Mark McBride

My task here is to articulate my own novel hybrid theory of (claim-)rights, namely, the Tracking Theory of rights. While new, it has historical antecedents. There is nothing (entirely) new under the sun. Its most vivid antecedents come from the fields of epistemology, in particular Robert Nozick's work, and legal philosophy, in particular Gopal Sreenivasan's work. I am happy to stand on the shoulders of giants. Here I want to freshly articulate the theory from the ground up. So the challenge will be to keep the articulation of the Tracking Theory front and centre, but, naturally, indebtedness to Nozick and Sreenivasan will be woven in at multiple junctures. My Tracking Theory will neither stand nor fall with Nozick's. The relation is more subtle. The strategy is to trade on the indubitable subtlety of Nozick's epistemology to capture the structure of a central normative concept.

This is the first book to bring together distinguished jurisprudential theorists, as well as up-and-coming scholars, to critically assess the nature of legal reasoning. The volume is divided into 3 parts: The first part, General Jurisprudence and Legal Reasoning, addresses issues at the intersection of general jurisprudence - those pertaining to the nature of law itself - and legal reasoning. The second part, Rules and Reasons, addresses two concepts central to two prominent types of theory of legal reasoning. The essays in the third and final part, Doctrine and Practice, delve into the mechanics of legal practice and doctrine, from a legal reasoning perspective.

Professor Matthew Kramer is one of the most important legal philosophers of our time - even if the label 'legal philosopher' does not do justice to the breadth of his work. This collection of essays brings together esteemed philosophers, as well as junior scholars, to critically assess Kramer's philosophy. The contributions focus on Kramer's work on legal philosophy, metaethics, normative ethics, and political philosophy. The volume is divided into six parts, each focusing on different aspect of Kramer's work. The first part, Rights and Right-holding, contains five essays addressing Kramer's work on rights and right-holding, including the Hohfeldian analysis and the interest theory of right-holding. The four essays in the second part, General Jurisprudence, focus on Kramer's work in general jurisprudence, from the compatibility of legal positivism with universal legal error, to his robust defense of inclusive legal positivism, concluding with reflections on his writings on the rule of law. The third part, General Matters of Ethics, contains two essays addressing Kramer's metaethical work on moral realism as a moral doctrine. The fourth and fifth parts, Freedom and Liberalism, have four essays falling within political philosophy, probing Kramer's work on negative freedom and political liberalism, respectively. The sixth part, Applied Ethics, contains two essays on Kramer's work on capital punishment and freedom of expression. The collection is rounded off by reflections on, and replies to, the contributions by Kramer himself.

My task here is to articulate my own novel hybrid theory of (claim-)rights, namely, the Tracking Theory of rights. While new, it has historical antecedents. There is nothing (entirely) new under the sun. Its most vivid antecedents come from the fields of epistemology, in particular Robert Nozick's work, and legal philosophy, in particular Gopal Sreenivasan's work. I am happy to stand on the shoulders of giants. Here I want to freshly articulate the theory from the ground up. So the challenge will be to keep the articulation of the Tracking Theory front and centre, but, naturally, indebtedness to Nozick and Sreenivasan will be woven in at multiple junctures. My Tracking Theory will neither stand nor fall with Nozick's. The relation is more subtle. The strategy is to trade on the indubitable subtlety of Nozick's epistemology to capture the structure of a central normative concept.

My task here is to articulate my own novel hybrid theory of (claim-)rights, namely, the Tracking Theory of rights. While new, it has historical antecedents. There is nothing (entirely) new under the sun. Its most vivid antecedents come from the fields of epistemology, in particular Robert Nozick's work, and legal philosophy, in particular Gopal Sreenivasan's work. I am happy to stand on the shoulders of giants. Here I want to freshly articulate the theory from the ground up. So the challenge will be to keep the articulation of the Tracking Theory front and centre, but, naturally, indebtedness to Nozick and Sreenivasan will be woven in at multiple junctures. My Tracking Theory will neither stand nor fall with Nozick's. The relation is more subtle. The strategy is to trade on the indubitable subtlety of Nozick's epistemology to capture the structure of a central normative concept.

My task here is to articulate my own novel hybrid theory of (claim-)rights, namely, the Tracking Theory of rights. While new, it has historical antecedents. There is nothing (entirely) new under the sun. Its most vivid antecedents come from the fields of epistemology, in particular Robert Nozick's work, and legal philosophy, in particular Gopal Sreenivasan's work. I am happy to stand on the shoulders of giants. Here I want to freshly articulate the theory from the ground up. So the challenge will be to keep the articulation of the Tracking Theory front and centre, but, naturally, indebtedness to Nozick and Sreenivasan will be woven in at multiple junctures. My Tracking Theory will neither stand nor fall with Nozick's. The relation is more subtle. The strategy is to trade on the indubitable subtlety of Nozick's epistemology to capture the structure of a central normative concept.

