Maria Regina Brioschi

The aim of the present paper is to show the need for cosmology in Peirce’s thought. To reach this goal, I first clarify Peirce’s definition of cosmology and its place in the classification of the sciences. Then, I shed slight on the entailment of cosmology in Peirce’s understanding of metaphysics and of logic, and I elucidate these connections in view of Synechism. Finally, in the light of the results achieved through the analysis, I provide a summarily description of Peirce’s cosmology, far from the common interpretation of it.

This paper investigates Alfred North Whitehead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to develop a historical, dynamic ontology (a “process ontology”, according to the former, and an “ontology of the flesh” for the latter). The claim of the paper is that their originality lies in the methods adopted to reach such ontologies, which show strong similarities. Both authors based their research on nature, conceived of as “the leaf of Being”, and on perceptual experience, understood not as a chaos of bare, punctual, sense data, but as the complex, original source of meaning that constitutes the primary field of philosophical investigation—the only source from which one can gain new understanding of both nature and logos (things, happenings, values, subjectivity, laws, etc.). After some introductory remarks on the connections between Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part clarifies why and how, according to the philosophers, ontology should start from a new scrutiny of nature. The second part specifies what this new conception of nature, based on perceptual experience, is. The third part focuses on how their ontologies must be construed as historic, insofar as behaviors, actions, and practices lie at the core of their concept of being.

What understanding of mathematical objectivity is promoted by Peirce’s pragmatism? Can Peirce’s theory help us to further comprehend the role of intersubjectivity in mathematics? This paper aims to answer such questions, with special reference to recent debates on mathematical practice, where Peirce is often quoted, although without a detailed scrutiny of his theses. In particular, the paper investigates the role of intersubjectivity in the constitution of mathematical objects according to Peirce. Generally speaking, this represents one of the key issues for the philosophy of mathematical practice, whereas – with regard to Peirce – these two aspects (intersubjectivity and objectivity) have been studied for a long time, but mostly as unrelated topics. To reconstruct the connection between Peirce’s reflection on intersubjectivity and the objectivity of mathematical theories, the paper is divided into three parts: (1) the first part introduces Peirce’s view of mathematics; (2) the second analyzes his peculiar “pragmatist realism,” which overcomes common dichotomies in the philosophy of mathematics; (3) the third illustrates the role that Peirce attributes to intersubjectivity in science, and investigates to what extent the intersubjective dimension is also essential in mathematics.

This article proposes an integrative reading of Peirce's and James's philosophies, which aims to figure out the main features of a shared pragmatist metaphysics. Two methodologies are adopted to reach this goal: a historical scrutiny of sources, prevalent in the first part, and a theoretical investigation of Peirce's and James's philosophies, in the second and third parts. The first part analyzes Peirce's and James's proximity, which lies in their common understanding of pragmatism as an anti-dogmatic method in philosophy, and their alleged main difference, which is represented by the issue of nominalism/anti-nominalism, and pivots around the concepts of individuals and generals. The article challenges the mainstream interpretation that sees Peirce as a champion of generality and continuity, whereas James is known for being an ardent defender of individuality. The arguments supporting such an unconventional interpretation are offered in the second part, which explores Peirce's view of individuality in logic, and the third one, dedicated to James's view of continuity in psychology. As a conclusion, Peirce and James's shared pragmatic metaphysics turns out to be centered on the dynamical bonding between individuals and generals.

After introducing the debate between substance philosophy and process philosophy, and clarifying the relevance of the category of ‘substance’ in Peirce’s thought, the present paper reconstructs the role of ‘substance’ and ‘being’ from Peirce’s early works to his theory of the proposition, provided after his studies on the logic of relatives. If those two categories apparently disappear in Peirce’s writings from the mid-1890s onwards, the account of ‘subject’ and ‘copula’ in Peirce’s analysis of the proposition allows one to grasp the reasons why Peirce omits ‘substance’ and ‘being’ in favor of his three categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness), and to understand why his philosophy cannot be considered as a substance philosophy.

