Syracuse University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1984
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  411
    Temporal parts of four dimensional objects
    Philosophical Studies 46 (3). 1984.
    I offer a clear conception of a temporal part that does not make the existence of temporal parts implausible. This can be done if (and only if) we think of physical objects as four dimensional, The fourth dimension being time. Unless we are willing to deny the existence of most spatial parts, Or willing to accept the possibility of coincident entities, Or accept something even more implausible, We should accept the existence of temporal parts
  •  318
    Property counterparts in ersatz worlds
    Journal of Philosophy 95 (6): 293-316. 1998.
  •  311
    Against metaphysical vagueness
    Philosophical Perspectives 10 177--85. 1996.
  •  237
    Things change
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3): 695-704. 1992.
  •  215
    The Donkey Problem
    Philosophical Studies 140 (1): 83-101. 2008.
    The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefor…Read more
  •  175
    Relevant alternatives and closure
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2). 1999.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  166
    Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory
    The Monist 88 (4): 600-618. 2005.
    Anti-essentialism holds that no thing has any modal properties except relative to a conceptualization—for instance, relative to a description. One and the same thing might be essentially rational relative to the description “mathematician” but only accidentally rational relative to the description “bicyclist.” Anti-essentialism was dominant in pre-Kripkean days. The old description theory of names made room for anti-essentialism by reducing apparently true de re modal attributions to de dicto on…Read more
  •  162
    Varieties of four dimensionalism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1). 1993.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  160
    This provocative book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time. It seeks to answer such questions as 'How is it that an object can survive change?' and 'How much change can an object undergo without being destroyed'? To answer these questions Professor Heller presents a theory about the nature of physical objects and about the relationship between our language and the physical world. According to his theory, the only actually existing physical entities are what the author c…Read more
  •  90
    Transworld Identity for the Ersatzist
    Philosophical Topics 30 (1): 77-101. 2002.
  •  88
    Temporal Overlap is Not Coincidence
    The Monist 83 (3): 362-380. 2000.
    The best reason to believe in temporal parts is to avoid commitment to coincidence—roughly, two objects occupying exactly the same space at exactly the same time. Most anti-coincidence arguments for temporal parts are fission arguments. Gaining some notice, however, are vagueness arguments. One goal of this paper is to clarify the way a temporal-parts ontology avoids coincidence, and another is to clarify the vagueness argument, highlighting the fact that it too is an anti-coincidence argument. …Read more
  •  74
    The worst of all worlds
    Philosophia 28 (1-4): 255-268. 2001.
  •  72
    Non-backtracking Counterfactuals and the Conditional Analysis
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1): 75-85. 1985.
    The conditional analysis of ability statements has many versions. In this paper I will deal with the version which claims that ‘x can do y’ is equivalent to ‘if x were to choose to do y, then x would do y.’ However, my comments should be equally applicable to any analysis of ability statements that can properly be called a version of the conditional analysis. The intuition behind the conditional analysis is that what it is for one to be able to do something is for one's choice to be effective. T…Read more
  •  67
    The best candidate approach to diachronic identity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4). 1987.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  61
    The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamples
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 333-37. 1996.
    In 1962 Hilary Putnam forced us to face the possibility of robot cats. More than twenty years later Daniel Dennett found himself doing battle with mad scientists and other “bogeymen.” Though these two examples are employed in different philosophical arena, there is an important connection between them that has not been emphasized. Separating the concept associated with a kind term from the extension of that term, as Putnam and others have urged, raises the possibility of accepting counterexample…Read more
  •  58
    Five layers of interpretation for possible worlds
    Philosophical Studies 90 (2): 205-214. 1998.
  •  56
    Hudson fine tunes his way to hyperspace (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2). 2008.
  •  53
    Painted Mules and the Cartesian Circle
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1). 1996.
    René Descartes, one of the dominant figures in the history of philosophy, has been accused of one of the most obvious mistakes in the history of philosophy — the so-called cartesian circle. It is my goal in this paper to arrive at an understanding of Descartes's work that attributes to him a theory that should be of philosophical interest to contemporary epistemologists, is consistent with, and suggested by, the actual text, and avoids the circle.I begin with a brief explanation of the supposed …Read more
  •  52
    Metaphysical boundaries: A question of independence
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3). 1989.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  50
    Might-counterfactuals and gratuitous differences
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1). 1995.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  47
    Putnam, Reference, and Realism
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1): 113-127. 1988.
  •  44
    Practically Strange (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1): 203. 1996.
    In Eli Hirsch’s clever and careful Dividing Reality he asks us to consider several strange languages. For example, in the Gricular language there is no word that applies to all and only green things and none that applies to all and only circular things, but there are the three words “gricular,” which applies to anything that is either green or circular, “grincular,” which applies to anything that is either green or not circular, and “ngricular,” which applies to anything that is either circular …Read more