ABSTRACTAccording to interest theorists of rights, rights function to protect the right-holder's interests. True. But this leaves a lot unsaid. Most saliently here, it is certainly not the case that every agent who stands to benefit from performance of a duty gets to be a right-holder. For a theory to allow this to be the case—to allow for an explosion of right-holders—would be tantamount to a reductio thereof. So the challenge for interest theorists is to respect the core of the interest theory while delimiting the set of right-holders in a principled manner. The foremost explicit attempt to do this has invoked Bentham's test. Predictably, invocation of this test has come under attack, with the ultimate aim of challenging the interest theory itself. My purpose in this paper is to render Bentham's test as clearly and accurately as possible. Doing so will raise issues of modality—ultimately in rendering Bentham's test's logical form. Ultimately a core attack on Bentham's test falls away, and, to that extent, the interest theory remains standing as a promising theory of rights.

Scott Shapiro, a prominent defender of exclusive legal positivism—exclusivism—has intriguingly (re)introduced a logical principle, the endorsement and rejection of which he (I take it) supposes can helpfully distinguish exclusivism from its contrary, inclusive legal positivism—inclusivism. It is an intriguing thought that principles pitched at such a high level of abstraction as this could distinguish between the two versions of positivism. My aim will be to test whether this principle—and associated principles—can do such distinguishing work.

This original collection of jurisprudential essays furthers our understanding of the nature of rights. In Part 1, Halpin considers the value of Hohfeldian neutrality when theorising about law in general, and legal rights in particular, and Kurki focuses on Hohfeld's operative notion of power. In Part 2, Kramer rebuts Wenar's objections to his Interest Theory of rights, and May provides a comparative defence of the Interest Theory against Wenar's Kind-Desire theory of claim-rights. Penner then pursues legal doctrine, focusing on whether judges hold the powers of their office as rights, an issue over which Wenar and Kramer have clashed. Sreenivasan, utilising a novel test case involving pure public goods, argues that the third party beneficiary objection to the Interest Theory is fatal. McBride builds on Sreenivasan's Hybrid Theory of claim-rights to construct his new Tracking Theory of rights. Cruft then argues that the best extant versions of the Interest and Will Theories of rights cannot avoid a form of circularity, and Van Duffel argues that meeting four adequacy constraints, which he proposes, counts in favour of any theory of rights. In Part 3, Andersson proposes a tie breaking procedure for rights conflicts in the applied realm of politics, and Steiner concludes by alleging that Kant's principle of right, a standard of corrective justice, has distributive implications. 'A fine collection of cutting-edge essays on the most important normative concept of modernity.' Professor Leif Wenar, King's College London 'This important collection proceeds much beyond the famous 1998 A Debate Over Rights which sets the stage for the debates concerning rights since then. It explores three aspects of rights. First it re-examines the Hohfeldian classification and highlights its importance and relevance. Second it investigates and develops the debates between the interest and the will theory. It includes essays by the main established proponents of these two positions as well as essays by newcomers to this field. The different essays in this part address each other in ways which sharpen and clarify the disagreements and provide new original arguments for the contending views. Last, it provides a new perspective on the debates concerning conflicts of rights and the ways to overcome them. This collection will no doubt dominate the future conceptual discussions concerning the nature of rights and their role in political theory.' Professor Alon Harel, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

How do we know what we know? In this stimulating and rigorous book, Mark McBride explores two sets of issues in contemporary epistemology: the problems that warrant transmission poses for the category of basic knowledge; and the status of conclusive reasons, sensitivity, and safety as conditions that are necessary for knowledge. To have basic knowledge is to know some proposition immediately, i.e., knowledge that doesn't depend on justification for any other proposition. This book considers several puzzles that arise when you take seriously the possibility that we can have basic knowledge. McBride's analysis draws together two vital strands in contemporary epistemology that are usually treated in isolation from each other. Additionally, its innovative arguments include a new application of the safety condition to the law. This book will be of interest to epistemologists―both professionals and students.

Some philosophers claim that there are no genuine instances of transmission failure provided we operate with the right account of thesources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning. My aim in this paper is to clear the way for instances of transmission failure regardless of the account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning with which one operates. My aim is not to claim there are in fact genuine instances of transmission failure; merely to render it possible, on all – or most – plausible accounts of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning.