Il linguaggio rappresenta uno degli aspetti più caratterizzanti di Processo e realtà e al contempo uno degli scogli più ardui per chi si accinge alla lettura. Per comprendere le ragioni di questa scelta, il presente articolo ripercorre le riflessioni di Whitehead sul linguaggio, sia ordinario che filosofico, per poi approdare ad un’analisi critica del linguaggio di Processo e realtà, tesa a mostrare il nesso profondo che sussiste tra la filosofia dell’evento e le decisioni che l’autore prende a livello lessicale e sintattico.

The present paper proposes an emergentist reading of Peirce, with special reference to his concept of evolution. Although the author never adopts the word “emergence” in a technical manner, it will be demonstrated that the core problem of emergence lies at the heart of his evolutionary doctrine, generally displayed by the interplay of his three well-known categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Indeed, although the Classical pragmatists most quoted in connection to emergentism are Dewey and Mead (and William James to some degree), scholars have recently suggested some emergentist readings of Peirce’s thought (cf. above all Tiercelin 1998, Quieroz & El-Hani 2006, Rose 2016), in particular with regard to semiotic process and cosmogony. Exploring further the path opened by those researches, the present paper aims to clarify the theoretical problem of emergent evolution from a pragmatist perspective and especially to illustrate Peirce’s emergentist standpoint. In order to reach this goal, the article is divided into four parts: after (1) a brief introduction to the contemporary debates on emergence, (2) I give a historical overview of Classical Pragmatism and British Emergentists, (3) with a special focus on the common roots of the British Emergentists and Peirce on evolution. Finally, (4) I offer an emergentist reading of Peirce’s theory of evolution. In particular, I show how his strong emphasis on chance and the “growth” of the universe go together with his arch-stone of synechism (that is his theory of continuity), through what he calls agapasm.

Il presente articolo analizza il rapporto tra filosofia, esperienza ed evento nel pensiero di A.N. Whitehead. L’autrice ripercorre e descrive, a partire dalla critica al concetto di oggetto, la peculiare dialettica di astratto e concreto al centro dalle indagini whiteheadiane sull’esperienza percettiva. Successivamente, viene mostrato come la pratica filosofica differisca da ogni genere di scienza, pur necessitandone in virtù della co-implicazione di oggetto ed evento, astrazione e riconoscimento.This article analyzes the relationship between philosophy, experience and event in A.N. Whitehead’s thought. From the critic of the concept of object, the author retraces and describes the peculiar “abstract-concrete dialectic”, at the center of the researches concerning the perceptual experience.Furthermore, according to Whitehead’s later works, she demonstrates how the philosophical practice is different from all other kinds of science, although it requires science itself because of the co-implication of object and event, abstraction and recognition

The relationship between James and Whitehead has been underlined from the very outset by the critical scholarship on Whitehead, as is testified by the presence of articles that appeared before the author’s death. By dissociating myself from the radical interpretation that frames Whitehead’s speculative opus as a systematization of James’s ideas, I survey that confrontation which has been advanced in the last years (Weber 2002, 2003, 2011, Sinclair 2009) in order to provide further contribution, by tackle the problem of novelty. Precisely, I concentrate on those instances, especially the methodological ones, which are not simply akin, but rather properly shared by the authors. In other words, I focus on those grounding ideas from which they endorse a pluralistic universe, conceived in connection with the problem of novelty. Properly, 1) I analyze the way Whitehead refers to James in his books; 2) I compare the roles they acknowledge to reason, in the nexus with the concept of experience; 3) I show the importance both authors ascribe to the problem of novelty, the main topic involved in their efforts to build up new cosmologies.

Why an emergentist account of subjectivity? On the one hand, emergentism provides a new paradigm to rethink subjectivity beyond any dualism. At the same time, the issue of subjectivity puts a strain on emergentism itself, and pushes it beyond its limits. To show it, in the present paper I address a fundamental question: How can we describe subjectivity from an emergentist perspective? To answer, I will tackle Samuel Alexander’s and Alfred North Whitehead’s emergentist accounts of subjectivity. Alexander locates subjectivity into a consistent emergentist framework, but his model of subjectivity remains grounded in the classical interpretation of subjectivity as mind. Whitehead gives a more innovative model of subjectivity, which implies a radical revision of its temporality and connection to the world, but this leads him beyond emergentism as a whole