•  15
    Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis (review)
    Philosophical Studies 129 (3): 645-665. 2005.
    I discuss Soames's proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore's moral philossophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore's epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In view of the distance between something's being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames's proposal is mistaken
  •  1
    Descartes
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149): 453-458. 1987.
  •  88
    Russell on Acquaintance
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 20 219-244. 1986.
    In Russell's Problems of Philosophy , acquaintance is the basis of thought and also the basis of empirical knowledge. Thought is based on acquaintance, in that a thinker has to be acquainted with the basic constituents of his thoughts. Empirical knowledge is based on acquaintance, in that acquaintance is involved in perception, and perception is the ultimate source of all empirical knowledge.
  • Thinking About Things
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Mark Sainsbury presents an original account of how language works when describing mental states, based on a new theory of what is involved in attributing attitudes like thinking, hoping, and wanting. He offers solutions to longstanding puzzles about how we can direct our thought to such a diversity of things, including things that do not exist.
  • Indexicals and Reported Speech
    In Timothy Smiley (ed.), Philosophical Logic, . pp. 45-69. 1998.
  • Paradoxes
    Philosophy 65 (251): 106-111. 1990.
  •  304
    The review praises the philosophical quality, but is less enthusiastic about the scholarship and historical accuracy.
  •  70
    Sorites paradoxes and the transition question
    Philosophical Papers 21 (3): 177-190. 1992.
    This discusses the kind of paradox that has since become known as "the forced march sorites", here called "the transition question". The question is whether this is really a new kind of paradox, or the familiar sorites in unfamiliar garb. The author argues that resources adequate to deal with ordinary sorites are sufficient to deal with the transition question, and tentatively proposes an affirmative answer.
  •  7
    III—Tolerating Vagueness
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 33-48. 1989.
  •  78
    Rejoinder to Rasmussen
    Analysis 44 (3). 1984.
  •  277
    one hand, it raises fundamental doubts about the Davidsonian project, which seems to involve isolating specifically semantic knowledge from any other knowledge or skill in a way reflected by the ideal of homophony. Indexicality forces a departure from this ideal, and so from the aspiration of deriving the truth conditions of an arbitrary utterance on the basis simply of axioms which could hope to represent purely semantic knowledge. In defence of Davidson, I argue that once his original idea for…Read more
  •  22
    Hume seems to tell us that our ideas are copies of our corresponding impres-sions, that we have an idea of necessary connection, but that we have no corresponding impression, since nothing can be known to be really necessarily connected. The paper considers two ways of reinterpreting the doctrine of the origins of ideas so as to avoid the apparent inconsistency. If we see the doctrine as concerned primarily with establishing conditions under which we possess an idea, there is no need for an idea…Read more
  • Russell
    In Ted Honderich (ed.), The Philosophers: Introducing Great Western Thinkers, Oxford University Press. 1999.
  •  127
    Easy possibilities
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 907-919. 1997.
  •  97
    Why the World Cannot be Vague
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1): 63-81. 1995.
  • Book reviews (review)
    Mind 88 (1): 604-607. 1979.
  •  35
    Tolerating Vagueness
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89. 1989.
  •  22
    Evidence for Meaning
    Mind and Language 1 (1): 64-82. 1986.
  •  84
    Logical Forms explains both the detailed problems involved in finding logical forms and also the theoretical underpinnings of philosophical logic. In this revised edition, exercises are integrated throughout the book. The result is a genuinely interactive introduction which engages the reader in developing the argument. Each chapter concludes with updated notes to guide further reading
  •  40
    Saying and conveying
    Linguistics and Philosophy 7 (4). 1984.
  •  19
    Logical Forms: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic
    with T. S. Champlin
    Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167): 243. 1992.
    Logical Forms explains both the detailed problems involved in finding logical forms and also the theoretical underpinnings of philosophical logic. In this revised edition, exercises are integrated throughout the book. The result is a genuinely interactive introduction which engages the reader in developing the argument. Each chapter concludes with updated notes to guide further reading
  •  29
    I–R.M. Sainsbury
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1): 243-269. 1999.
  •  33
    Facts and Free Logic
    ProtoSociology 26. 2006.
    Comment on S. Neale's, "Facts and Free Logic".
  •  21
    Rational dialetheism is the view that for some contradictions, it is rational to believe that they are true. The view, associated with the work of among others, Graham Priest, looks as if it must lead to absurd consequences, and the present paper is an unsuccessful attempt to find them. In particular, I suggest that there is no non-question-begging account of acceptance, denial and negation which can be brought to bear against the rational dialetheist. Finally, I consider the prospect of attacki…Read more