Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
PhD, 1992
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
  •  14
    Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its Limits
    Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 30 (3): 205-207. 2023.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its LimitsMarga Reimer, PhD (bio)I thoroughly enjoyed reading and reflecting on this provocative, engagingly written, and persuasively argued paper. My commentary focuses on the authors’ “understanding first” principle. I begin by exploring that principle’s scope by appeal to aesthetic analogues to the moral cases of Pete and Jacob; I then explore its limits by appeal to cases invo…Read more
  •  597
    Metaphor
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 845. 2006.
    Metaphor has traditionally been construed as a linguistic phenomenon: as something produced and understood by speakers of natural language. So understood, metaphors are naturally viewed as linguistic expressions of a particular type, or as linguistic expressions used in a particular type of way. This linguistic conception of metaphor is adopted in this article. In doing so, the article does not intend to rule out the possibility of non-linguistic forms of metaphor. Many theorists think that non-…Read more
  •  5
    “Hesperus is Phosphorus”: Contingent or Necessary?
    Facta Philosophica 2 (1): 3-21. 2000.
  •  78
    In his classic paper, “Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder,” Brendan Maher (1974) argues that psychiatric delusions are hypotheses designed to explain anomalous experiences, and are “developed through the operation of normal cognitive processes.” Consider, for instance, the Capgras delusion. Patients suffering from this particular delusion believe that someone close to them—such as a spouse, a sibling, a parent, or a child—has been replaced by an impostor: by someone who bears a striking…Read more
  •  111
    Could there have been unicorns?
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1). 1997.
    Kripke and Dummett disagree over whether or not there could have been unicorns. Kripke thinks that there could not have been; Dummett thinks otherwise. I argue that Kripke is correct: there are no counterfactual situations properly describable as ones in which there would have been unicorns. In attempting to establish this claim, I argue that Dummett's critique of an argument (reminiscent of an argument of Kripke's) to the conclusion that there could not have been unicorns, is vitiated by a conf…Read more
  •  100
  •  39
    Reflections on Insight: Dilemmas, Paradoxes, and Puzzles
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1): 85-89. 2010.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on InsightDilemmas, Paradoxes, and PuzzlesMarga Reimer (bio)Keywordsinsight, psychosis, treatment adherence, medical model, autonomy, open placebos, rationalityThe Practitioner's DilemmaThe psychiatrist aware of the potential intractability of what Jennifer Radden calls "insightlessness," faces a dilemma. Should she encourage her patient to embrace a medical model of his "troubles," a model whose adoption is likely to mot…Read more
  •  31
  •  131
    Only a Philosopher or a Madman: Impractical Delusions in Philosophy and Psychiatry
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 315-328. 2010.
    Whether your scepticism is as absolute and sincere as you claim is something we shall learn later on, when we end this little meeting: we’ll then see whether you leave the room through the door or the window; and whether you really doubt that your body has gravity and can be injured by its fall—which is what people in general think on the basis of their fallacious senses and more fallacious experience. What Could Be more dissimilar than a well-argued philosophical thesis and a psychiatric delusi…Read more
  •  12
    Demonstrating with Descriptions
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 877-893. 1992.
  •  45
    In a recent paper Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore challenge an assumption that they rightly claim is pervasive among contemporary philosophers of language. According to this assumption (MA), an adequate semantic theory T for a language L should assign p as the semantic content of a sentence S in L if and only if in uttering S a speaker says that p. I claim that the arguments of Cappelen and Lepore are based upon an uncharitable interpretation of MA. If ‘saying’ is understood in a roughly Gricea…Read more
  •  59
    A "Meinongian" Solution to a Millian Problem
    American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (3). 2001.
  •  12
    The Metaphor of Correspondence
    ProtoSociology 23 93-110. 2006.
  •  150
    Psychopathy without (the language of) disorder
    Neuroethics 1 (3): 185-198. 2008.
    Psychopathy is often characterized in terms of what I call “the language of disorder.” I question whether such language is necessary for an accurate and precise characterization of psychopathy, and I consider the practical implications of how we characterize psychopathy—whether as a biological, or merely normative, disorder.
  •  136
    Medical professionals, including mental health professionals, largely agree that moral judgment should be kept out of clinical settings. The rationale is simple: moral judgment has the capacity to impair clinical judgment in ways that could harm the patient. However, when the patient is suffering from a "Cluster B" personality disorder, keeping moral judgment out of the clinic might appear impossible, not only in practice but also in theory. For the diagnostic criteria associated with these part…Read more
  •  1
    Descriptively introduced names
    In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond, Oxford University Press. pp. 613--629. 2004.
  •  212
    Three views of demonstrative reference
    Synthese 93 (3). 1992.
    Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) ar…Read more
  •  42
    Treatment Adherence in the Absence of Insight: A Puzzle and a Proposed Solution
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1): 65-75. 2010.
    Patients with psychosis often have poor insight into their illness. Poor insight into illness is, at least among patients with psychosis, a good predictor of treatment non-adherence. This is no mystery, for as Xavier Amador asks, "Who would want to take medicine for an illness they did not believe they had?" What is curious is that some patients with psychosis do adhere to treatment despite a lack of insight. Why do these patients adhere to treatment, given that they do not believe they are ill …Read more
  •  41
    Russell's anticipation of Donnellan's distinction
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1). 1993.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  23
    Ordinary proper names
    In Gerhard Preyer Georg Peter (ed.), Logical Form and Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 444--466. 2002.
  •  117
    Empty Names: Communicative Value without Semantic Value 1 (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3): 738-747. 2007.
  •  149
    What malapropisms mean: A reply to Donald Davidson (review)
    Erkenntnis 60 (3): 317-334. 2004.
    In this paper, I argue against Davidson's (1986) view that our ability to understand malapropisms forces us to re-think the standard construal of literal word meaning as conventional meaning. Specially, I contend that the standard construal is not only intuitive but also well-motivated, for appeal to conventional meaning is necessary to understand why speakers utter the particular words they do. I also contend that, contra Davidson, we can preserve the intuitive distinction between what a speake…Read more
  •  216
    The problem of empty names
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4). 2001.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  62
    A Defense of De Re Belief Reports
    Mind and Language 10 (4): 446-463. 1995.
    In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account…Read more