Marcus Düwell

Thaddeus Metz, in his book “A Relational Moral Theory” compares the relational African view to Western theories of right action with a focus on Kant (respective contemporary Kantianism) and Utilitarianism. In focussing on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view, Metz questions the interpretation of basic normative assumptions that are guiding central Western moral and political institutions. He particularly focusses on Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to which he ascribes substantive moral assumptions in terms of utility respective autonomy. In this paper, we reconstruct Metz’s position on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view on ethics. We then investigate whether his relational conceptualisation is a convincing reconstruction of African views and question his take on Western positions, focussing in particular on views around individual rights and communality as presented in the Kantian tradition. We highlight the value of ubuntu in intercultural discourse to foster ethical and moral reasoning in a holistic way and conclude that any reflection on ethics necessarily involves an understanding of our common human nature, which is at the core of philosophical anthropology.

This chapter aims at an understanding of the distinctive role of the humanities. The first part offers, with reference to Helmuth PlessnerPlessner, H., an outline under which conditions it is conceivable that a specific life form might develop the capacity to strive for understanding and self-understanding. Such a foundation in philosophical anthropology is needed for the possibility of a hermeneutical understanding of the role of the human being. On the basis of this hermeneutic perspective the second part sketches how knowledge, orientation and morality are possible. The capacity of humans to judge makes ‘reflective knowledge’ possible. Likewise, morality is given with the ability of human beings to form a reflective relationship with themselves. On the basis of such a hermeneutic and critical view of the human being, the societal role of the humanities can be understood. The third part outlines this role by stressing that it is this fundamental role of the humanities, to make understanding in a methodologically reflective way possible, that gives the humanities both intrinsic importance and societal relevance.

Der Beitrag untersucht zunächst einige Beispiele für die Berufung auf Menschenbilder in bioethischen Diskussionen. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Rede von ‚Menschenbildern‘ selbst undeutlich und auch manipulations- und ideologieanfällig ist. Es besteht sowohl die Gefahr, dass moralische Diskurse relativistisch an bestimmte Traditionen gebunden werden als auch, dass der Verweis auf eine Fundierung von Normativität in Menschenbildern moralische Verständigung nahezu aussichtslos macht. In Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen Anthropologie wird über alternative Konzeptualisierungen nachgedacht. Dabei geht es darum, Menschenbilder in einer menschlichen Grundsituation zu lokalisieren, wonach Menschen symbolische und normative Ordnungen schaffen. Eine solche Reflexion auf die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit, Menschenbilder zu schaffen, öffnet die Diskussion auf eine universalistische Perspektive. Abschließend werden einige Implikationen für den bioethischen Diskurs skizziert.

Hatte Jeremy Bentham den von ihm geprägten Begriff deontology in seinem gleichnamigen Werk noch im etymologisch buchstäblichen Sinne als »Lehre vom Sollen« verstanden und mit der »Wissenschaft von der Moral« gleichgesetzt, so dient das Adjektiv ›deontologisch‹ heutzutage ausschließlich der Kategorisierung einer spezifischen Teilklasse allgemeiner Konzeptionen normativer Ethik. ›Deontologische‹ Theorien normativer Ethik werden dann in der Regel ›teleologischen‹ Theorien, und/oder ›konsequentialistischen‹ Theorien gegenübergestellt.

Das Gendiagnostikgesetz verbietet seit 2010 die pränatale Diagnostik spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen GenDG). In seiner Begründung bezog sich der Gesetzgeber in Analogie zu internationalen Empfehlungen für den pädiatrischen Bereich vor allem auf das Recht des heranwachsenden Kindes bzw. des späteren Erwachsenen auf Nichtwissen. Mit diesem gesetzlichen Verbot hat Deutschland einen viel diskutierten Sonderweg in der Regulierung genetischer Pränataldiagnostik eingeschlagen. Seither jedoch hat sich nicht nur die Perspektive auf prädiktive Testungen im Kindesalter verändert. In zunehmendem Maße generieren auf das gesamte Genom abzielende Diagnostikangebote auch andere vorgeburtlich genetische Informationen, die – in ähnlicher Weise wie diejenigen zu spätmanifestierenden Erkrankungen eine potenzielle Gefahr für das Recht auf Nichtwissen der späteren Person darstellen. Es soll daher im Rahmen dieses Beitrages überprüft werden, inwiefern das deutsche Diagnostikverbot und dessen Bezug auf das Recht auf Nichtwissen des späteren Kindes eine tragfähige Basis zur Regulierung gendiagnostischer Untersuchungen in der Pränatalmedizin insgesamt darstellt bzw. zukünftig darstellen kann.Untersucht wird der Argumentationsgang des Diagnostikverbotes im Hinblick auf spätmanifestierende Erkrankungen vor dem Hintergrund der Entwicklungen in der prädiktiven Diagnostik. Eine Analyse des normativen Begründungsrahmens zeigt, dass nach wie vor deutlicher Klärungsbedarf hinsichtlich der philosophisch-ethischen Fundierung wie auch hinsichtlich der Interpretation eines Rechts auf Nichtwissen eines Kindes im Kontext von genetischer Diagnostik besteht. Darüber hinaus müssen auch Interessen des Kindes an eventuell möglich werdender pränataler Behandlung oder Prävention von Erkrankungen in die Abwägung miteinbezogen werden.Um zukünftigen Herausforderungen genomischer Pränataldiagnostik und -therapie begegnen zu können, müsste dringend geklärt werden, inwiefern Rechte zukünftiger Personen tatsächlich in der speziellen Situation der Schwangerschaft relevant sein können und mit welchen Pflichten diese für den Gesetzgeber, aber insbesondere auch für zukünftige Eltern und Ärzte einhergehen. Der Menschenrechtsdiskurs könnte hierfür eine tragfähige Basis und hilfreiche Strategien liefern.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Kant’s justification of the categorical imperative. The book contests the standard interpretation of Kant’s views by arguing that he never abandoned his view about this as expressed in his Groundwork. It is distinctive in the way in which it places Kant’s argument in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is essential to understand it as an argument from within human agential self-understanding. The book reviews that existing literature, then presents a logical construction of Kant’s argument, which it defends by examining what Kant has to say about synthetic a priori practical propositions in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, and by a detailed examination of how he presents his argument in the Second Critique and the Groundwork. Particular attention is given to the views of two scholars who share many of the views expressed in this book: Klaus Steigleder and Michael Wolff. Special attention is also given to the views of Owen Ware, who, while sharing many of our arguments has a very different overall view. The concluding chapter provides a statement about the validity of Kant’s argument.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Kant’s justification of the categorical imperative. The book contests the standard interpretation of Kant’s views by arguing that he never abandoned his view about this as expressed in his Groundwork. It is distinctive in the way in which it places Kant’s argument in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is essential to understand it as an argument from within human agential self-understanding. The book reviews that existing literature, then presents a logical construction of Kant’s argument, which it defends by examining what Kant has to say about synthetic a priori practical propositions in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, and by a detailed examination of how he presents his argument in the Second Critique and the Groundwork. Particular attention is given to the views of two scholars who share many of the views expressed in this book: Klaus Steigleder and Michael Wolff. Special attention is also given to the views of Owen Ware, who, while sharing many of our arguments has a very different overall view. The concluding chapter provides a statement about the validity of Kant’s argument.

