•  12
    Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional
    Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 12 (2): 70-82. 2018.
    In this article, we consider Wittgenstein’s approach to non-inferential knowledge, its relation to special propositions, and the nature of the justification of these propositions. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of non-inferential knowledge whose rational status is not the result of basic beliefs (in a foundational sense) that justify it. In Wittgenstein’s rule-following analysis, Frege’s theory is criticized. This theory is based on the idea that having a conceptual repertoire prior …Read more
  •  11
    The Declaration of Sydney on human death
    with C. Machado, J. Korein, Y. Ferrer, and L. Portela
    Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (12): 699-703. 2007.
    On 5 August 1968, publication of the Harvard Committee’s report on the subject of “irreversible coma” established a standard for diagnosing death on neurological grounds. On the same day, the 22nd World Medical Assembly met in Sydney, Australia, and announced the Declaration of Sydney, a pronouncement on death, which is less often quoted because it was overshadowed by the impact of the Harvard Report. To put those events into present-day perspective, the authors reviewed all papers published on …Read more
  • La Escuela de Barcelona
    Naturaleza y Gracia 2 257-262. 1983.
  •  9
    Aging Neuro-Behavior Ontology
    with Fernando Martínez-Santiago, John A. Williams, Luke T. Slater, and Georgios V. Gkoutos
    Applied Ontology 15 (2): 219-239. 2020.
  •  265
    The Role of Intuition in Metaphysics
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3): 79-99. 2015.
    In this paper I consider the possibility of a kind of a priori cognition that serves the purposes of metaphysics, given that metaphysics involves the search for modal knowledge. Necessary or, better, modal knowledge is a priori; so metaphysical knowledge is likewise a priori. Here I argue that intuition is the route to modal knowledge in metaphysics, and I insist that conceivability or knowledge of conceptual truths does not lead towards the modal realm of metaphysics.
  •  6
    Ex ante evaluation of interdisciplinary research projects: A literature review
    Social Science Information 55 (4): 568-588. 2016.
    Ex ante evaluations have received little attention in the literature, resulting in a scattered set of contributions, despite their potential impact on society at large and on the academic careers of the members of research teams proposing interdisciplinary projects. Firstly, a review of the existing literature on the evaluation of interdisciplinary research proposals is presented. Then, two alternatives to the traditional peer-review process are described in the context of interdisciplinary rese…Read more
  • Sullivan on the Principle that Everything Has a Cause
    Dialogue 41 (3): 427-438. 2002.
    RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine l'argumentation de Sullivan en faveur du principe que toute chose a une cause. On soutient que les critiques de Smith et d'Allen ne lui rendent pas justice et que Sullivan est justifié de maintenir que nous n'avons pas de bonnes raisons de nier la vérité de ce principe. Sa défense finale, cependant, qui semble basée sur une approche thomiste, échoue. Être contingent et être causé sont séparables. Il semble au bout du compte que nous n'ayons pas non plus de bonnes rais…Read more
  •  67
    The object of this paper is to offer a conception of singular causality that lies between two main views in the literature, which I take to be paradigmatically represented by David Armstrong (1997) and by Michael Tooley (1987, 1990) respectively. Armstrong maintains that there is singular causation wherever there are singular facts that instantiate causal laws; these facts are otherwise independent regularities. Tooley maintains that singular causation is independent of causal laws together with…Read more
  •  95
    On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo
    Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2): 147-164. 2012.
    This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories…Read more
  •  385
    Indexicals as token-reflexives
    Mind 107 (427): 529-564. 1998.
    Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality contend that indexicals are "token-reflexives": semantic rules associated with any given indexical-type determine the truth-conditional import of properly produced tokens of that type relative to certain relational properties of those tokens. Such a view may be understood as sharing the main tenets of Kaplan's well-known theory regarding content, or truth-conditions, but differs from it regarding the nature of the linguistic meaning of indexicals and als…Read more
  • La Escuela de Barcelona
    Naturaleza y Gracia 2 257-262. 1983.