Marcus Sacrini

No início do artigo, reconstruo a posição complexa de Husserl em relação à noção de fantasia. Por um lado, a fantasia aparece como severamente limitada, do ponto de vista da progressão da consciência na constituição de objetidades em um mundo objetivo. Por outro lado, uma vez esclarecidas as opções metodológicas de Husserl para dar destaque a essa constituição objetiva, aparece a riqueza da associatividade inerente ao fantasiar. Pretendo avançar essa investigação ao propor uma sistematização dos padrões de associação por semelhança das experiências comumente chamadas de “devaneios”.

O artigo retoma, de início, o modelo de análise de atos intencionais proposto por Husserl em Investigações lógicas. Segundo esse modelo, os atos são estudados como unidades vivenciais relativamente autônomas, dos quais se descrevem suas características estruturais. O artigo acompanha, logo a seguir, o desenvolvimento da fenomenologia das associações por Husserl, o que permitirá consolidar uma nova forma de análise dos atos, enquanto conectados por nexos de motivação. Por fim, propõe-se levar adiante a análise da fenomenologia das associações por meio da noção de devaneio.

In this paper, I argue that Merleau-Ponty reformulates traditional transcendental philosophy in the sense of showing that the a priori conditions of experience cannot be separated from the concrete experiences. In the first section, I revisit Kant and Husserl, to show how these authors delimit the transcendental conditions as a formal domain independent from any concrete experience. Then I reconstruct the argumentative move through which Merleau-Ponty rejects this formal delimitation of the transcendental sphere and reintroduces it as inseparable from empirical domain, initially in The Structure of Behavior and later in Phenomenology of Perception

Dans ce texte, je reprends l’évaluation de Michel Haar selon laquelle le projet ontologique de Merleau-Ponty aboutirait à une métaphysique. Afin de rendre cette évaluation plus sévère, je propose un autre critère, d’inspiration kantienne, selon lequel un tel projet pourrait également être classifié de métaphysique. Ensuite, j’expose les stratégies philosophiques de Merleau-Ponty qui permettent de juger d’après ces deux critères que l’auteur ne construit pas une métaphysique, mais une ontologie indirecte, laquelle, une fois bien comprise, se laisse déjà remarquer au niveau du discours philosophique lui-même.

It is known that Sartre, although having considered himself as a phenomenologist for some years, criticizes explicitly some positions held by Husserl, such as those related to the pure ego. I would like to point in this ar-ticle to a less noted although more basic divergence (included in The tran-scendence of the ego) between these authors, namely, the divergence related to the interpretation of the evidence criterion that should guide reflection. I in-tend to show that by assuming a much stronger criterion than Husserl’s, Sar-tre is committed to accept problematic positions, which will only be overthrown in Sketch for a theory of the emotions

In this paper, I argue that Merleau-Ponty reformulates traditional transcendental philosophy in the sense of showing that the a priori conditions of experience cannot be separated from the concrete experiences of the embodiedsubject. In the first section, I revisit Kant and Husserl, to analyze how these authors delimit the transcendental conditions as a formal domain independent from any concrete experience. Then I reconstruct the argumentative move through which Merleau-Ponty rejects this formal delimitation of the transcendental sphere and reintroduces it as inseparable from empirical domain, initially in The Structure of Behavior (section 2) and later in Phenomenology of Perception (section 3)

In this article, I reconstruct and evaluate Merleau-Ponty’s main responses to philosophical skepticism in the relevant parts of his work. To begin with, I introduce the skeptical argument that Merleau-Ponty most often tried to refute, namely, the dream argument. Secondly, I show how Merleau-Ponty, in his initial works, excludes the skeptical problem by appealing to a general contact with the world guaranteed by perception. Finally, I analyze how in his last texts Merleau-Ponty considers at least some uses of the skeptical arguments as tools to make our opaque contact with being explicit.

The present article analyses the transformation of the first version of phenomenology, introduced by Husserl in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900), into the transcendental phenomenology as outlined in Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge (1906-7). First, it is argued that phenomenology was initially conceived as a discipline that should clarify the legitimacy of the objective constructions of pure logic by relating them to the corresponding subjective acts of thought. Then, it is shown that Husserl acknowledges that this first investigation is dependent on pure logic, and that he gradually extends the phenomenological tasks so as to develop an autonomous universal science of pure consciousness, committed to exploring the totality of the experience of the world. However, it is suggested, in the conclusion, that the problem of the dependence on pure logic is not completely solved in 1906-7

Neste artigo, defendo que Merleau-Ponty reformula a filosofia transcendental de matiz kantiano no sentido de mostrar que as condições a priori da experiência não podem ser separadas das vivências concretas do sujeito encarnado. Na primeira seção, eu retorno a Kant e Husserl para analisar como esses autores delimitam as condições transcendentais como um domínio formal independente de qualquer experiência concreta. Em seguida, reconstruo o movimento argumentativo pelo qual Merleau-Ponty rejeita essa delimitação formal da esfera transcendental e reapresenta essa última como inseparável do domínio empírico, inicialmente em A estrutura do comportamento e posteriormente em Fenomenologia da percepção.Merleau-Ponty. Transcendental. Gestalt. Circularidade existencial.In this paper, I argue that Merleau-Ponty reformulates traditional transcendental philosophy in the sense of showing that the a priori conditions of experience cannot be separated from the concrete experiences of the embodied subject. In the first section, I revisit Kant and Husserl, to analyze how these authors delimitthe transcendental conditions as a formal domain independent from any concrete experience. Then I reconstruct the argumentative move through which Merleau-Ponty rejects this formal delimitation of the transcendental sphere and reintroduces it as inseparable from empirical domain, initially in The Structure of Behavior and later in Phenomenology of Perception.Merleau-Ponty. Transcendental. Gestalt. Existential circularity.