"The history of human rights suggests that individuals should be empowered in their natural, political, political, social and economic vulnerabilities. States within the international arena hold each other responsible for doing just that and support or interfere where necessary. States are to protect these essential human vulnerabilities, even when this is not a matter of self-interest. This function of human rights is recognized in contexts of intervention, genocide, humanitarian aid and development. This book develops the idea of environmental obligations as long-term responsibilities in the context of human rights. It proposes that human rights require recognition that, in the face of unsustainable conduct, future human persons are exposed and vulnerable. It explores the obstacles for long-term responsibilities that human rights law provides at the level of international and national law and challenges the question of whether lifestyle restrictions are enforceable in view of liberties and levels of wellbeing typically seen as protected by human rights. The book will be of interest to postgraduates studying Human Rights, Sustainability, Law and Philosophy."--Provided by publisher.

The history of human rights suggests that individuals should be empowered in their natural, political, political, social and economic vulnerabilities. States within the international arena hold each other responsible for doing just that and support or interfere where necessary. States are to protect these essential human vulnerabilities, even when this is not a matter of self-interest. This function of human rights is recognized in contexts of intervention, genocide, humanitarian aid and development. This book develops the idea of environmental obligations as long-term responsibilities in the context of human rights. It proposes that human rights require recognition that, in the face of unsustainable conduct, future human persons are exposed and vulnerable. It explores the obstacles for long-term responsibilities that human rights law provides at the level of international and national law and challenges the question of whether lifestyle restrictions are enforceable in view of liberties and levels of wellbeing typically seen as protected by human rights. The book will be of interest to postgraduates studying Human Rights, Sustainability, Law and Philosophy.

This introduction to human dignity explores the history of the notion from antiquity to the nineteenth century, and the way in which dignity is conceptualised in non-Western contexts. Building on this, it addresses a range of systematic conceptualisations, considers the theoretical and legal conditions for human dignity as a useful notion and analyses a number of philosophical and conceptual approaches to dignity. Finally, the book introduces current debates, paying particular attention to the legal implementation, human rights, justice and conflicts, medicine and bioethics, and provides an explicit systematic framework for discussing human dignity. Adopting a wide range of perspectives and taking into account numerous cultures and contexts, this handbook is a valuable resource for students, scholars and professionals working in philosophy, law, history and theology.

Human beings orient themselves in the world via judgments; factual, moral, prudential, aesthetic, and all kinds of mixed judgments. Particularly for normative orientation in complex and contested contexts of action, it can be challenging to form judgments. This paper explores what one can reasonably expect from a theory of the power of judgment from a Kantian approach to ethics. We reconstruct practical judgments on basis of the self-reflexive capacities of human beings, and argue that for the subject to see himself as committed to prudential goods it is necessarily implied that he understands himself as committed to moral judgment. However, to understand the normativity of understanding oneself as a being with practical commitments at all, the aesthetic judgment is introduced: the power of judgment in its pure form of selfreflexivity. We claim that aesthetic reflection and judgment is conditional on the possibility for human beings to enter the space of reasons, and therewith for practical self-understanding as such. The paper concludes with a preliminary sketch of different conceptual possibilities in fleshing out the role of the power of judgment in its aesthetic employment in developing mixed judgments

The aim of the paper is to examine the possible relationships between the different dimensions of aesthetics on the one hand, and medical practice and medical ethics on the other hand. Firstly, I consider whether the aesthetic perception of the human body is relevant for medical practice. Secondly, a possible analogy between the artistic process and medical action is examined. The third section concerns the comparison between medical ethical judgements and aesthetic judgement of taste. It is concluded that the mutual relevance between the aesthetic sphere, moral judgement and medical practice can be understood only if we recognize these spheres as distinct