Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
PhD, 1992
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
  •  591
    Metaphor
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 845. 2006.
    Metaphor has traditionally been construed as a linguistic phenomenon: as something produced and understood by speakers of natural language. So understood, metaphors are naturally viewed as linguistic expressions of a particular type, or as linguistic expressions used in a particular type of way. This linguistic conception of metaphor is adopted in this article. In doing so, the article does not intend to rule out the possibility of non-linguistic forms of metaphor. Many theorists think that non-…Read more
  •  215
    The problem of empty names
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4). 2001.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  208
    Three views of demonstrative reference
    Synthese 93 (3). 1992.
    Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) ar…Read more
  •  200
    Davidson on metaphor
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1). 2001.
  •  158
    Demonstratives, demonstrations, and demonstrata
    Philosophical Studies 63 (2): 187--202. 1991.
  •  147
    What malapropisms mean: A reply to Donald Davidson (review)
    Erkenntnis 60 (3): 317-334. 2004.
    In this paper, I argue against Davidson's (1986) view that our ability to understand malapropisms forces us to re-think the standard construal of literal word meaning as conventional meaning. Specially, I contend that the standard construal is not only intuitive but also well-motivated, for appeal to conventional meaning is necessary to understand why speakers utter the particular words they do. I also contend that, contra Davidson, we can preserve the intuitive distinction between what a speake…Read more
  •  139
    Psychopathy without (the language of) disorder
    Neuroethics 1 (3): 185-198. 2008.
    Psychopathy is often characterized in terms of what I call “the language of disorder.” I question whether such language is necessary for an accurate and precise characterization of psychopathy, and I consider the practical implications of how we characterize psychopathy—whether as a biological, or merely normative, disorder.
  •  130
    Medical professionals, including mental health professionals, largely agree that moral judgment should be kept out of clinical settings. The rationale is simple: moral judgment has the capacity to impair clinical judgment in ways that could harm the patient. However, when the patient is suffering from a "Cluster B" personality disorder, keeping moral judgment out of the clinic might appear impossible, not only in practice but also in theory. For the diagnostic criteria associated with these part…Read more
  •  128
    Only a Philosopher or a Madman: Impractical Delusions in Philosophy and Psychiatry
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 315-328. 2010.
    Whether your scepticism is as absolute and sincere as you claim is something we shall learn later on, when we end this little meeting: we’ll then see whether you leave the room through the door or the window; and whether you really doubt that your body has gravity and can be injured by its fall—which is what people in general think on the basis of their fallacious senses and more fallacious experience. What Could Be more dissimilar than a well-argued philosophical thesis and a psychiatric delusi…Read more
  •  126
    Quantification and context
    Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (1): 95-115. 1998.
  •  126
    Incomplete descriptions
    Erkenntnis 37 (3). 1992.
    Standard attempts to defend Russell's Theory of Descriptions against the problem posed by incomplete descriptions, are discussed and dismissed as inadequate. It is then suggested that one such attempt, one which exploits the notion of a contextually delimited domain of quantification, may be applicable to incomplete quantifier expressions which are typically treated as quantificational: expressions of the form AllF's, NoF's, SomeF's, Exactly eightF's, etc. In this way, one is able to retain the …Read more
  •  114
    Empty Names: Communicative Value without Semantic Value 1 (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3): 738-747. 2007.
  •  106
    Could there have been unicorns?
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1). 1997.
    Kripke and Dummett disagree over whether or not there could have been unicorns. Kripke thinks that there could not have been; Dummett thinks otherwise. I argue that Kripke is correct: there are no counterfactual situations properly describable as ones in which there would have been unicorns. In attempting to establish this claim, I argue that Dummett's critique of an argument (reminiscent of an argument of Kripke's) to the conclusion that there could not have been unicorns, is vitiated by a conf…Read more
  •  105
    Metaphorical Meanings. Do you see what I mean?
    The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 3. 2007.
    My intention in this paper is to propose a conception of metaphorical meaning on which the meaning of a metaphor includes propositional as well as non-propositional features. I will make two general claims on behalf of the proposed account: first, it is intuitive; second, it is of theoretical value. In claiming that the proposed account is of theoretical value, I mean only that its adoption leads to an increased understanding of the nature of metaphor: of metaphorical thought and ofmetaphorical …Read more
  •  104
    The problem of dead metaphors
    Philosophical Studies 82 (1). 1996.
  •  100
  •  89
    A Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions
    Philosophical Psychology 24 (5). 2011.
    A number of philosophers have argued that psychiatric delusions threaten Donald Davidson's rationalist account of intentional agency. I argue that a careful look at both Davidson's account and psychiatric delusions shows that, in fact, the two are perfectly compatible. Indeed, a Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions proves remarkably illuminating
  •  88
    Performative utterances: A reply to Bach and Harnish (review)
    Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (6). 1995.
  •  76
    Distinguishing Between the Psychiatrically and Philosophically Deluded: Easier Said Than Done
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 341-346. 2010.
    take leave of one’s senses English, Verb. 1. (idiomatic) To go crazy; to stop behaving rationally A Chief concern in “Only a Philosopher or a Madman” was to draw attention to a number of striking yet underappreciated similarities between paradigm psychiatric delusions and standard philosophical doctrines, “nihilistic” as well as “common sense.” The similarities were presented as illuminating given their potential to inform the debate over whether psychiatric delusions are properly (or usefully) …Read more
  •  73
    In his classic paper, “Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder,” Brendan Maher (1974) argues that psychiatric delusions are hypotheses designed to explain anomalous experiences, and are “developed through the operation of normal cognitive processes.” Consider, for instance, the Capgras delusion. Patients suffering from this particular delusion believe that someone close to them—such as a spouse, a sibling, a parent, or a child—has been replaced by an impostor: by someone who bears a striking…Read more
  •  61
    A Defense of De Re Belief Reports
    Mind and Language 10 (4): 446-463. 1995.
    In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account…Read more
  •  58
    A "Meinongian" Solution to a Millian Problem
    American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (3). 2001.
  •  52
    The wettstein/salmon debate: Critique and resolution
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2). 1998.
    Does Keith Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction have ‘semantic significance’? Howard Wettstein has claimed (in several papers) that it does; Nathan Salmon has responded (in several papers) that it does not. Specifically, while Wettstein has claimed that definite descriptions, used referentially, function semantically as demonstratives, Salmon has responded to Wettstein's claims by defending a unitary Russellian account of such expressions, according to which they invariably function a…Read more