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3A Statistical Referential Theory of Content: Using Information Theory to Account for MisrepresentationMind and Language 16 (3): 311-334. 2001.A naturalistic scheme of primitive conceptual representations is proposed using the statistical measure of mutual information. It is argued that a concept represents, not the class of objects that caused its tokening, but the class of objects that is most likely to have caused it (had it been tokened), as specified by the statistical measure of mutual information. This solves the problem of misrepresentation which plagues causal accounts, by taking the representation relation to be determined vi…Read more
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61Causal Responsibility and Robust CausationFrontiers in Psychology 11 1069. 2020.How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor -- the robustness of the causal chain linking the agent’s action and the outcome -- influences judgments of causal responsibility of the agent. In three experiments, we vary robustness by manipulating the number of background circumstances under which the action causes the effect, and find that causal responsibility judgments increase with robustn…Read more
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9A PDP approach to set size effects within the Stroop task: Reply to Kanne, Balota, Spieler, and Faust (1998)Psychological Review 105 (1): 188-194. 1998.
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25Neural mechanism for the magical number 4: Competitive interactions and nonlinear oscillationBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1): 151-152. 2001.The aim of our commentary is to strengthen Cowan's proposal for an inherent capacity limitation in STM by suggesting a neurobiological mechanism based on competitive networks and nonlinear oscillations that avoids some of the shortcomings of the scheme discussed in the target article (Lisman & Idiart 1995).
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2Postscript: Contrasting predictions for preference reversalPsychological Review 117 (4): 1291-1293. 2010.
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5Value certainty in drift-diffusion models of preferential choicePsychological Review 130 (3): 790-806. 2023.
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21Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 95 (C): 103212. 2021.
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12Examining the mechanisms underlying contextual preference reversal: Comment on Trueblood, Brown, and Heathcote (2014)Psychological Review 122 (4): 838-847. 2015.
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484Impoverished or rich consciousness outside attentional focus: Recent data tip the balance for OverflowMind and Language 34 (4): 423-444. 2019.The question of whether conscious experience is restricted by cognitive access and exhausted by report, or whether it overflows it—comprising more information than can be reported—is hotly debated. Recently, we provided evidence in favor of Overflow, showing that observers discriminated the color‐diversity (CD) of letters in an array, while their working‐memory and attention were dedicated to encoding and reporting a set of cued letters. An alternative interpretation is that CD‐discriminations d…Read more
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442Agency, Teleological Control and Robust CausationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2): 302-324. 2018.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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8An appeal against the item's death sentence: Accounting for diagnostic data patterns with an item-based model of visual searchBehavioral and Brain Sciences 40. 2017.
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10Task conflict and proactive control: A computational theory of the Stroop taskPsychological Review 125 (1): 59-82. 2018.
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23The neurodynamics of choice, value-based decisions, and preference reversalIn Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. pp. 277--300. 2008.
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22A Neural Network Model for Attribute‐Based Decision ProcessesCognitive Science 17 (3): 349-396. 1993.We propose a neural model of multiattribute-decision processes, based on an attractor neural network with dynamic thresholds. The model may be viewed as a generalization of the elimination by aspects model, whereby simultaneous selection of several aspects is allowed. Depending on the amount of synaptic inhibition, various kinds of scanning strategies may be performed, leading in some cases to vacillations among the alternatives. The model predicts that decisions of a longer time duration exhibi…Read more
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17Dynamics of decision-making: from evidence accumulation to preference and beliefFrontiers in Psychology 4. 2013.
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14The role of the frontal cortex in memory: an investigation of the Von Restorff effectFrontiers in Human Neuroscience 8. 2014.
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The neurodynamics of choice, value-based decisions and preference reversalIn Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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511A statistical referential theory of content: Using information theory to account for misrepresentationMind and Language 16 (3): 331-334. 2001.A naturalistic scheme of primitive conceptual representations is proposed using the statistical measure of mutual information. It is argued that a concept represents, not the class of objects that caused its tokening, but the class of objects that is most likely to have caused it (had it been tokened), as specified by the statistical measure of mutual information. This solves the problem of misrepresentation which plagues causal accounts, by taking the representation relation to be determined vi…Read more
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43We See More Than We Can Report “Cost Free” Color Phenomenality Outside Focal AttentionPsychological Science 25 (7): 1394-1403. 2014.The distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is a subject of intensive debate. According to one view, visual experience overflows the capacity of the attentional and working memory system: We see more than we can report. According to the opposed view, this perceived richness is an illusion—we are aware only of information that we can subsequently report. This debate remains unresolved because of the inevitable reliance on report, which is limited in capacity. To bypa…Read more
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9Loss Aversion and Inhibition in Dynamical Models of Multialternative ChoicePsychological Review 111 (3): 757-769. 2004.
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14'Tis all in pieces (separate RFs and CFs), all coherence goneBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4): 693-694. 1997.We argue that the separation between CF (contextual field) and RF (receptive field) in relation to the NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate) system is empirically questionable and that it is functionally unnecessary. In addition, the proposed suppression of unexpected information will in many cases be counterproductive.
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40The time course of perceptual choice: The leaky, competing accumulator modelPsychological Review 108 (3): 550-592. 2001.
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48Control, Choice, and the Convergence/Divergence DynamicsJournal of Philosophy 103 (4): 188-213. 2006.
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13Short-term memory after all: Comment on Sederberg, Howard, and Kahana (2008)Psychological Review 115 (4): 1108-1116. 2008.
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13Disentangling decision models: From independence to competitionPsychological Review 120 (1): 1-38. 2013.
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89Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?Mind and Language 19 (2): 241-248. 2004.The merit of the SINBAD model is to provide an explicit mechanism showing how the cortex may come to develop detectors responding to correlated properties and therefore corresponding to the sources of these correlations. Here I argue that, contrary to the article, SINBAD neurosemantics does not need to rely on teleofunctions to solve the problem of misrepresentation. A number of difficulties for the teleofunction theories of content are reviewed and an alternative theory based on categorization …Read more