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14Bolzano & Kant (edited book)Brill Rodopi. 2012.Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Themenschwerpunkt/Special Topic: Bolzano & Kant Gastherausgeber/Guest Editor: Sandra Lapointe Sandra Lapointe: Introduction Sandra Lapointe: Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians Nicholas F. Stang: A Kantian Reply to Bolzano¿s Critique of Kant¿s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Clinton Tolley: Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre Timothy Rosenkoetter: Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions Waldemar …Read more
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2How to Take Truth as a Goal?In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 203-214. 2007.
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7Quine's Ladder: Two and a Half Pages from the Philosophy of LogicIn Felicia Ackerman (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1981.This chapter contains sections titled: Redundancy, Utility, and Disquotation Limited Redundancy: A Dilemma Utility and Quine's Ladder A Variant Ladder and Dis‐That‐ISM Climbing the Ladder? Affirming a Lot of Sentences Needing the Truth Predicate? References.
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23Analytic Epistemology and Armchair PsychologyActa Analytica 38 (1): 45-52. 2023.Critical comments on Guido Melchior’s book, Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (2019). In the second part of his book, Melchior aims to employ his sensitivity account of the epistemic concept of checking to explain well-known puzzle cases about knowing. My comments focus on Melchior’s explanation of knowledge-closure puzzles, as exemplified by Dretske’s zebra case. I raise three critical points about the explanation Melchior proposes for puzzles of this type.
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1Nonexistence and Reid’s Conception of ConceivingGrazer Philosophische Studien 26 (1): 585-599. 1985.Brentano's famous thesis of the Intentionality of the Mental was already formulated by Thomas Reid who used it in his campaign against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume Theory of Ideas. Apphed to the case of conceiving the thesis says that to conceive is to conceive something. This principle stands in apparent conflict with the common-sensical view, defended by Reid, that we can conceive what does not exist. Both principles, it is argued, are plausible and should be retained. The problem is how to resolve…Read more
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24Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 229-232. 1993.
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26Anti-RealismDisputatio 8 (43): 173-185. 2016.According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial as…Read more
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561Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and TruthPhilosophical Perspectives 10 281-296. 1996.Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, in particular,…Read more
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29Review Essay: Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyWorking Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4): 943. 1996.
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Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von Roderick M. ChisholmRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3): 359-360. 1988.
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Substantivism and Deflationism in the Theory of TruthDissertation, The University of Arizona. 1990.The main concern of this work is to understand and evaluate the debate between substantivism and deflationism in the theory of truth. According to substantive theories, truth consists in, and has to be explained in terms of, a special relation between the truth bearing item and reality. According to deflationism, such theories offer a needlessly inflated account of truth. ;Chapter one sketches a paradigmatic substantive theory of truth that explains the notion of truth by invoking the notions of…Read more
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473The correspondence theory of truthStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the last 2300 years this basi…Read more
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7Knowledge-closure and skepticismIn Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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62Truth (review)Philosophical Review 106 (3): 441-443. 1997.Schmitt allots a chapter to each of the main types of theories about truth: pragmatism, coherentism, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. He discusses various arguments for these positions and concludes that only the arguments supporting the correspondence theory are successful. Schmitt's positive case for correspondence makes up the least original part of the book. He explicitly credits Field and remarks that he is mainly concerned with making Field's difficult account more accessible —…Read more
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45Defending Existentialism?In Maria Elisabeth Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs, Ontos Verlag. pp. 167--209. 2009.This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple resp…Read more
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Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift Für Analytische Philosophie. Gegründet von Rudolf Haller (edited book)Brill | Rodopi. 2004.
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159Neither mentioning 'brains in a vat' nor mentioning brains in a vat will prove that we are not brains in a vatPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 891-896. 1991.In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in which a…Read more
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86Theories of TruthIn I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen & J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 331--414. 2004.
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89Küenne on Conceptions of Truth (review)Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1): 179-191. 2006.The review focuses on Küenne's account of truthmaking and on his minimalist approach to truth.
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70Truth as One and Many (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4): 743-746. 2011.Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 743-746, December 2011
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8FrontmatterIn Marian David & Mauro Antonelli (eds.), Existence, Fiction, Assumption: Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy, De Gruyter. 2016.
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11A Substitutional Theory of Truth?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 182-189. 2006.University of Notre Dame.
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38Signifier and Signified. Linguistico-Philosophical Enquiries into the Problem of Reference (review)Philosophy and History 21 (1): 31-34. 1988.
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Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI (edited book)de Gruyter. 2016.
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6On the Roles of Trustworthiness and AcceptanceGrazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 93-107. 1991.Our tmst in our own trustworthiness as evaluators of tmth plays a uniquely important role in Lehrer's recent work in epistemology. Lehrer has claimed that a person who trusts in her own trustworthiness has a reason for accepting everything she accepts, including that she is trustworthy. This claim is too bold, trust in our trustworthiness cannot play the epistemic role Lehrer assigns to it. Neither does a suitably revised version of the claim succeed in assigning any important epistemic role to …Read more
Graz, Styria, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |