•  196
    A more thought-ful ape?
    Biology and Philosophy 38 (4): 1-12. 2023.
    In A Better Ape, Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell (2022) provide an ambitious and compelling history of the evolution of human morality. Informed by evidence from an impressively vast multidisciplinary literature, they offer a rich bio-cultural evolutionary explanation of how the human moral mind arose and developed over time that has wide appeal for philosophers and scientists alike. In this paper, I examine Kumar and Campbell’s novel moral psychology and raise questions about their account o…Read more
  •  2
    “Once a Scientist…”: Disciplinary Approaches and Intellectual Dexterity in Educational Development
    with K. Kearns, M. Hatcher, M. DiPietro, D. Donohue‐Bergeler, L. E. Drane, E. Luoma, A. E. Phuong, L. Thain, and M. Wright
    To Improve the Academy: A Journal of Educational Development 37 (1): 128-141. 2018.
    The authors claim that disciplinary epistemologies—disciplinary habits of mind and ways of thinking—offer productive lenses for observing teaching practices. Furthermore, they argue that educational developers who draw from multiple epistemologies in combination provide rich evidence with regard to teaching and learning and can speak to academic colleagues from an array of disciplines. Clarity is provided for career paths in educational development for colleagues from academic disciplines who ar…Read more
  •  740
    Is There Such a Thing as Genuinely Moral Disgust?
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2): 501-522. 2022.
    In this paper, I defend a novel skeptical view about moral disgust. I argue that much recent discussion of moral disgust neglects an important ontological question: is there a distinctive psychological state of moral disgust that is differentiable from generic disgust, and from other psychological states? I investigate the ontological question and propose two conditions that any aspiring account of moral disgust must satisfy: it must be a genuine form of disgust, and it must be genuinely moral. …Read more
  •  798
    Psychopathy, Autism and Questions of Moral Agency
    In Alexandra Perry & C. D. Herrera (eds.), Ethics and Neurodiversity, . pp. 238-259. 2013.
    In recent years, philosophers have looked to empirical findings about psychopaths to help determine whether moral agency is underwritten by reason, or by some affective capacity, such as empathy. Since one of psychopaths’ most glaring deficits is a lack of empathy, and they are widely considered to be amoral, psychopaths are often taken as a test case for the hypothesis that empathy is necessary for moral agency. However, people with autism also lack empathy, so it is reasonable to think that an…Read more