•  5
    Is the leibnizian'doctrine of science laying on a doctrine of knowledge? This book demonstrates that there is not such a dependence in Leibniz'searlier writings in which the theory of science is established, independently of any doctrine of understanting.
  •  134
    In the autumn of 1667, the young Leibniz published a «new method» for the science of law. Producing a revised edition of that early work was to become his lifelong project, to the purpose of which he wrote, in the 1690s, a succession of new versions of most of its sections. The main reason for this enduring interest was probably the fact that the juridical part of the treatise was preceded with a more general one, encapsulating in a few pages a systematic overview of the disciplines composing th…Read more
  •  8
    Sur le monde présent
    with Leibniz
    Philosophie 1 (1): 6-12. 2007.
  •  44
    Recent scholarship has established that, until the mid-1670s, Leibniz did not hold the possibilist ontology which, in his mature philosophy, provides the foundation for both his account of human freedom and of eternal truth. Concentrating on the Mainz period , this paper examines the conciliation, in those early writings, of an actualist ontology and a conception of necessary truth as analytical. The first section questions the view that Leibniz was educated in a “Platonist” tradition; the secon…Read more
  •  11
    The purpose of this paper is to try and understand what Leibniz is up to in his 1684 Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas. A close reading of the text shows that, by composing it, Leibniz casts into a new, systematic shape, a number of epistemological concepts, insights or tenets which had gradually emerged, in relative independence from one another, in his writings of the previous eight years (approximately since 1676, the last year of his stay in Paris, which was also the moment when he f…Read more
  •  6
    Présentation
    Philosophie 92 (1): 3-5. 2007.
  •  32
    An authoritative interpretative trend, inspired by the phenomenological reading of Leibniz in the light of Husserlian idealism, presents his epistemology as resting ultimately on the thesis of a pre-symbolical “intuition” of thought-contents. However fruitful the symbolic apparatus, however complex the theory elaborated, the validity of this theory would depend on the fundamental, non-verbal, experience that its first notions are possible. The textual basis invoked to support this interpretation…Read more