Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy
PhD, 2019
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States
  •  17
    A Regularity Theory of Causation
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (1): 2-32. 2024.
    In this paper, we propose a regularity theory of causation. The theory aims to be reductive and to align with our pre‐theoretic understanding of the causal relation. We show that our theory can account for a wide range of causal scenarios, including isomorphic scenarios, omissions, and scenarios which suggest that causation is not transitive.
  •  23
    Ramsey’s conditionals
    Synthese 200 (2): 1-31. 2022.
    In this paper, we propose a unified account of conditionals inspired by Frank Ramsey. Most contemporary philosophers agree that Ramsey’s account applies to indicative conditionals only. We observe against this orthodoxy that his account covers subjunctive conditionals as well—including counterfactuals. In light of this observation, we argue that Ramsey’s account of conditionals resembles Robert Stalnaker’s possible worlds semantics supplemented by a model of belief. The resemblance suggests to r…Read more
  •  20
    Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals
    Acta Analytica 38 (3): 439-451. 2022.
    One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461–508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a “uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario”. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.
  •  11
    Causal and Evidential Conditionals
    Minds and Machines 32 (4): 613-626. 2022.
    We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is to embed a causal model in an agent’s belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems to be relative to beliefs about both particular facts and causal relations. Unlike other attempts using causal models, we show that ours can account rather well not only for various causal but also evidential conditionals.
  •  343
    In legal proceedings, a fact-finder needs to decide whether a defendant is guilty or not based on probabilistic evidence. We defend the thesis that the defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. We draw on Leitgeb’s stability theory for an appropriate notion of rational belief and show how our thesis solves the problem of statistical evidence. Finally, we defend our account of legal proof against challenges from Staff…Read more
  •  8
    A Connexive Conditional
    Logos and Episteme 13 (1): 55-63. 2022.
    We propose a semantics for a connexive conditional based on the Lewis-Stalnaker conditional. It is a connexive semantics that is both classical and intuitive.
  •  78
    A Ramsey Test Analysis of Causation for Causal Models
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2): 587-615. 2021.
    We aim to devise a Ramsey test analysis of actual causation. Our method is to define a strengthened Ramsey test for causal models. Unlike the accounts of Halpern and Pearl ([2005]) and Halpern ([2015]), the resulting analysis deals satisfactorily with both over- determination and conjunctive scenarios.
  •  52
    Difference-Making Causation
    Journal of Philosophy 118 (12): 680-701. 2021.
    We put forth an analysis of causation. The analysis centers on the notion of a causal model that provides only partial information as to which events occur, but complete information about the dependences between the events. The basic idea is this: an event causes another just in case there is a causal model that is uninformative on both events and in which the first event makes a difference as to the occurrence of the other. We show that our analysis captures more causal scenarios than the other…Read more
  •  28
    Counterfactuals for causal responsibility in legal contexts
    with Holger Andreas and Matthias Armgardt
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 31 (1): 115-132. 2023.
    We define a formal semantics of conditionals based on _normatively ideal worlds_. Such worlds are described informally by Armgardt (Gabbay D, Magnani L, Park W, Pietarinen A-V (eds) Natural arguments: a tribute to john woods, College Publications, London, pp 699–708, 2018) to address well-known problems of the counterfactual approach to causation. Drawing on Armgardt’s proposal, we use iterated conditionals in order to analyse causal relations in scenarios of multi-agent interaction. This result…Read more
  •  807
    Should decision-making algorithms be held to higher standards of transparency than human beings? The way we answer this question directly impacts what we demand from explainable algorithms, how we govern them via regulatory proposals, and how explainable algorithms may help resolve the social problems associated with decision making supported by artificial intelligence. Some argue that algorithms and humans should be held to the same standards of transparency and that a double standard of transp…Read more
  •  73
    Causation in terms of production
    Philosophical Studies 177 (6): 1565-1591. 2020.
    In this paper, we analyse actual causation in terms of production. The latter concept is made precise by a strengthened Ramsey Test semantics of conditionals: \ iff, after suspending judgement about A and C, C is believed in the course of assuming A. This test allows us to verify or falsify that an event brings about another event. Complementing the concept of production by a weak condition of difference-making gives rise to a full-fledged analysis of causation.
  •  6
    On the Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’
    Erkenntnis 84 (6): 1229-1262. 2019.
    The well-known formal semantics of conditionals due to Stalnaker Studies in logical theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1968), Lewis, and Gärdenfors The logic and 1140 epistemology of scientific change, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1978, Knowledge in flux, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988) all fail to distinguish between trivially and nontrivially true indicative conditionals. This problem has been addressed by Rott :345–370, 1986) in terms of a strengthened Ramsey Test. In this paper, we refine Rott’s strengthen…Read more
  •  39
    On the Ramsey Test Analysis of ‘Because’
    Erkenntnis 84 (6): 1229-1262. 2019.
    The well-known formal semantics of conditionals due to Stalnaker Studies in logical theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1968), Lewis, and Gärdenfors The logic and 1140 epistemology of scientific change, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1978, Knowledge in flux, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988) all fail to distinguish between trivially and nontrivially true indicative conditionals. This problem has been addressed by Rott :345–370, 1986) in terms of a strengthened Ramsey Test. In this paper, we refine Rott’s strengthen…Read more
  •  56
    Learning Conditional Information by Jeffrey Imaging on Stalnaker Conditionals
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (5): 851-876. 2018.
    We propose a method of learning indicative conditional information. An agent learns conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the minimally informative proposition expressed by a Stalnaker conditional. We show that the predictions of the proposed method align with the intuitions in Douven, 239–263 2012)’s benchmark examples. Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker conditionals can also capture the learning of uncertain conditional information, which we illustrate by generating predictions for the Judy …Read more
  •  10292
    “Could a machine think?” asks John R. Searle in his paper Minds, Brains, and Programs. He answers that “only a machine could think1, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains.”2 The subject of this paper is the analysis of the aforementioned question through presentation of the symbol manipulation approach to intelligence and Searle's well-known criticism to this approach, namely the Chinese room argument. The examination of these issues leads to the systems reply of the Chinese roo…Read more
  •  1645
    I confront Feyerabend's position and critical rationalism in order to have a foundation or starting point for my (historical) investigation. The main difference of his position towards falsificationism is the belief that different theories cannot be discussed rationally. Feyerabend is convinced that Galilei's observations with the telescope in the historical context of the Copernican revolution supports his criticism. In particular, he argues that the Copernican theory was supported by deficient…Read more