My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept both I think that it is clear that there are a cluster of related concepts in the area, many of which are coherent and defensible; some of which are not.
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: libertarianism
God: theism and atheism Agnostic/undecided
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept: rationalism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Skip
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Lean toward: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: deontology
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: qualia theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept an intermediate view Caveats concerning lexical semantics vs. compositional semantics. I accept that proper names are lexically Millian; Frege's Puzzle (and the failure of pragmatic solutions to it) strongly suggests that proper names contribute more to the compositional semantics of complex expressions than is provided by their lexical meanings.
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival Not really my area, but I am a little unclear on how these sorts of examples go in the context of dualism. What seems to me to be required for survival is token identity of mental states (not physical states), so the correct answer here depends somewhat on how one sees the psycho-physical laws.
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: metaphysically possible