Margaret R. Moore

The three major normative theories of secession are just-cause theories, choice theories, and national self-determination theories. Just-cause and choice theories are problematic because they view secession in terms of the application of liberal theories of justice or a liberal principle of autonomy, without regard for the dynamics of nationalist mobilitization and national politics. National self-determination theories can be supported by a collective autonomy argument. This is related to a particular view of the relationship between collective self-government and territory

In recent years numerous multi-national states have disintegrated along national lines, and today many more continue to witness bitter secessionist struggles. This ambitious study brings together for the first time a series of original essays on the ethics of secession. A host of leading figures explore key issues in this important debate, including, what is `a people' and what gives them a right to secede? And is national self-determination consistent with liberal and democratic principles or is it a dangerous doctrine?

This volume examines comparatively the views and principles of seven prominent ethical traditions on one of the most pressing issues of modern politics - the making and unmaking of state and national boundaries. The traditions represented are Judaism, Christianity, Islam, natural law, Confucianism, liberalism and international law. Each contributor, an expert within one of these traditions, shows how that tradition can handle the five dominant methods of altering state and national boundaries: conquest, settlement, purchase, inheritance and secession. Written by a distinguished group of international specialists this volume is unique in providing both in-depth normative and comparative perspectives on a troubling question that will offer readers real insight into inter-tradition conflict. Those readers will range from upper-level undergraduates to scholars in such fields as philosophy, political science, international relations and comparative religion.

This article examines the nature of the wrongs that are inflicted on individuals and groups who have been expelled from the land that they previously occupied, and asks what they might consequently be owed as a matter of corrective justice. I argue that there are three sorts of potential wrongs involved in such expulsions: being deprived of the moral right of occupancy; being denied collective self-determination; and having one's property rights violated. Although analytically distinct, all of these wrongs are likely to be perpetrated when people are expelled from their homelands. Although there is substantial literature on corrective justice dealing with such cases, most of that literature focuses on the expropriation of property only, and is therefore unlikely to grasp the full implications of the wrong done or to reveal the full extent of what might be owed to people as a matter of corrective justice.

This paper is interested in place-related attachments. It discusses the way in which territory or land is treated in theories of global distributive justice, and argues that this fails to capture the normatively significant relationship between peoples and places. This paper argues that any adequate theory of justice in territory has to begin by recognizing that territory is a claimant-relative good, and that this should be an important point of departure for theorizing about land and justice. Not only do the current theories of distributive justice fail to acknowledge the claimant-relative nature of territory, but they do not offer a good way to incorporate place-related attachments in their theories

The current statist order assumes that states have a right to make rules involving the transfer and/or extraction of natural resources within the territory. Cosmopolitan theories of global justice have questioned whether the state is justified in its control over natural resources, typically by pointing out that having resources is a matter of good luck, and this unfairness should be addressed. This paper argues that self-determination does generate a right over resources, which others should not interfere with. It does not entail, however, that there is no obligation on rich countries to redistribute to poor countries. Indeed, in some rare instances, it might be necessary for a particular political community to use its resources, but the presumption is that the collectively self-determining group should have the right to decide that

Associative duties—duties inherent to some of our relationships—are most commonly discussed in terms of intimate associations such as of families, friends, or lovers. In this essay I ask whether impersonal associations such as state or nation can also give rise to genuinely associative duties, i.e., duties of patriotism or nationalism. I distinguish between the two in terms of their objects: the object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together. I explore three arguments for the thesis that a special concern for one’s polity and fellow-citizens, or one’s nation and co-nationals, is an associative duty: from reciprocity, from collective self-determination, and from the well-being of compatriots or co-nationals. I argue that the relationship among compatriots is a more plausible contender for generating associative duties than the relationship among co-nationals, although even in this case there are questions whether these are genuinely associative duties, or simply special duties. Although the relationship among co-nationals is a less plausible contender for associative duties, the well-being argument does apply to the relationship among both co-nationals and compatriots. I also suggest that there is a certain privileging of the status quo in the way that associative duties arguments work, because they tend to operate from existing relations and associations

Les questions de justice soulevées par la possession du territoire sont nombreuses. Qui a droit à quoi ? La distribution est-elle équitable ? Quels sont les droits censés découler d’un droit au territoire ? Et il y en a bien d’autres. Le présent article met en évidence que ces questions de justice sont abordées sous une perspective plutôt différente selon la conception que l’on se fait du territoire. Il existe à ce dernier égard deux courants dominants : le premier, souvent identifié à Locke, voit le territoire sous l’angle de la propriété ; le second, que l’on rattache à Kant, est considéré comme le domaine géographique du pouvoir juridictionnel.There are many justice issues raised by the possession of territory ; questions of who is entitled to what ; the fairness of the distribution ; and the entitlements that are thought to follow from having a right to territory, to name a few. This paper then goes on to show that these justice issues are framed somewhat differently depending on one’s conception of territory. There are two dominant conceptions of territory : territory as property ; and territory as the geographical domain of jurisdictional authority. The former is often identified with Locke, and the latter with Kant

The nation is usually taken to be an expression, and ?nationalism? a defence, of culture. But we may have sanguinary national conflict (as in Northern Ireland or the former Yugoslavia) where cultural difference is small; and we may have minimal conflict (as in Switzerland or Belgium) where cultural difference is great. This essay proposes a shift, away from seeing nations as grounded in culture, to seeing them as grounded in ?identity? ? often forged by historical forces having nothing to do with culture per se. This essay rejects a cultural argument for liberal nationalism (associated with the work of Raz, Miller and Kymlicka among others) precisely because it confounds national identity with common culture. Since nations diverge despite a common culture, ?common culture? cannot explain them. Identity is more fundamental. It persists where culture changes.