Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
PhD, 1992
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
  •  6
    Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its Limits
    Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 30 (3): 205-207. 2023.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its LimitsMarga Reimer, PhD (bio)I thoroughly enjoyed reading and reflecting on this provocative, engagingly written, and persuasively argued paper. My commentary focuses on the authors’ “understanding first” principle. I begin by exploring that principle’s scope by appeal to aesthetic analogues to the moral cases of Pete and Jacob; I then explore its limits by appeal to cases invo…Read more
  •  591
    Metaphor
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 845. 2006.
    Metaphor has traditionally been construed as a linguistic phenomenon: as something produced and understood by speakers of natural language. So understood, metaphors are naturally viewed as linguistic expressions of a particular type, or as linguistic expressions used in a particular type of way. This linguistic conception of metaphor is adopted in this article. In doing so, the article does not intend to rule out the possibility of non-linguistic forms of metaphor. Many theorists think that non-…Read more
  •  4
    “Hesperus is Phosphorus”: Contingent or Necessary?
    Facta Philosophica 2 (1): 3-21. 2000.
  •  139
    Psychopathy without (the language of) disorder
    Neuroethics 1 (3): 185-198. 2008.
    Psychopathy is often characterized in terms of what I call “the language of disorder.” I question whether such language is necessary for an accurate and precise characterization of psychopathy, and I consider the practical implications of how we characterize psychopathy—whether as a biological, or merely normative, disorder.
  •  130
    Medical professionals, including mental health professionals, largely agree that moral judgment should be kept out of clinical settings. The rationale is simple: moral judgment has the capacity to impair clinical judgment in ways that could harm the patient. However, when the patient is suffering from a "Cluster B" personality disorder, keeping moral judgment out of the clinic might appear impossible, not only in practice but also in theory. For the diagnostic criteria associated with these part…Read more
  •  1
    Descriptively introduced names
    In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond, Oxford University Press. pp. 613--629. 2004.
  •  208
    Three views of demonstrative reference
    Synthese 93 (3). 1992.
    Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) ar…Read more
  •  36
    Treatment Adherence in the Absence of Insight: A Puzzle and a Proposed Solution
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1): 65-75. 2010.
    Patients with psychosis often have poor insight into their illness. Poor insight into illness is, at least among patients with psychosis, a good predictor of treatment non-adherence. This is no mystery, for as Xavier Amador asks, "Who would want to take medicine for an illness they did not believe they had?" What is curious is that some patients with psychosis do adhere to treatment despite a lack of insight. Why do these patients adhere to treatment, given that they do not believe they are ill …Read more
  •  39
    Russell's anticipation of Donnellan's distinction
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1). 1993.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  22
    Ordinary proper names
    In Gerhard Preyer Georg Peter (ed.), Logical Form and Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 444--466. 2002.
  •  114
    Empty Names: Communicative Value without Semantic Value 1 (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3): 738-747. 2007.
  •  147
    What malapropisms mean: A reply to Donald Davidson (review)
    Erkenntnis 60 (3): 317-334. 2004.
    In this paper, I argue against Davidson's (1986) view that our ability to understand malapropisms forces us to re-think the standard construal of literal word meaning as conventional meaning. Specially, I contend that the standard construal is not only intuitive but also well-motivated, for appeal to conventional meaning is necessary to understand why speakers utter the particular words they do. I also contend that, contra Davidson, we can preserve the intuitive distinction between what a speake…Read more
  •  215
    The problem of empty names
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4). 2001.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  61
    A Defense of De Re Belief Reports
    Mind and Language 10 (4): 446-463. 1995.
    In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account…Read more
  •  126
    Quantification and context
    Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (1): 95-115. 1998.
  •  200
    Davidson on metaphor
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1). 2001.
  •  76
    Distinguishing Between the Psychiatrically and Philosophically Deluded: Easier Said Than Done
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 341-346. 2010.
    take leave of one’s senses English, Verb. 1. (idiomatic) To go crazy; to stop behaving rationally A Chief concern in “Only a Philosopher or a Madman” was to draw attention to a number of striking yet underappreciated similarities between paradigm psychiatric delusions and standard philosophical doctrines, “nihilistic” as well as “common sense.” The similarities were presented as illuminating given their potential to inform the debate over whether psychiatric delusions are properly (or usefully) …Read more
  •  52
    The wettstein/salmon debate: Critique and resolution
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2). 1998.
    Does Keith Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction have ‘semantic significance’? Howard Wettstein has claimed (in several papers) that it does; Nathan Salmon has responded (in several papers) that it does not. Specifically, while Wettstein has claimed that definite descriptions, used referentially, function semantically as demonstratives, Salmon has responded to Wettstein's claims by defending a unitary Russellian account of such expressions, according to which they invariably function a…Read more
  •  21
    Remark and Reply
    Linguistics and Philosophy 18 655-675. 1995.
  •  126
    Incomplete descriptions
    Erkenntnis 37 (3). 1992.
    Standard attempts to defend Russell's Theory of Descriptions against the problem posed by incomplete descriptions, are discussed and dismissed as inadequate. It is then suggested that one such attempt, one which exploits the notion of a contextually delimited domain of quantification, may be applicable to incomplete quantifier expressions which are typically treated as quantificational: expressions of the form AllF's, NoF's, SomeF's, Exactly eightF's, etc. In this way, one is able to retain the …Read more
  •  33
    Donnellan's distinction/Kripke's test
    Analysis 58 (2): 89-100. 1998.
  •  6
    What Do Belief Ascrebers Really Mean? A Reply to Stephen Schiffer
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 404-423. 2017.
    Stephen Schiffer has recently claimed that the currently popular “hidden‐indexical” theory of belief reports is an implausible theory of such reports. His central argument for this claim is based on what he refers to as the “meaning‐intention” problem. In this paper, I claim that the meaning‐intention problem is powerless against the hidden‐indexical theory of belief reports. I further contend that the theory is in fact a plausible theory of such reports.