I want to consider a puzzle in the realm of confirmation theory. The puzzle arises from consideration of reasoning with an argument, given certain epistemological commitments. Here is the argument (preceded by the stipulated justification for the first premise):(JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) The table looks red.(EK) (1) The table is red.(2) If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining on it.(3) The table is not white with red lights shining on it.(EK) – the easy knowledge argument – has received much epistemological scrutiny of late. My aim, in this discussion note, is to set out an example, leading to the puzzle, putatively troubling for dogmatism. The puzzle takes the form of a pair of arguments which I take to be extractable from the recent work of a number of prominent epistemologists. My aim is modest: I seek not novelty, but rather merely to tie together accessibly some interesting recent work towards the formal end of epistemology which bears on cruxes at the heart of traditional epistemology.

Stewart Cohen (2002; 2005) considers a case where his son wants a red table for his room. Cohen and his son go to the furniture store. Cohen’s son is concerned that the table his father is considering purchasing, which appears red, may in fact be white with red lights shining on it. Cohen responds with the following reasoning:(WARRANT FOR 1) The table looks red.(EK) (1) The table is red.(2) If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining on it.(3) The table is not white with red lights shining on it.If one reasons thus, say one’s engaged in EK-reasoning. Cohen finds such a response unsatisfactory. It is not a way of coming to know (3)—it is too easy. And structurally similar reasoning delivers (knowledge of) the falsity of sceptical hypotheses concerning the external world, testimony, other minds etc. So the unsatisfactoriness threatens to generalise. I sketch (one strand of) José Zalabardo’s (2005) original and heterodox attempt to diagnose this unsatisfactoriness, and explore its upshots

Suppose one has a visual experience as of having hands, and then reasons as follows: I have hands, If I have hands an external world exists; An external world exists. Suppose one’s visual experience gives one defeasible perceptual warrant, or justification, to believe – that is, one’s experience makes it epistemically appropriate to believe . And suppose one comes to believe on the basis of this visual experience. The conditional premise is knowable a priori. And can be established by modus ponens inference. If one reasons thus, say one’s engaged in -reasoning. What, if anything, is wrong with -reasoning? I consider two prominent responses to this question – the dogmatists’ and Crispin Wright’s. Each finds fault in -reasoning, but on different grounds. I argue Wright’s response faces a problem which is standardly only taken to be faced by dogmatists

Stewart Cohen considers a case where his son wants a red table for his room. Cohen and his son go to the furniture store. Cohen’s son is concerned that the table his father is considering purchasing, which appears red, may in fact be white with red lights shining on it. Cohen responds with the following reasoning: The table looks red. The table is red. If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining on it. The table is not white with red lights shining on it. If one reasons thus, say one’s engaged in -reasoning. Cohen finds such a response unsatisfactory. It is not a way of coming to know —it is too easy. And structurally similar reasoning delivers the falsity of sceptical hypotheses concerning the external world, testimony, other minds etc. So the unsatisfactoriness threatens to generalise. I consider Martin Davies ’s attempt to diagnose this unsatisfactoriness and find it incomplete. I then attempt to remedy the incompleteness in Davies ’s attempt.

John Hawthorne has two forceful arguments in favour of:Single-Premise Closure Necessarily, if S knows p, competently deduces q from p, and thereby comes to believe q, while retaining knowledge of p throughout, then S knows q.Each of Hawthorne's arguments rests on an intuitively appealing principle which Hawthorne calls the Equivalence Principle. I show, however, that the opponents of SPC with whom he's engaging - namely Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick - have independent reason to reject this principle, and resultantly conclude that Hawthorne's arguments in favour of SPC are not knock-down.

Take the following principle (or schema) as the focus of the ensuing discussion (“P” and “Q” are placeholders for propositions): 1 (Closure) If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P, thereby coming to believe Q, while retaining one's knowledge that P, one comes to know that Q. My strategy in outline: first, I want to set out Fred Dretske's classic challenge to (Closure) – a challenge which began in 1970–1971. Then I want to consider a specific, recent counter‐challenge to Dretske's challenge to (Closure) mounted by John Hawthorne, and to defend Dretske's challenge from Hawthorne's counter‐challenge. Doing this is not to invalidate (Closure). In this regard my conclusions are modest: Dretske's challenge to (Closure) is – or, better: can be made – sophisticated and, so far, unmet.

This article addresses the question of whether judges can take the internal point of view towardtheir legal system's rule of recognition for purely prudential reasons. It takes a fresh look at an underappreciated conceptual argument of Joseph Raz's that answers: no. In a nutshell, Raz argues that purely prudential reasons are reasons of the wrong kind for judges to accept their legal system's rule of recognition. And should Raz's argument succeed, an important necessary connection between law and morality would be established