My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: no
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes It is a pragmatic distinction
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: no free will
God: theism and atheism Agnostic/undecided
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism There is no fact of the matter Causally-determined internal content is no content. It refers to a equivalence class of things in the world, but this is only one implicit definition of content.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: sense-datum theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific anti-realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: epistemic
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: inconceivable