Marco Tedeschini

This book provides a presentation of the concept of “atmosphere” in the realm of aesthetics. An “atmosphere” is meant to be an emotional space. Such idea of “atmosphere” has been more and more subsumed by human and social sciences in the last twenty years, thereby becoming a technical notion. In many fields of the Humanities, affective life has been reassessed as a proper tool to understand the human being, and is now considered crucial. In this context, the link between atmospheres and aesthetics becomes decisive. Nowadays, aesthetics is no longer only a theory of art, but has recovered its original vocation: to be a general theory of perception conceived of as an ordinary experience of pre-logical character. In its four parts, this volume discusses whether atmospheres could take the prominent and paradigmatic position previously held by art in order to make sense of such sensible experience of the world.

In this paper, I consider the relationship that obtains between disgust and the idea of a just society. _Contra_ Martha C. Nussbaum, who argues that disgust poses dangers to a just society, I contend that disgust can either damage or promote the construction of a just society. In fact, I largely agree with Nussbaum’s perspective on disgust, except for this point: disgust, I think, is not necessarily dangerous for a just society, but can also be useful and constitute an important element for its development. In order to justify my claim, first, I will comment on Nussbaum’s criticism of disgust. Second, I will analyse Paul Rozin and April E. Fallon’s seminal study on disgust, which Nussbaum’s own research fully presupposes. Third, I will outline a slightly different, indeed “holistic” view on disgust, and bring forward some arguments for the use of disgust in order to construct a just society.

Starting from a debate which took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century between Jean Clair and Arthur C. Danto, we will focus on the link between art and disgust, because we wish to show what art is now ‘doing’ with disgust. Our hypothesis is that art is part of the general process of self-reshaping that is underway in today’s capitalist societies. Therefore, by commenting Aurel Kolnai’s phenomenological analysis of disgust, we will gain the tools to try to show how disgust could be a crucial factor in the above process. Finally, we will recall the work of artists such as Pasolini, Nebreda, and McCarthy, in order to suggest how art could use disgust and have an actual political effect by orienting that process. All this is possible, because disgust has to do with the good life.

What is a “Monster”? In the first part of my paper, I answer this question by delving into the historical changes that the concept of “monster” underwent in Western culture along with centuries. I claim that what we call “monster” had been the object of an “integral gaze” since its origin, while, during the 19th Century, it has become the object of a “disintegrated gaze”. What I mean with “integral gaze” is that we look at and understand something in one sole way: the monster exceeds the natural order. On the contrary, with “disintegrated gaze”, I mean that we look at and understand something in different ways, so that looking at and understanding do not gather nor hold together: the monster as much is experienced as an unnormal living being as is thought as a normal living being. This condition is far more general. Though, I contend that the analysis of the transformations undergone by the concept of “monster” over the last two centuries make us aware of such historical condition. This condition is concerning in so far as it “disintegrates” our understanding of the world. In the second part of my paper, I point out a way to surpass such condition, at least with regard to the concept of “monster”. To this purpose, I will answer my starting question by describing the ontological structure of a “monster”. This is the structure of a paradox. The monster is a paradox.

For the past twenty years, the relationship between politics, morality and disgust has been resolved into a denunciation of the injustices perpetrated in the name of this emotion. However, no compelling reasons have been brought forward to release the suspicion that the condemnation is merely a corollary of the dominant liberal ideology. I will exemplify this weakness by analysing the theory of disgust proposed by Debra Lieberman and Carlton Patrick in 2018. I will offer a different empirical basis for articulating an adequate answer to the question “what is disgust?”. I will use some acquisitions from philology to exemplify the moral and political scope of disgust. I will propose an “ontological” definition of disgust, based on which I will distinguish between disgust and its ethical and political use to justify oppression and discrimination. This use must be replaced by explicating the reasons that justify such oppression and discrimination. The fact of not being able to give reasons for such behaviours every time they occur opens up a breach in the direction of a more free and thus more just society.

In this paper I will discuss Barry Smith’s and Kevin Mulligan’s revision of Husserl’s phenomenology, starting from the fact that many Italian scholars seem to follow them in a sense, by dealing with phenomenology as a sort of a priori ontology. Therefore, I will first reconstruct Smith’s and Mulligan’s attempt and its objectives, then I will show how it is rooted in the school of Brentano and, in particular, in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, I will provide some arguments against this attempt : first of all that it does not attain a better description of the world, secondly that phenomenology does the job of formal ontology better than the latter.