Mark Peterson

In the early years of the 20th century, physicists bumped into the quantum level of observation. They began to experience problems with their observations which, disturbingly, seemed to suggest as much about the underlying psychological foundation of the scientist as about the universe—or worse, which suggested that these two might somehow be internally related. Heisenberg and Gödel, among others, raised questions that science was hard pressed to answer. Quantum wave theory and relativity involved the observer in the observation, but paradoxes seemed to result from attempts to describe how they are related.

The Philosophy of Nature does not begin, as we expect, with nature. Instead, Hegel describes the practical and theoretical approaches we make to nature as philosophers; that is, in thought and, metaphorically, with our teeth. This ledge on the climb into nature is often overlooked as we rush from the logic into space and time. There may be two reasons for this. The first is a natural expectation that a philosophy of nature begin by describing natural phenomena, not our approaches to them. The second is that the terms ‘practical’ and ‘theoretical’, familiar from the Logic and Philosophy of Spirit, may seem at first glance to be out of place here. Whatever the reason, these paragraphs have not been discussed at any length in the secondary literature.

In the early years of the 20th century, physicists bumped into the quantum level of observation. They began to experience problems with their observations which, disturbingly, seemed to suggest as much about the underlying psychological foundation of the scientist as about the universe—or worse, which suggested that these two might somehow be internally related. Heisenberg and Gödel, among others, raised questions that science was hard pressed to answer. Quantum wave theory and relativity involved the observer in the observation, but paradoxes seemed to result from attempts to describe how they are related.

The Philosophy of Nature does not begin, as we expect, with nature. Instead, Hegel describes the practical and theoretical approaches we make to nature as philosophers; that is, in thought and, metaphorically, with our teeth. This ledge on the climb into nature is often overlooked as we rush from the logic into space and time. There may be two reasons for this. The first is a natural expectation that a philosophy of nature begin by describing natural phenomena, not our approaches to them. The second is that the terms ‘practical’ and ‘theoretical’, familiar from the Logic and Philosophy of Spirit, may seem at first glance to be out of place here. Whatever the reason, these paragraphs have not been discussed at any length in the secondary literature.