathematical knowledge. However, the path is not as easy as that Hintikka suggests. I will show that the well-known issue of logical omniscience directly threatens the understanding of intuitionism offered by IF epistemic logic.

The purpose of this talk is to reassert the philosophical significance that the DEL notion of an announcement may have, by (1) drawing an epistemologically motivated double distinction a. between "assertions" and "announcements" on the one hand, b. "public" and "private announcements" on the other hand, by (2) bringing it to bear on two "Moorean Puzzles" - Moore's Paradox and Moore's Proof - that we propose to revisit, thereby (3) contributing to grounding the logic of announcements in the philosophy of knowledge.

This present book explores recent advances in modeling discourse processes, in particular, new approaches aimed at understanding pathological language behavior specific to schizophrenia. The contributors examine the modeling paradigm of formal semantics, which falls within the scope of both linguistics and logic while providing overlapping links with other fields such as philosophy of language and cognitive psychology. This book is based on results presented during the series of workshops on Coherence and Discourse organized by SLAM, a project developed to systemize the study of pathological language processing by taking an overarching interdisciplinary approach combining psychology, linguistics, computer science and philosophy. The principle focus is on conversations produced by people with psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and autism. The contributions come from young and experienced researchers, and invited speakers. The book appeals to likeminded students and researchers.

This book presents comparisons of recent accounts in the formalization of natural language with informal conceptions of interaction that have been developed in both psychology and epistemology. There are four parts which explore: historical and systematic studies; the formalization of context in epistemology; the formalization of reasoning in interactive contexts in psychology; the formalization of pathological conversations. Part one discusses the Erlangen School, which proposed a logical analysis of science as well as an operational reconstruction of psychological concepts. These first chapters provide epistemological and psychological insights into a conceptual reassessment of rational reconstruction from a pragmatic point of view. The second focus is on formal epistemology, where there has recently been a vigorous contribution from experts in epistemic and doxatic logics and an attempt to account for a more realistic, cognitively plausible conception of knowledge. The third part of this book examines the meeting point between logic and the human and social sciences and the fourth part focuses on research at the intersection between linguistics and psychology. Internationally renowned scholars have contributed to this volume, building on the findings and themes relevant to an interdisciplinary scientific project called DiaRaFor which was hosted by the MSH Lorraine from 2007 to 2011.

This short paper provides a tentative formalization of Czeżowski's ideas about axiological concepts: Good and Evil are conceived of as modalities rather than as predicates. A natural account of the resulting “ethical logic” appears to be very close to standard deontic logic. If one does not resolve to become an antirealist regarding moral values, a possible way out is to become a revisionist about deontology: convert to intuitionism or some other kind of revisionism in deontic logic, and remain classical in ethical logic.

This Festschrift is published on the occasion of Gerhard Heinzmann's 60th birthday. Its title "Construction" refers to Heinzmann's philosophical options, as well as to his exceptional involvement in the building of many scientific enterprises and new scientific institutions. Sixty authors contributed to the volume, and the gathered essays witness the various centers of interest and intellectual achievements of Heinzmann. They are organised in five sections: Henri Poincare; History and Philosophy of Mathematics; History and Philosophy of Logic; Pragmatism; and Miscellaneous.

RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re . Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un objet simplement intentionnel. ABSTRACT: De se attitudes are generally regarded as being a proper part of de re attitudes. In this paper an alternative analysis that avoids ontological commitment to the self is proposed, based on the notion of de objecto attitudes. This proposal develops an idea from Hintikka’s second generation epistemic logic, which introduces a syntactic marker expressing independence relations between certain logical constants. According to this semantic account, the Self, as the denotation of ‘I’, is conceived of as a mere intentional object

Les pronoms personnels peuvent faire référence à la représentation physique (comme une statue ou une photographie) d’une personne plutôt qu’à cette personne elle-même. L’article présente une explication de ce liage sans identité apparente. Une objection est adressée à la théorie des proxies de Reuland et Winter, fondée sur la distinction entre attitudes de re et attitudes de se. La stratégie proposée ici consiste à introduire une nouvelle modalité pour chaque nouveau support d’une représentation physique, ce qui permet d’éviter les proxies et de restaurer l’identité à la base de la résolution des anaphores. Les modalités correspondent à des fenêtres modales au travers desquelles le sujet peut appréhender des objets, existants ou non, y compris lui-même. La sémantique proposée suppose de réinterpréter certains prédicats. Elle emprunte à Wehmeier l’idée de relation inter-mondaine, qui soulève en tant que telle des questions métaphysiques. L’article aborde ces questions, pour proposer finalement d’étendre la théorie des fenêtres modales à l’ensemble des relations intentionnelles.

RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re. Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un objet simplement intentionnel. ABSTRACT: De se attitudes are generally regarded as being a proper part of de re attitudes. In this paper an alternative analysis that avoids ontological commitment to the self is proposed, based on the notion of de objecto attitudes. This proposal develops an idea from Hintikka’s second generation epistemic logic, which introduces a syntactic marker expressing independence relations between certain logical constants. According to this semantic account, the Self, as the denotation of ‘I’, is conceived of as a mere intentional object.

Kripke’s substitutional interpretation of quantifiers is usually said to be unsatisfactory for independence-friendly (IF) languages. The purpose of this paper is to question this claim. Two accounts of substitutional semantics for IF sentences will be written down, and the objection of the so-called ‘dummy variables’ will be ruled out. Moreover, it will be argued, against the traditional view, that Game-Theoretical Semantics (GTS) should be conceived of as substitutional. The paper ends with some remarks concerning the reasons why substitution is especially suitable for dynamic semantics.