Mariano Martín-Villuendas

Múltiples estudios experimentales han iluminado el potencial papel que las alteraciones epigenéticas podrían jugar en el inicio y estabilización de las enfermedades. Estas investigaciones han motivado el surgimiento de una nueva disciplina conocida como epidemiología epigenética. Este artículo tiene dos objetivos fundamentales. Primero, analizar y clarificar las principales dificultades epistemológicas, ontológicas y metodológicas que enfrenta la articulación de esta nueva disciplina científica. Segundo, estructurar un marco filosófico alternativo e innovador basado en un pluralismo científico que permita, en último término, integrar la epidemiología epigenética dentro de la actual práctica médica.

Much effort has been devoted to explaining in what sense models represent their corresponding target systems. This has been considered a pivotal philosophical problem since representational models have been widely assumed to canalize our knowledge and understanding of reality. The aim of the paper is to analytically structure the framework commonly adopted to address the Scientific Representation Problem (SR-P), i.e., onto-representationalism, and to examine its main problems. Due to its very theoretical conditions, I conclude that onto-representationalism constitutes an inadequate meta-scientific platform to approach SR-P. I locate the problem in the semantic assumption. To materialize these analyses, I examine the main arguments proposed by the main variants of onto-representationalism: classical onto-representationalism and sophisticated onto-representationalism.

Scientific understanding constitutes one of the most firmly settled topics in the philosophy of general science. The most accepted approach within the debate has been the so-called “factivism of understanding.” Here, I show analytically how the latter is articulated through the acceptance of two interrelated theses: an epistemological—veritism—and an ontological one—realism. Recently, a group of authors challenged this line of thought by dissociating ontological and epistemological commitments. I examine these proposals, elucidating to what extent they fail in their attempt to formulate a consistent account of scientific understanding. I argue that if one wants to articulate an account committed to a truth-centered epistemology, one should adopt a realist stance; if one wants to formulate a realist account of scientific understanding, one should subscribe to a truth-centered epistemology.

In recent times, the philosophy of science has been reinvigorated by insights from different biological and cognitive sciences. These disciplines have provided not only new approaches to traditional philosophical problems but have also opened the door to new conceptual puzzles. The fundamental aim of this volume is to bring together some of the main debates that have structured the fields of philosophy of biology and cognitive sciences in the last few years from a practice-based approach. The present volume includes 12 manuscripts by leading young scholars that gathered at the 11th edition of the Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Sciences Workshop held in November 2022 in Salamanca, Spain. Chapters two to six are dedicated to the philosophy of biology and include discussions on hot topics such as biological functions or the concept of pain. Chapters seven to twelve are devoted to the cognitive sciences and include essays on ecological psychology, meaning in life, or animal cognition. Irrespective of the specific topic covered, all chapters emphasize the practical aspects of science, drawing heavily on the daily activities of working scientists.

In recent times, the philosophy of science has been reinvigorated by insights from the biological and cognitive sciences. These disciplines have provided not only new perspectives to approach traditional philosophical problems but have also opened the way to new conceptual and methodological questions that call for new and innovative solutions. This book brings together some of the main debates that have structured in the last years the fields of philosophy of biology and cognitive sciences. It is organized around 11 chapters distributed in two parts: one devoted to the philosophy of biology, and the other to the cognitive sciences. These ideas were originally presented at the 11th edition of the International Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Science (PBCS-XI) workshop held in 2022 in Salamanca, Spain. Part I of the volume is devoted to topics related to the philosophy of biology and includes hot topics such as “biological functions”, “modelization”, “pain medicine”, or “organicism”. Part II is devoted to debates in the cognitive sciences and includes issues related to "ecological psychology", "enactivism", "FEP" or "animal cognition". Considering the diversity of the topics covered in this volume, the book is purposely conceived to serve as an updated introduction to the fields of the philosophy of biology and cognitive sciences for those researchers interested in having a panoramic view of these two areas of inquiry. But not only that, the detailed and scholarly coverage of the topics included renders this book appealing to a much more specialized audience interested in particular aspects of each of the debates already mentioned.